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-SUMMARY IN FRENCH- 
RÉSUMÉ EN FRANÇAIS 
Instruments Politiques, Recherche et 
Développement, Innovations, et Diffusion de la 
Technologie dans une Structure Nord-Sud 
CHAPITRE 0 – Introduction Générale 
La question des innovations technologiques est prépondérante en économie. Elle rejoint l’accès à des 
biens et services nouveaux, parfois de plus haute qualité, pour le consommateur. Elle est liée 
également à la question de la compétitivité des offreurs d’un pays qui se définit comme la capacité à 
vendre face à une concurrence internationale. Cette compétitivité contient d’ailleurs deux volets : la 
compétitivité-prix et la compétitivité hors-prix. La première correspond à la capacité de vendre un 
produit à caractéristiques équivalentes de ceux des concurrents mais à un prix plus faible. Ainsi, être 
plus compétitif passe par la réduction des coûts de production. Les innovations peuvent être source de 
compétitivité-prix si elles sont réductrices de coûts de production (cost-reducing). La seconde 
correspond à la capacité de vendre un produit à un prix identique de ceux des concurrents mais avec 
des caractéristiques différentes (notamment à qualité supérieure). Les innovations peuvent alors 
stimuler la compétitivité hors-prix si elles permettent de différentier le produit final verticalement par 
rapport à ceux des concurrents.  
Un indicateur potentiel d’innovations technologiques correspond aux dépenses d’investissement en 
Recherche et Développement (R&D). Il s’agit d’un investissement dans la connaissance qui se définit 
comme « les travaux de création entrepris de façon systématique en vue d’accroitre la somme des 
connaissances, y compris la connaissance de l’homme, de la culture et de la société, ainsi que 
l’utilisation de cette somme de connaissances pour de nouvelles applications » et regroupe « la 
recherche fondamentale », « la recherche appliquée » et « le développement expérimental » (Source : 
Définition de l’INSEE). Comme nous l’avons précisé avec la compétitivité précédemment, il y a deux 
types d’investissement en R&D. Le premier type correspond à la R&D de procédé (process R&D) 
qui est réductrice de coûts de production (cost-reducing R&D). Ce type d’investissement permet 
alors d’augmenter la compétitivité-prix. Le second correspond à la R&D de produit (product R&D) 
qui est innovatrice en termes de caractéristiques du produit vendu. Il engendre alors une hausse de la 
compétitivité hors-prix en contribuant à différentier le produit verticalement de ceux des concurrents.  
En économie internationale, la littérature a d’abord étudié le concept d’investissement en R&D dans 
un cadre théorique. Le modèle de référence est celui de Brander et Spencer (1983). Les auteurs 
utilisent un modèle d’équilibre partiel en duopole où les firmes investissent en R&D. Il s’agit en 
l’occurrence d’un investissement en R&D réducteur de coût de production. La structure est 
particulière : le jeu s’effectue sur l’investissement en R&D. Ainsi, à l’équilibre, les firmes choisissent 
un niveau optimal d’investissement en R&D maximisant leur profit. Elles choisissent ensuite le niveau 
optimal de production ; les auteurs faisant l’hypothèse d’une concurrence de type Cournot (sur les 
quantités produites). D’autres études s’intéressent au cas de la R&D de produit. Il est montré d’ailleurs 
que les firmes ont tendance à investir plutôt en R&D de produit au début du cycle de vie d’un produit 
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puis en  R&D de procédé à la fin (Utterback et Abernaty, 1975 ; Klepper, 1996). Le modèle 
théorique de référence en présence de R&D de produit est celui de Park (2001). Il considère un 
duopole avec une firme d’un pays riche produisant un bien de haute qualité (high-tech firm) et une 
firme d’un pays en développement produisant un bien de faible qualité (low-tech firm). Chaque firme 
vend son bien dans un pays tiers. La qualité dépend des dépenses en R&D réalisées. La différentiation 
verticale entre les deux produits provient bien de la différence en termes d’investissement en R&D.  
L’investissement en R&D a une importance cruciale pour les économies industrialisées qui font face à 
une concurrence croissante de pays disposant d’avantages compétitifs liés à des coûts de production 
plus faibles, notamment un coût du travail bon marché. La question est de savoir comment ces 
économies développées peuvent stimuler les innovations technologiques domestiques, c’est-à-dire les 
dépenses en R&D. Il convient de s’intéresser à l’impact potentiel de la mise en place d’instruments 
politiques mis en place par les pouvoirs publics de ces pays afin d’identifier des leviers qui permettent 
d’encourager les innovations.  
Si l’importance de la technologie au niveau de la compétitivité d’un pays et de ses indicateurs 
économiques et commerciaux est incontestable, celle de sa protection et de sa diffusion l’est tout 
autant. Dès qu’un innovateur découvre une nouvelle technologie ou crée un produit nouveau, il 
dispose d’un monopole temporel sur l’utilisation de cette nouvelle technologie ou sur la vente de ce 
produit nouveau. Nous parlons d’ailleurs d’une durée de monopole pour l’innovateur. Celle-ci 
correspond également à la rapidité de la diffusion technologique vers les concurrents. Elle dépend de 
la capacité des concurrents à innover en investissant en R&D également. Mais dans le cadre des pays 
en développement, les niveaux des dépenses en R&D sont assez faibles. Ils profitent plutôt d’effets de 
débordement, autrement appelés spillovers, provenant des innovations effectuées par les pays riches 
plutôt que de réaliser leurs propres innovations. La diffusion technologique est effectivement cruciale 
pour les économies du Sud. Précédemment, nous avons précisé l’importance des innovations 
technologiques pour les économies riches tant elles pouvaient stimuler leur compétitivité face à une 
concurrence de plus en plus importante du monde émergent. La question de la diffusion technologique 
met en avant une réelle problématique de développement économique, humain, social ou encore 
sociétal pour les pays à revenu modeste. La diffusion de la technologie est un processus qui peut être 
difficilement remis en cause à l’échelle mondiale, mis à part dans les pays les moins avancés, 
éventuellement, qui ont pour l’instant un retard structurel trop important. Sinon, le réel débat n’est pas 
de savoir si la diffusion de la technologie va avoir lieu entre pays du Nord et pays du Sud mais plutôt 
de savoir à quelle vitesse. La variable à analyser est donc la rapidité de la diffusion technologique. 
La littérature économique s’est également intéressée à la question de la diffusion technologique en 
illustrant trois sources principales de diffusion : le commerce international, les IDE et les spillovers 
de R&D (Keller, 2004). Un apport important est celui de Grossman et Helpman (1991). Ils 
démontrent, dans une structure théorique, l’importance du commerce des biens intermédiaires comme 
déterminant de la vitesse de la diffusion technologique. Au niveau de la mesure de la diffusion 
technologique, l’élasticité de la Productivité Totale des Facteurs (Total Factor Productivity) par 
rapport à différents facteurs de diffusion tels que le commerce ou les IDE est un instrument potentiel 
(Keller, 2002). Un autre instrument potentiel correspond aux collaborations de brevets entre pays 
(Fleming et al., 2007 ; Guan et Chen ; 2012).  
La question est de savoir de quelle manière les instruments politiques peuvent influencer la vitesse de 
diffusion technologique entre pays riches et pays en développement. En effet, une fois avoir identifié 
l’impact des instruments politiques mis en place par les gouvernements des pays riches sur 
l’investissement en R&D local, il faut également analyser l’impact sur la diffusion de la technologie 
-SUMMARY IN FRENCH- 
3 
 
vers les pays à revenu modeste. De la même manière, il peut être intéressant d’étudier l’impact 
d’instruments politiques mis en place également par les pays du Sud pour voir s’il peut y avoir un 
intérêt notamment en accélérant la diffusion de la technologie.  
Le but de ce travail est de fournir des éléments de réponses aux questions suivantes : 
§ Les firmes issues de pays riches sont-elles incitées à innover lorsque leur gouvernement 
domestique met en place des instruments politiques ? 
§ Les résultats sont-ils robustes à un changement de type de R&D (de procédé ou de produit) ? 
§ Ces instruments politiques accélèrent-ils ou ralentissent-ils la diffusion de la technologie vers les 
pays émergents ? 
§ Quels sont les déterminants empiriques significatifs de cette diffusion de la technologie ? 
CHAPITRE 1 – Instruments Politiques, Recherche et Développement 
Réductrice de Coûts, et Incertitude dans un Duopole Nord-Sud1 
Les pays du Nord font face à une concurrence croissante des pays du Sud qui bénéficient de coûts de 
production plus faibles, via un coût du travail bon marché notamment. Les décideurs politiques des 
pays industrialisés cherchent à mettre en œuvre des moyens permettant d’inciter les producteurs 
locaux à innover, via un investissement en R&D, afin de limiter les coûts de production. Un certain 
nombre d’études théoriques ont montré que la mise en place d’instruments politiques pouvait stimuler 
la R&D domestique : une subvention de la R&D (Spencer et Brander, 1983 ; Leahy et Neary, 
1997), une subvention de la production (Leahy et Neary, 1997) ou encore un tarif sur importations 
(Krugman, 1984 ; Reitzes, 1991 ; Bouët, 2001). En contrepartie, des restrictions quantitatives sur le 
commerce peuvent être néfastes (Reitzes, 1991 ; Bouët, 2001).  
Ce premier chapitre fournit une analyse exclusivement théorique quant à l’impact d’une sélection 
d’instruments politiques, notamment de politique commerciale, sur l’investissement en R&D. Il 
convient alors de considérer un cas de figure simple d’un duopole Nord-Sud. Chaque firme vend une 
partie de sa production localement et exporte le reste vers le pays étranger. La firme du Sud bénéficie 
d’un coût marginal faible lié à un coût du travail bon marché. De ce fait, elle n’investit pas en R&D. 
Concernant la firme du Nord, nous reprenons l’hypothèse d’incertitude quant au résultat de la R&D 
illustrée par Bouët (2001). L’investissement en R&D peut se traduire par une réussite. Dans ce cas, le 
coût marginal de la firme du Nord est faible, comme celui de la firme du Sud.  Mais il peut également 
se traduire par un échec. Dans ce cas, le coût marginal est plus élevé que celui de la firme du Sud. 
L’investissement en R&D se traduit par une réussite sous une probabilité qui dépend positivement du 
niveau de cette R&D mais avec des rendements décroissants. Cette hypothèse de rendements 
décroissants est très importante car elle conditionne la majorité des résultats de ce chapitre. Elle est 
d’ailleurs tirée de la littérature économique (Spencer et Brander, 1983 ; Reitzes, 1991). La firme du 
Nord va chercher à maximiser un niveau d’espérance de profit compte tenu du résultat incertain de la 
R&D. Pour cela, elle choisit le niveau de R&D optimal. L’investissement en R&D est coûteux et 
s’ajoute au coût total de production, pesant ainsi sur le profit espéré. À partir de l’hypothèse de 
rendements décroissants de la R&D, nous pouvons démontrer que l’investissement en R&D 
d’équilibre est une fonction croissante de ce que nous appelons le différentiel de profit de la firme du 
Nord et décroissante du coût unitaire de la R&D. Ce différentiel désigne la différence entre le profit de 
la firme du Nord en cas de réussite de la R&D et celui en cas d’échec de la R&D. Une fois que la 
                                                          
1
 Ce chapitre a été coécrit  avec Antoine Bouët (LAREFI, Université de Bordeaux ; IFPRI, Washington) et a 
fait l’objet d’une publication dans la Revue Économique (Berthoumieu et Bouët, 2016).  
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firme du Nord a choisi son niveau optimal de R&D, les deux firmes se concurrencent et maximisent 
leur profit en fonction du résultat de la R&D. Nous considérons deux types de concurrence : Cournot 
(sur les quantités produites) et Bertrand (sur les prix). Nous vérifions ainsi si les résultats tiennent avec 
un changement de mode de concurrence.  
Nous étudions l’impact de la mise en place de deux types d’instrument politique par le gouvernement 
du pays du Nord sur l’investissement en R&D de la firme du Nord. Nous intégrons des instruments 
mis en place au niveau des frontières (“at-the-border” policy instruments) : un tarif sur 
importations, des restrictions quantitatives (quota et restrictions volontaires aux exportations) et un 
prix-minimum. Nous intégrons des instruments mis en place derrière les frontières (“behind-the-
border” policy instruments) : une subvention de la production et une subvention de la R&D. Pour 
cibler l’impact de ces instruments sur la R&D, il faut étudier celui sur le différentiel de profit 
mentionné précédemment. Dans ce chapitre, nous considérons que le gouvernement du Sud reste en 
« libre-échange » et ne met pas en place d’instrument politique. En effet, nous justifions les 
instruments politiques mis en place par le Nord par le fait que le gouvernement cherche à mettre en 
place des outils stimulant l’innovation pour palier au désavantage compétitif vis-à-vis de la firme du 
Sud. L’intégration d’instruments politiques mis en place par le Sud laisserait la place à une autre 
problématique.  
Les résultats montrent que chaque instrument politique augmente le niveau de R&D de la firme du 
Nord mis à part les restrictions quantitatives. La mise en place de ces instruments entraine un transfert 
de profit de la firme du Sud vers la firme du Nord (profit-shifting). Ce transfert de profit est d’autant 
plus important que le coût marginal de la firme du Nord est faible. La firme du Nord est incitée à 
augmenter son investissement en R&D afin d’augmenter la probabilité de réussite de cet 
investissement. Néanmoins, l’analyse de l’impact de la mise en place d’un quota sur importations fait 
figure de cas particulier. Nous distinguons deux cas de figure : la mise en place d’un quota 
relativement restrictif et celle d’un quota très restrictif. Dans le premier cas, il s’agit d’un quota tel 
qu’il ne soit restrictif qu’en cas d’échec de la R&D. Un quota engendre une hausse du profit de la 
firme domestique car la concurrence de la firme étrangère diminue. Ici, le profit de la firme du Nord 
n’augmente qu’en cas d’échec de la R&D. Dans ce cas, la firme du Nord réduit son investissement en 
R&D par rapport à la situation de libre-échange. Dans le second cas, le quota est restrictif quel que soit 
le résultat de la R&D. La mise en place du quota peut alors soit augmenter soit diminuer 
l’investissement en R&D de la firme du Nord. Nous démontrons d’ailleurs qu’il existe un seuil tel que 
l’investissement en R&D soit exactement égal à celui de libre-échange. L’investissement en R&D 
devient plus fort qu’en libre-échange avec un quota plus restrictif que ce seuil. Il est intéressant de voir 
la différence qu’il peut y avoir entre la mise en place d’un quota et celle d’un tarif sur importations 
alors que chacun engendre une baisse des importations domestiques. Cela provient du fait que le quota 
engendre un changement dans la relation stratégique entre les firmes contrairement à un tarif 
(Bhagwati, 1968 ; Krishna, 1989). Avec un quota restrictif, la firme du Nord bénéficie d’un avantage 
informationnel car elle connait déjà le volume maximum que peut exporter la firme du Sud (qui est 
fixé par le gouvernement). En concurrence de type Cournot, la firme du Sud n’exporte plus le volume 
optimal vers le pays du Nord. La firme du Nord choisit bien le niveau optimal de vente locale mais 
sans tenir compte de la condition de premier ordre de la firme du Sud. Les résultats sont robustes au 
type de concurrence (Cournot ou Bertrand).  
Nous effectuons également une analyse de bien-être afin de vérifier que le gouvernement du Nord ait 
bien un intérêt à mettre en place chaque instrument politique. Cela permet également de déterminer 
quel est l’instrument favori du gouvernement du Nord. Pour cela, nous posons une fonction de bien-
être national espéré du pays du Nord qui est la somme du profit espéré de la firme du Nord, du surplus 
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du consommateur espéré et des recettes publiques espérées dans le pays du Nord. Les résultats 
montrent que chacun des instruments étudiés augmentent le bien-être national espéré du pays du Nord. 
Avec une concurrence de type Cournot, l’instrument favori est une subvention de la production. 
Malgré le coût en termes de dépenses publiques, elle permet d’augmenter fortement le profit espéré de 
la firme du Nord via un soutien direct (des recettes directes) mais aussi le surplus du consommateur en 
réduisant les prix. Avec une concurrence de type Bertrand, l’instrument favori devient le tarif sur les 
importations. Il permet d’augmenter le profit espéré de la firme du Nord et de créer des recettes 
publiques supplémentaires malgré une baisse du surplus du consommateur espéré. L’effet l’emporte 
sur celui de la subvention à la production. En effet, la concurrence de type Bertrand est plus 
concurrentielle que celle de type Cournot. Une subvention de la production réduit les niveaux de prix 
de manière trop importante ce qui stimule fortement la demande pour le produit vendu par la firme du 
Nord. De ce fait, les dépenses publiques sont relativement importantes ce qui pèse sur l’effet total 
positif sur le bien-être espéré du Nord.  
CHAPITRE 2 – Différentiation Verticale, Incertitude, Recherche et 
Développement de Produit et Instruments Politiques dans un duopole 
Nord-Sud2 
Le Chapitre 1 illustrait un investissement en R&D de procédés qui était réducteur de coûts. Nous nous 
intéressons maintenant à la R&D de produit. Comme nous l’avons dit précédemment, l’objectif de cet 
investissement n’est pas de réduire les coûts de production mais de différentier les caractéristiques du 
produit final par rapport à ceux des concurrents. Nous nous focalisons sur la différentiation verticale : 
l’investissement en R&D est supposé augmenter la qualité du produit.  
Nous reprenons la même structure Nord-Sud que dans le Chapitre 1. Ce cadre théorique est déjà utilisé 
dans la littérature économique, même au niveau des innovations de produit (Park, 2001 ; Zhou, 
Spencer et Vertinsky, 2002) : les firmes des pays riches sont considérées comme high-tech alors que 
les firmes des pays en développement sont considérées comme low-tech. Seule la firme du Nord 
investit en R&D. L’objectif étant de vendre un produit de plus haute qualité que celui de la firme du 
Sud. De la même manière, le résultat de la R&D est incertain : il peut se solder par une réussite ou un 
échec. En cas de réussite, il y a effectivement différentiation verticale entre les deux produits. La 
principale modification intervient au niveau des fonctions de demande : chaque consommateur a un 
plus fort intérêt pour le produit de la firme du Nord. En cas d’échec, les deux produits sont de qualité 
identique. La firme du Nord cherche donc à maximiser une espérance de profit du fait de l’incertitude. 
Elle choisit donc le niveau d’investissement en R&D optimal. Dans un second temps, les firmes se 
concurrencent sur les prix qu’elles fixent. Nous faisons donc l’hypothèse d’une concurrence de type 
Bertrand. Nous effectuons la même hypothèse de rendements décroissants de la R&D. De ce fait, 
l’investissement en R&D d’équilibre est une fonction croissante d’un différentiel de profit de la firme 
du Nord, comme dans le Chapitre 1. Il s’agit de la différence entre le profit en cas de réussite de la 
R&D, c’est-à-dire en présence de différentiation verticale, et celui en cas d’échec de la R&D. Nous 
analysons l’impact de la mise en place des mêmes instruments politiques que ceux du Chapitre 1. De 
la même manière, seul le gouvernement du Nord met en place ces instruments. Néanmoins, nous 
intégrons un instrument supplémentaire : un standard de qualité. Il s’agit d’un instrument technique 
mis en place par le gouvernement du Nord tel que seuls les produits de haute qualité puissent être 
vendus sur le marché du Nord. Il s’agit alors d’une forme de quota prohibitif.  
                                                          
2
 Ce chapitre a été coécrit avec la doctorante Viola Lamani (LAREFI, Université de Bordeaux) et a fait l’objet 
d’un LAREFI Working Paper (Berthoumieu et Lamani, 2016).  
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Les résultats sont proches de ceux du Chapitre 1. Chaque instrument politique augmente 
l’investissement en R&D mis à part le quota sur importations. Un changement important concerne tout 
de même l’impact d’une subvention de la production dont la démonstration aboutit à un résultat qui 
n’est pas certain. Une explication potentielle est la suivante. La subvention de la production est le seul 
instrument qui engendre une baisse relativement forte des prix fixés par la firme du Nord. Ils 
diminuent plus fortement que ceux de la firme du Sud. La subvention contribue à augmenter les ventes 
locales et les exportations de la firme du Nord, de manière plus importante qu’un tarif par exemple. 
Comme nous l’avons dit précédemment, la principale caractéristique de la différentiation verticale est 
de modifier les fonctions de demande. Avec une subvention de la production, étant donné la hausse 
relativement forte de la demande pour le produit de la firme du Nord, l’incitation à différentier le 
produit verticalement peut être moins forte. Dans le chapitre précédent, le principal effet de la réussite 
de la R&D concernait une baisse du coût marginal de production. Ceci peut expliquer la différence au 
niveau de l’impact de la subvention de la production. Néanmoins, dans ce Chapitre 2, en effectuant des 
simulations numériques et en faisant varier les paramètres du modèle, nous obtenons 
systématiquement un effet positif de la mise en place de la subvention de la production sur 
l’investissement en R&D de la firme du Nord.  
Nous effectuons une analyse de bien-être à l’aide de simulations numériques. La fonction de bien-être 
du pays du Nord est la même que dans le chapitre précédent. L’instrument préféré du gouvernement 
du Nord est systématiquement le tarif sur importations. Il s’agit potentiellement du seul instrument 
pouvant augmenter toutes les composantes du bien-être national. Un résultat important est que le 
surplus du consommateur espéré peut augmenter avec la mise en place du tarif alors que, 
paradoxalement, les prix fixés augmentent. Cela provient du goût du consommateur pour la qualité. Le 
tarif augmente l’investissement en R&D et ainsi la probabilité de réussite de la R&D. Il y a donc une 
plus forte probabilité que le bien produit par la firme du Nord soit de plus haute qualité. Si le 
consommateur est très sensible à la qualité, l’effet sur son surplus peut devenir positif. Nous 
identifions des cas de figure où il augmente, en utilisant des simulations numériques. Nous identifions 
également des cas de figure où un prix-minimum et un standard de qualité peuvent augmenter le 
surplus du consommateur. Mais ces deux instruments précédents ne créent pas de recettes publiques 
supplémentaires, ce qui explique que le tarif est préférable en termes de bien-être.  
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CHAPITRE 3 – Instruments Politiques, Brevets et Diffusion Internationale 
de la Technologie dans un Duopole Nord-Sud3 
Nous étudions maintenant la question de la diffusion technologique. Il s’agit d’un sujet central 
permettant de stimuler le développement économique. Les modèles de croissance endogène ont 
montré que l’acquisition de technologies modernes permet d’augmenter le revenu par tête via la 
productivité des facteurs de production. Le niveau de vie des pays en développement peut ainsi être 
amélioré. Les conditions de travail peuvent également devenir plus favorables.  
La diffusion de la technologie provient de la diffusion de l’information (Geroski, 2000 ; Keller, 
2002). Les nouveaux outils de télécommunication ont un rôle important. Comme nous l’avons 
présenté précédemment, il y a d’autres canaux de diffusion technologique entre pays : le commerce, 
les IDE et les spillovers de R&D. Il s’agit d’un phénomène qui ne peut pas être évité mais 
simplement accéléré ou ralenti. La diffusion de la technologie est très importante pour les pays du Sud. 
Il s’agit de la principale source d’acquisition de technologies modernes puisque le niveau des 
innovations locales reste faible (Keller, 2004). La protection industrielle des inventeurs/innovateurs de 
pays riches peut poser problème. Les inventeurs de certaines technologies peuvent déposer un brevet 
afin de disposer d’un monopole sur son utilisation. Le brevet peut être un frein à la diffusion 
technologique vers les pays du Sud.  
L’objet du chapitre est de modéliser le phénomène de diffusion de la technologie d’une firme d’un 
pays du Nord vers une firme d’un pays du Sud. Il s’agit d’une diffusion inter-firme illustrée à l’aide 
d’une structure dynamique contrairement aux deux premiers chapitres. Nous nous inspirons du modèle 
de Miyagiwa et Ohno (1997) qui adaptent celui de Spencer et Brander (1983) en dynamique. Dans 
leur étude, initialement, deux firmes disposent d’une technologie obsolète et investissent en R&D pour 
découvrir une technologie nouvelle. Il y a une course à la R&D à la fin de laquelle il y a un vainqueur 
qui est la firme qui a découvert la nouvelle technologie la première. La seconde firme continue 
d’investir en R&D jusqu’à la découverte de la nouvelle technologie également. Il y a donc une période 
de monopole pour la première firme quant à l’utilisation de la nouvelle technologie.  
Dans ce chapitre, nous considérons directement une situation asymétrique dès la période Ͳ. La firme 
du Nord dispose d’une technologie nouvelle alors que la firme du Sud dispose d’une technologie 
obsolète. La diffusion de cette nouvelle technologie a lieu à une date ܶ qui se situe sur l’intervalle ሾͲǡλሻ. La firme du Nord publie un brevet sur sa nouvelle technologie dans le but d’augmenter la 
durée de monopole de l’utilisation de la nouvelle technologie. La mise en place du brevet a un effet 
positif sur le profit actualisé de la firme du Nord en augmentant la durée de monopole. Mais en même 
temps, il y a un coût de publication et de maintenance du brevet. À chaque période de temps, la firme 
doit payer des frais de maintenance pour que le brevet reste en vigueur. De ce fait, il existe une durée 
totale de brevet optimale qui maximise le profit actualisé de la firme du Nord. La durée du brevet est 
également appelée « longueur du brevet » (patent length). Ainsi, lorsque la durée du brevet 
augmente, la diffusion de la nouvelle technologie entre la firme du Nord et celle du Sud ralentit. La 
firme du Nord choisit d’abord la durée optimale du brevet maximisant le profit actualisé. Puis, les 
deux firmes se concurrencent sur les quantités produites à chaque point de temps.  
Nous étudions l’impact d’instruments politiques sur la vitesse de la diffusion de la nouvelle 
technologie de la firme du Nord vers la firme du Sud via l’effet sur la durée du brevet. Cette fois-ci 
                                                          
3 Ce chapitre a fait l’objet d’une publication dans la revue The International Trade Journal (Berthoumieu, 
2016).  
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nous intégrons non seulement des instruments mis en place par le pays du Nord, mais aussi par la suite 
des instruments mis en place par le gouvernement du Sud en guise de première extension. Dans les 
deux premiers chapitres, la problématique centrale était de connaitre les moyens dont disposent les 
décideurs politiques pour relancer les innovations des pays du Nord face à la concurrence croissante 
des pays à bas coûts de production. Ici, la problématique est de connaitre l’impact des instruments 
politiques sur la diffusion vers les pays du Sud. Il y a un enjeu en termes de développement pour les 
pays du Sud. Il peut être intéressant d’intégrer la mise en place de représailles de ce fait. De plus, nous 
considérons la mise en place d’un instrument politique supplémentaire de la part de la firme du Sud : 
un investissement public en R&D. En effet, les niveaux de R&D sont faibles dans les pays en 
développement. Ce programme public de R&D permet à la firme du Sud d’utiliser une technologie 
intermédiaire située entre la technologie obsolète et la technologie nouvelle.  
Les résultats montrent que les instruments mis en place par le gouvernement du Nord ont tendance à 
ralentir la diffusion de la nouvelle technologie en incitant la firme du Nord à augmenter la durée du 
brevet. Une nouvelle fois, le quota sur importations fait exception à la règle. Sa mise en place incite à 
réduire la durée du brevet et ainsi à accélérer la diffusion de la nouvelle technologie, et ce quel que 
soit son degré de restriction cette fois-ci. Les instruments mis en place par le gouvernement du Sud 
accélèrent la diffusion de manière générale. L’investissement public en R&D décourage la firme du 
Nord à augmenter la durée du brevet car le différentiel en termes de dotation technologique est moins 
important.  
Il est intéressant d’analyser l’impact total de la mise en place de tarifs ou encore de subventions à la 
production de la part des deux gouvernements. Ces situations renvoient au concept de « guerre 
commerciale » (trade war) lorsque deux pays mettent en place des instruments protectionnistes. Les 
résultats montrent qu’une guerre commerciale sur les subventions à la production ralentit la diffusion 
de la technologie alors qu’une guerre tarifaire l’accélère. Cela provient de la nature de ces instruments. 
La subvention à la production du gouvernement du Nord entraine un gain direct via des recettes 
supplémentaires sur le profit de la firme du Nord alors que le tarif n’entraine qu’un gain indirect via la 
baisse de la concurrence du Sud. La subvention du Sud entraine un coût indirect pour la firme du Nord 
alors que le tarif du Sud entraine un coût direct. Ainsi, avec les deux subventions, la firme du Nord est 
incitée à augmenter la durée du brevet, alors qu’avec les deux tarifs, elle est incitée à la réduire.  
Au niveau de l’analyse de bien-être, l’instrument favori du gouvernement du Nord est la subvention à 
la production. Elle augmente le profit actualisé de la firme du Nord et le surplus du consommateur. 
Elle augmente aussi la durée du brevet ce qui augmente le coût total de celui-ci. Ce coût est reversé 
par la firme du Nord à l’office nationale des brevets du pays du Nord c’est-à-dire aux pouvoirs publics 
de ce pays. Cela limite l’effet négatif de la subvention sur les recettes publiques. L’instrument favori 
du gouvernement du Sud est l’investissement public en R&D. Il s’agit d’un moyen de disposer d’une 
technologie intermédiaire rapidement ce qui profite à la firme du Sud et aux consommateurs.  
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CHAPITRE 4 – Diffusion de la Technologie via Collaborations de Brevet : 
Le Cas de l’Intégration Européenne4 
Ce chapitre propose une approche empirique de la question des déterminants de la diffusion 
technologique entre pays du Nord et pays du Sud à l’aide d’estimations économétriques. Pour ce faire, 
il est nécessaire d’utiliser un instrument qui puisse mesurer au mieux la variable expliquée de l’étude, 
en l’occurrence la diffusion technologique. Suite à une revue des méthodes utilisées dans la littérature 
économique, nous avons fait le choix de retenir comme indicateur les collaborations internationales de 
brevets (Fleming et al., 2007 ; Breschi et Lissoni, 2009 ; Picci, 2010 ; Guan et Chen, 2012 ; 
Montobbio et Sterzi, 2013). Il s’agit de brevets publiés dans un pays par un inventeur avec la 
collaboration d’un inventeur localisé dans un pays étranger.  
Nous nous intéressons au cas particulier de l’Union Européenne. Nous étudions les collaborations de 
brevets entre les pays d’Europe de l’Est ayant ou non récemment intégré l’Union Européenne et ceux 
d’Europe de l’Ouest, les pays à l’origine de la construction européenne. Nous utilisons les données sur 
les brevets publiés à l’Office Européenne des Brevets (European Patent Office) par des inventeurs 
d’Europe de l’Est ayant collaboré avec des inventeurs d’Europe de l’Ouest. Nous utilisons des 
données fournies par l’OCDE (OECD) en prenant 13 pays émergents d’Europe de l’Est – dont 8 
membres de l’Union Européenne depuis 2004 (République Tchèque, Estonie, Lituanie, Lettonie, 
Hongrie, Pologne, Slovaquie et Slovénie), 2 membres depuis 2007 (Roumanie et Bulgarie) et 3 non 
membres (Russie, Ukraine et Croatie) – et 7 pays riches d’Europe de l’Ouest sur la période 2000-2011.  
Nous étudions l’impact de plusieurs variables explicatives potentielles. Nous cherchons, en particulier, 
à analyser l’impact de l’intégration européenne des pays émergents d’Europe de l’Est. Il s’agit d’une 
variable muette (dummy variable) prenant la valeur 1 si le pays est membre de l’Union Européenne 
et 0, sinon. Nous cherchons également à illustrer l’impact : (i) de la taille des marchés avec les niveaux 
de PIB et de population ; (ii) du capital humain avec les dépenses en R&D et en éducation ; (iii) des 
relations commerciales et des localisations ; (iv) des inégalités de revenu et de technologie entre les 
pays. Cela reprend globalement les différentes variables intégrées dans la littérature économique. 
Ainsi, nous analysons l’impact d’autres variables telles que l’existence de frontière commune entre les 
deux pays, les niveaux de PIB, les inégalités internationales de revenu entre les pays, les niveaux de 
population, la distance géographique, la distance technologique (aussi bien au niveau de la structure 
des innovations que de l’intensité des innovations), les dépenses en R&D, les dépenses publiques dans 
l’éducation, les flux commerciaux et les Investissements Directs Étrangers.  
Au niveau de la variable expliquée, nous effectuons une analyse en deux temps. Dans un premier 
temps, nous analysons l’impact de chaque variable explicative sur la probabilité qu’il y ait 
collaboration de brevet entre le pays émergent d’Europe de l’Est et le pays riche d’Europe de l’Ouest. 
Dans un second temps, nous étudions l’impact sur l’intensité des collaborations de brevet, autrement 
dit leur nombre. Il s’agit donc d’une approche en deux temps que l’on trouve essentiellement dans les 
études empiriques de commerce international utilisant des équations de gravité. Nous étudions à la fois 
la marge extensive (probabilité) et la marge intensive (intensité). Il s’agit du principal apport de cette 
étude puisque l’essentiel des études sur les collaborations de brevet se focalisent sur la marge 
intensive. Concernant l’analyse sur la probabilité, nous effectuons une estimation de type Logit 
puisque la variable expliquée est dite muette. Pour l’analyse de l’intensité, nous effectuons une 
estimation de type Poisson mais aussi une estimation conditionnelle en Moindres Carrés Ordinaires et 
Généralisés.  
                                                          
4 Ce chapitre a fait l’objet d’un LAREFI Working Paper (Berthoumieu, 2015). 
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Les résultats montrent que l’intégration européenne ne semble pas être un déterminant significatif de 
la probabilité de collaboration de brevet puisque le coefficient n’est pas significativement différent de 
zéro avec les différentes régressions effectuées. En revanche, l’effet sur l’intensité des collaborations 
de brevet est significatif et positif. Le coefficient est généralement situé entre 0,2 et 0,3. Le fait 
d’appartenir à l’Union Européenne pour les pays d’Europe de l’Est augmente d’environ 0,2/0,3% 
l’intensité de leurs collaborations technologiques avec les pays d’Europe de l’Ouest. L’intégration 
européenne n’est donc pas un facteur de probabilité mais plutôt d’intensité des collaborations de 
brevet. Nous effectuons un test de robustesse en prenant le nombre d’années depuis que le pays est 
membre de l’Union Européenne (jusqu’en 2011). La valeur est comprise entre 0 et 8 puisque les 
premières intégrations à l’Union Européenne ont eu lieu en 2004 pour ces pays. Les résultats sont 
identiques en termes de signe et d’effets significatifs mais les coefficients deviennent plus faibles. Ils 
sont régulièrement inférieurs à 0,1.  
Au niveau des autres déterminants significatifs, il y a l’impact significatif et positif des exportations 
des pays d’Europe de l’Est en direction de ceux de l’ouest, aussi bien sur la probabilité que l’intensité. 
En contrepartie, les importations et les IDE n’ont jamais d’effet significatif. La distance géographique 
est également un déterminant significatif mais dont l’effet est négatif : les pays ont moins de chance de 
collaborer et collaborent moins lorsqu’ils sont éloignés géographiquement. Les inégalités de revenu 
ont un effet significativement négatif sur la probabilité de collaboration alors que la distance 
technologique (en termes de structure et d’intensité) pèse significativement sur l’intensité des 
collaborations.  
CHAPITRE 5 – Conclusion Générale 
Ce travail consiste à apporter un certain nombre d’éléments de réponse aux questions posées à la fin de 
l’introduction générale. L’objectif n’était pas d’identifier la supériorité du protectionnisme ou du libre-
échange au niveau des innovations et de la diffusion de la technologie. Il n’est pas possible de 
proposer une conclusion générale : (i) il existe plusieurs types de barrières protectionnistes dont 
l’impact n’est pas forcément identique ; (ii) leur effet peut être incertain ou du moins conditionné par 
certains paramètres.  
Nous sommes parvenus à démontrer que les pays industrialisés ayant des problèmes de compétitivité 
face à la concurrence croissante des pays émergents ont un intérêt à mettre en place certains 
instruments de politique commerciale. Ceux-ci peuvent potentiellement stimuler les innovations 
mesurées par les dépenses en R&D. En effet, la mise en place d’un tarif sur importations, d’une 
subvention à la production, d’une subvention à la R&D et d’un prix-minimum de la part du 
gouvernement du Nord permet d’augmenter l’investissement en R&D de la firme domestique. En 
effet, ces instruments entrainent un transfert de profit de la firme du Sud vers la firme du Nord (du fait 
du soutien des pouvoirs publics). La firme du Nord est incitée à augmenter son investissement en 
R&D pour que le gain de profit soit plus fort. Ces résultats tiennent que l’on raisonne avec de la R&D 
de procédé ou de la R&D de produit.  
Ce travail nous a permis également d’illustrer la particularité d’un instrument politique. Il s’agit des 
restrictions quantitatives. En effet, la mise en place d’un quota, contrairement aux autres instruments, a 
un effet ambigu sur l’investissement en R&D domestique. Nous avons vu qu’il pouvait y avoir deux 
types de quota : un quota relativement restrictif et un quota très restrictif. Avec le premier, sa mise en 
place entraine une baisse de la R&D de manière certaine. Avec le second, il existe un seuil tel que le 
niveau de R&D est le même qu’en libre-échange. Avec un quota plus restrictif, le niveau de R&D 
augmente par rapport au libre-échange. Inversement avec un quota moins restrictif. Cet instrument 
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peut décourager l’innovation. Cela provient de la nature même du quota. Comme l’expliquent 
Bhagwati (1968) ou encore Krishna (1989), le quota modifie la relation stratégique existante entre 
deux firmes concurrentes. Le résultat permet d’expliquer pourquoi les pays du Sud peuvent être incités 
à mettre en place des Restrictions Volontaires aux Exportations, dans la mesure où elles réduisent la 
R&D.  
Nous étudions également la question de la diffusion technologique, dans une structure théorique dans 
un premier temps. Si certains pays du Sud bénéficient d’avantages en termes de coût du travail bon 
marché, en contrepartie, ils peuvent subir un désavantage en termes de dotation technologique. La 
diffusion de la technologie permet aux pays du Sud de disposer de technologies modernes découvertes 
dans les pays du Nord. Nous étudions un cas de figure où un brevet est déposé sur cette découverte 
afin de ralentir la diffusion de la technologie. Nous avons analysé l’impact des instruments politiques 
sur la durée de ce brevet qui mesure la vitesse de la diffusion technologique. Les instruments mis en 
place par le gouvernement du Nord ralentissent la diffusion de la technologie en augmentant la durée 
du brevet mis à part le quota sur importations une nouvelle fois.  
Enfin, nous proposons une analyse empirique au niveau de ce concept de diffusion technologique à 
l’aide d’une étude économétrique. La diffusion de la technologie est mesurée par les collaborations de 
brevet entre les pays riches d’Europe de l’Ouest et les économies en transition de l’Est. Nous étudions 
en particulier l’impact de l’intégration européenne des pays d’Europe de l’Est au cours des années 
2000 sur la diffusion de la technologie. Cela ne semble pas être un déterminant significatif de la 
probabilité de collaboration entre les pays. En revanche, cela augmente significativement l’intensité (le 
nombre) de ces collaborations. Nous avons également analysé l’impact d’autres déterminants 
potentiels.  
Enfin, nous pouvons avancer un certain nombre d’extensions potentielles au niveau des différentes 
études réalisées dans ce travail.  
§ Une première extension potentielle est l’intégration de représailles du gouvernement du Sud dans 
les chapitres théoriques même si nous proposons une première possibilité d’extension à la fin du 
Chapitre 3. Celle-ci demeure largement perfectible. Une analyse de bien-être avec la mise en place 
d’instruments à la fois dans le Nord et dans le sud pourrait être intéressante. 
§ Il serait également possible d’utiliser un cadre théorique différent pour ces chapitres. Nous nous 
concentrons sur des duopoles. Il serait intéressant de modéliser un oligopole à ܰ firmes dans 
chaque pays, d’intégrer d’autres pays, ou encore de modifier ces structures Nord-Sud en structures 
Nord-Nord ou Sud-Sud.  
§ L’introduction de l’asymétrie d’information peut être envisagée, notamment concernant les deux 
premiers chapitres. Nous pouvons considérer un cas de figure où le gouvernement du Nord ne 
connait pas la probabilité de succès de la R&D ou le niveau de coût marginal en cas de succès.  
§ Concernant le Chapitre 3, la principale extension serait d’introduire la mise en place d’un contrat 
de licence (licensing) entre la firme du Nord et la firme du Sud afin que la seconde puisse utiliser 
la nouvelle technologie plus rapidement. Ainsi, la rapidité de la diffusion de la technologie 
dépendrait essentiellement de la date de la mise en place de ce contrat de licence.  
§ Au niveau de l’étude économétrique du Chapitre 4, une possibilité d’extension serait d’utiliser une 
autre variable expliquée que les collaborations de brevet pour mesurer la diffusion de la 
technologie, notamment en disposant de données sur les IDE en R&D en provenance des pays 
riches et en direction des pays du Sud. Il serait également bénéfique d’intégrer de véritables 
variables d’instruments politiques puisque l’intégration à l’Union Européenne n’est pas seulement 
une mesure de libre-échange.   
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-CHAPTER 0- 
General Introduction 
Technology has a significant impact on economic behavior. Households consume high 
technology goods and services in order to increase their welfare and to be part of the 
digital world. Producers benefit from modern technologies in order to reduce production 
costs and to produce innovative goods and services. From a macroeconomic point of view, 
countries also benefit from technological innovations in order to increase total 
productivity and economic growth, and to involve job creations. Nevertheless, they may 
also involve unskilled job destructions.  
0.1. Technology and Competitiveness 
The issue of technological innovations is crucial in economics. They condition the access 
to new high quality goods and services for consumers. They also impact producers’ 
competitiveness that we can define as the ability to sell their product when they face 
world competition. There are two forms of competitiveness: price-competitiveness and 
non-price competitiveness. We can define price-competitiveness as the ability to sell 
products with almost identical features compared to competitors’ products, but at a lower 
price. Technological innovations may increase price-competitiveness when they are “cost-
reducing” i.e. when they reduce production costs. We can define non-price 
competitiveness as the ability to sell products that are differentiated vertically in terms 
of features, at the same price as that of competitors. For example, product quality may 
be higher. Technological innovations may also increase non-price competitiveness since 
they may influence features of goods and services. The relationship between innovations 
and competitiveness is a crucial issue especially for countries where competitiveness 
influences economic and trade performances. The French case is a good example because 
France has faced external deficits since 2002. France has experienced a downturn and 
still pains to recover. During the same period, Germany has benefitted from external 
surpluses. Policy makers often put forward the difference in terms of labor cost. 
However, in 2012, the labor cost per hour worked in the industrial sector equaled EUR 
36.30 in France and EUR 35.20 in Germany (Source: DESTATIS). The difference is 
higher for the non-wage labor cost, i.e. for social security contributions. In 2012, for a 
wage of EUR 100, such a cost equaled EUR 50 in France and EUR 27 in Germany. 
Therefore, labor cost is not the only determinant of competitiveness.  
The role of innovations may be significant. Research and Development (R&D) 
expenditures measure producers’ technological innovations. We can define R&D as a 
“systematic activity combining both basic and applied research, and aimed at discovering 
solutions to problems or creating new goods and knowledge [Source: Business 
Dictionary].” R&D expenditures are both public and private. Firms invest in human 
capital in order to improve economic and trade performances. There are two types of 
R&D: product R&D and process R&D. Product R&D aims to create new products and to 
differentiate finished goods vertically compared to competitors’ goods. Process R&D aims 
to create new processes such as modern equipment in order to reduce production costs. 
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Process R&D is cost-reducing R&D. Does Germany innovate more than France? In 2012, 
the share of R&D expenditures in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) equaled 2.92 
percent in Germany and 2.26 percent in France (Source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators). Therefore, German firms innovate more. It explains the 
difference in terms of non-price competitiveness between the two countries. The quality 
of German goods is often higher.  
Competitiveness issues do not only relate to the competition between rich countries. 
Developed countries are facing growing competition from developing/emerging 
economies. In this study, “Northern countries” are industrialized/developed countries 
and “Southern countries” are developing/emerging countries. They aim to sell their 
product on big Northern markets. Developing economies benefit from lower production 
costs owing to a cheaper labor force. For example, in 2012, the labor cost per hour 
worked in the industrial sector only equaled EUR 3.80 in Romania (source: DESTATIS). 
Therefore, developed countries like France and Germany face a competitive 
disadvantage. Nevertheless, production costs also depend on other variables like labor 
productivity, capital cost and infrastructure quality.  
The share of emerging countries’ exports in the total level of exports has increased 
compared to that of rich countries’. In 2012, the share of developed countries’ exports of 
commodities equaled 51.81 percent, while, in 1995, such a share equaled 71.55 percent 
(WTO, 2014). The same evolution has occurred for the production of wealth. In 2012, the 
share of high-income OECD countries’ GDP in the world GDP equaled 61.29 percent, 
while the same share equaled 80.61 percent in 1995 (Source: World Bank WDI). Rich 
countries are looking for ways to increase their economic and trade performances 
compared to emerging countries. Innovations may be considered as the solution since 
they increase competitiveness while competition from the South is growing. Even if rich 
countries have a competitive disadvantage in terms of labor cost, they benefit from an 
advantage in terms of technological endowment. Most of R&D investments are 
implemented in developed countries. The share of Southern countries’ R&D expenditures 
in their GDP has always been lower than 2 percent (Source: World Bank WDI).  
0.2. International Technology Diffusion 
There is a high correlation between innovations and competitiveness. Industrial 
protection and technology diffusion are also crucial issues. An inventor that creates a 
new technology or a new product benefits from a temporary monopoly on the use of the 
new technology or the sale of the new product. We call it a “monopoly period” for the 
inventor. The speed of technology diffusion depends on such a period and on the ability 
of competitors to innovate by investing in R&D. But emerging countries’ R&D 
expenditures are low. They wait to benefit from spillovers from rich countries’ 
innovations rather than innovate themselves. “For the most part, the South does not 
initiate technical change [Stewart, 1984, p. 88].” Previously, we have mentioned the 
impact of innovations on competitiveness for rich countries while competition from 
emerging countries is growing. But technology diffusion relates to economic, social and 
human development issues for Southern countries.  
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Technology diffusion increases economic development via a supply effect. Firms may 
benefit from modern processes and produce new finished goods. It leads to further 
revenues for countries that benefit from foreign technologies. Emerging economies have 
to modernize capital endowments and finished goods in order to increase non-price 
competitiveness. For example, the pharmaceutical industry is essentially composed of 
developed countries’ Multinational Firms (MNF). In 2014, the top 10 of pharmaceutical 
firms by prescription sales contains Swiss, US, British and French MNF (source: 
Pharmaceutical Executive).5 They locate in each region of the world. Producers from 
Southern countries are trying to emerge on international markets. The most significant 
example is Indian firms. They specialize in generic drugs by producing a fifth of the 
world output (Source: World Health Organization). They sell a high share of their output 
in Southern countries.  
Technology diffusion also influences human development. The diffusion of modern 
technologies improves working conditions for the labor force. It involves a welfare gain 
for households. But skilled labor replaces unskilled labor. As a result, unskilled labor’s 
welfare may decrease with technology diffusion. The main gain is the diffusion of new 
products and new varieties that satisfy new needs. It also improves the level of 
knowledge (with information technology), education and health (with better living 
conditions and medical care). Therefore, technology diffusion may increase development 
indicators.  
Finally, technology diffusion may change emerging countries’ societies. According to the 
stages of economic growth in Rostow (1959), new processes for producers and new 
products for consumers involve the transition to the “drive to maturity” (fourth stage) 
and to the “age of high mass consumption” (fifth stage).  
Technology diffusion is not something avoidable, except for less advanced countries that 
face a structural gap. The real issue is to study the speed of technology diffusion from 
the North to the South. Countries may implement policy instruments to accelerate or 
slow down technology diffusion.  
0.3. Implementation of Policy Instruments 
We focus on two potential issues: the relationship between technological innovations and 
competitiveness in rich countries, and the speed of technology diffusion toward 
developing/emerging countries. Another issue is to study the impact of policy 
instruments implemented by policy makers on both the innovations incentive and the 
speed of technology diffusion. Examples of policy instruments are trade policies. Trade 
policy can be defined as the implementation or the removal of instruments that protect 
local producers and disadvantage foreign competitors. Free trade is a particular case in 
which a government phases out all trade barriers. In this case, trade policy relates to 
protectionism. In our study, we define “free trade” as the case in which governments do 
not implement any policy instrument.  
                                                          
5 See the article “Pharma Exec’s pharma top 50 in Brief” in Pharmaceutical Executive (July 2, 
2014). 
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Governments may implement traditional policy instruments like import tariffs and 
import quotas. There are two forms of tariffs: ad-valorem and specific. An ad-valorem 
tariff can be defined as a percentage of the value of imports paid by foreign exporters to 
the government. A specific tariff can be defined as an amount paid by foreign exporters 
to the government in local currency for one unit of imports. Under both cases, foreign 
exporters have to pay a tax to the government. A tariff also disadvantages local 
consumers by increasing the level of price of imports. The winners of the implementation 
of an import tariff are the government that benefits from tariff revenues and the local 
producers that benefit from a higher market share due to a drop in the foreign 
competition. Nevertheless, countries set bound tariffs at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) such as the level of applied tariffs cannot be higher.  
An import quota can be defined as the maximum level of imports from a foreign country. 
Foreign exporters’ sales decrease as compared to free trade. The government may 
provide import licenses via bids. Therefore, an import quota may involve further public 
revenues. The losers and winners are the same as those with tariffs. These instruments 
are traditional forms of protectionism i.e. defensive protectionist barriers. They are 
implemented “at-the-border” in order to disadvantage foreign competition. 
Other policy instruments like subsidies may also be implemented. A subsidy can be 
defined as a support to domestic producers. According to the WTO, “a subsidy shall be 
deemed to exist if: (a) (1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public 
body within the territory of a member … or (a) (2) there is any form of income or price 
support … and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred [Source: Article 1.1 of the WTO’s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures].” There are also two forms of 
subsidies: ad-valorem subsidies and specific subsidies. There are also several types of 
subsidy.  
First, governments may implement production/export subsidies. They provide revenues 
for each unity of output/export. Nevertheless, the WTO prohibits export subsidies 
because they cause trade distortions (Source: Article 3 of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures). The WTO does not prohibit production 
subsidies but a member can complain to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
about their trade-distorting effect. For example, governments may disguise production 
subsidies by subsidizing job creations in order to escape the regulation of the WTO. 
Second, governments may also implement investment subsidies like R&D subsidies. The 
WTO does not prohibit such instruments because they do not directly involve trade 
distortions.  
Each type of subsidy aims to reduce domestic firms’ costs. As a consequence, it increases 
consumer surplus by reducing prices and increasing domestic producers’ output. Foreign 
firms’ sales decrease with respect to domestic firms’. Domestic public revenues also 
decrease. Subsidies are offensive trade barriers compared to tariffs and quotas. They are 
implemented “behind-the-border”. Subsidized firms benefit from a direct increase in 
their profit.  
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Governments may also implement new trade policy instruments like Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VER), export taxes and price undertaking. VER are implemented by 
exporting countries. They set a maximum level of exports for their domestic producers. 
Generally, such an instrument is implemented due to pressures from importing 
countries. In this case, it corresponds to a disguised quota that the WTO cannot prohibit. 
The most significant example is the “Multi Fibre Arrangement” in 1974. Asian countries 
have limited their exports to Europe. Such an arrangement ended in 2005.  
Exporting countries can also implement export taxes. A particular motivation is an 
improvement in their terms-of-trade by increasing the price of exports at the expense of 
their competitiveness. Southern countries often implement such export taxes on 
agricultural goods like corn and soy.  
Governments may also implement price undertaking by setting a minimum price such as 
foreign firms cannot sell at a lower price. Northern government implements such 
minimum prices on imports from Southern countries where production costs are lower. 
In 2013, the European Union implemented a minimum price on solar panels imports 
from China. With these instruments, the winners are domestic producers and the losers 
are both foreign exporters and domestic consumers owing to the increase in prices.  
Finally, governments can implement informal barriers i.e. disguised protectionist 
barriers. They do not directly influence the level of trade. Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) like industrial standards are 
good examples. In a report for the G8 Summit, Evenett (2013) focuses on 
“Protectionism’s Quiet Return.” Traditional forms of protectionism only represent less 
than 40 percent of the measures implemented since the crisis of 2008. According to him, 
431 protectionist measures have been adopted throughout the world between June 2012 
and May 2013. Only 95 of them were different forms of subsidy and 64 were increases in 
tariff. Informal barriers cannot be defined as direct trade policy instruments. But, since 
they reduce the level of trade, they are new forms of protectionism that escape the 
WTO’s regulation.  
0.4. A Review of the Economic Literature 
First, we review the economic literature on trade policy instruments. Then, we focus on 
studies on technological innovation and diffusion. 
0.4.1. Policy Instruments 
Since this thesis is part of a study on the economic impact of several policy instruments 
like trade policies, let us review the economic literature on this type of instruments. 
Such a review enables us to know how the implementation of these instruments impacts 
strategic variables like output, profits and welfares.  
The issue of the implementation of trade policies has already been studied in the 
economic literature. According to Orgün (2012), “trade policy is one of the oldest subject 
areas in economics [p. 1283].” First, studies have illustrated that free trade is better than 
protectionism. For example, Ricardo (1817) proves that free trade is better than 
-CHAPTER 0- 
18 
 
autarky because countries are encouraged to specialize in industries in which 
comparative advantages are high and to import goods in other industries. Trade barriers 
are non-optimal.  
The first argument in favor of protectionism is mentioned by List (1841). He introduces 
the “infant-industry argument” by explaining that trade barriers promote new 
industries. Such barriers may be removed when new industries drive to maturity. 
Protectionism leads to free trade in this case. Mikic (1998) agrees with the infant-
industry argument by explaining that policy makers should help new firms against 
distortions like the imperfect access to information and capital.  
Bickerdike (1906) illustrates the positive impact of the implementation of an import 
tariff with the “big country argument.” With a small country, such an import tariff 
reduces the national welfare by creating production and consumption distortions. But 
the country size matters. A big country benefits from a monopoly (monopsony) power by 
representing a significant share of the world supply (demand). An import tariff 
significantly reduces the national demand, and therefore, the world demand. Therefore, 
it increases the domestic price, reduces the world price and improves the terms-of-trade. 
The impact on the national welfare may become positive. The terms-of-trade effect does 
not work for small countries.  
During the 1980s, new trade theories studied the issue of the strategic trade policy. They 
introduced assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. 
Spencer and Brander (2008) define the strategic trade policy as a “trade policy that 
affects the outcome of strategic interactions between firms in an actual potential 
international oligopoly [p. 1].”  
Brander and Spencer (1985) analyze the implementation of export subsidies in a 
theoretical framework close to the Boeing-Airbus duopoly in the aircraft industry. After 
its market entry, Airbus benefitted from subsidies implemented by the European Union. 
This economic support allowed Airbus to stay on the market. In return, the US 
government retaliated by subsidizing Boeing. Under the Nash equilibrium, authors 
prove that each government is encouraged to implement a positive export subsidy even if 
the foreign government retaliates. Eaton and Grossman (1986) criticize such a result 
because it depends on the mode of competition on the market. Brander and Spencer 
(1985) use output competition i.e. Cournot competition. Such a mode of competition 
relates to the aircraft industry in which firms compete in deliveries. According to Eaton 
and Grossman (1986), under price competition i.e. Bertrand competition, governments 
may be encouraged to implement export taxes. Brander and Spencer (1985) also 
demonstrate that cooperating governments are encouraged to tax domestic exports in 
order to maximize cumulative welfares. The reason is that taxes involve an increase in 
prices, terms-of-trade and public revenues. Brander and Spencer (1984) study the 
impact of an import tariff under imperfect competition by comparing cooperative and 
non-cooperative equilibria. The world welfare does not increase with a non-cooperative 
tariff. But the effect may be positive with a cooperative tariff especially in the case of 
high transport costs. 
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Krugman (1984) introduces the role of consumers’ taste for diversity when firms 
produce differentiated goods. He studies the impact of an import tariff in a theoretical 
framework under monopolistic competition. The tariff increases foreign firms’ production 
costs. Domestic (foreign) firm’s output, market share and profit increases (decreases) 
with the tariff. Lancaster (1984) also studies the impact of an import tariff by 
considering consumers’ taste for variety. Each consumer has one most preferred variety. 
The tariff increases the price of imported goods, reduces the price of domestic goods, and 
increases the number of varieties for consumers. With retaliations, when countries 
export identical featured goods (“interleaved case”), tariffs increase the number of 
varieties. If they export different featured goods (“split case”), such a number decreases.  
The main difference between traditional and new trade theories is that trade policy 
instruments promote exports. Domestic firms are encouraged to enter foreign markets. 
Policy instruments involve a profit-shifting from foreign firms to domestic firms 
(Brander, 1986; Spencer, 1986; Brander, 1995; Neary and Leahy, 2000). Baldwin 
and Krugman (1988) use the example of the aircraft industry. They show that a 
subsidy for Airbus would involve a high gain for world consumers. The subsidy would 
increase third countries’ welfare.  
Spencer (1986) mentions that governments should subsidize strategic sectors i.e. “key 
industries.” A key industry has the following features: (i) the profit gain must be higher 
than the cost of the subsidy; (ii) a highly concentrated oligopoly market in order to face 
foreign competition; (iii) there are high barriers to entry; (iv) a high international 
competition; (v) it benefits from competitive advantage relative to foreign competition, 
from scale economies, and from learning effects; (vi) there is a minimum (maximum) of 
spillovers from domestic (foreign) firms to foreign (domestic) firms; (vii) a product 
subsidy should be implemented at the beginning of the lifecycle; (viii) the subsidy does 
not reduce the productive efficiency by increasing the total production cost (Kreinin, 
1995). Neary and Leahy (2000) design a theoretical framework and mention three 
reasons to implement trade policies: (i) the profit-shifting from foreign firms to domestic 
firms; (ii) the changes in domestic firms’ behavior with respect to foreign firms; (iii) the 
changes in domestic firm’s behavior with respect to governments’ future policies.  
Several studies criticize these previous results. Dixit (1984) designs a model with a rich 
country and a developing country. He studies the impact of a tariff implemented by the 
developing country. The tariff may reduce the number of varieties with a high elasticity 
of substitution between each country’s exported goods. These results question those of 
Lancaster (1984). Krugman (1987) mentions that there are three main limits of the 
new interventionism: (i) empirical difficulties to model imperfect competition markets; 
(ii) dissipated gains with new entries on the market; (iii) robustness of the results with 
general equilibrium models. Baldwin and Green (1988) find that the implementation 
of protectionist barriers does not increase the level of output for five US industries over 
1972-1982.  
Rodrik (1988) studies the potential impact of several developing countries’ 
liberalization. He studies the case in which Turkey implements free entry in automobile, 
tire and electrical appliances industries. It would increase Turkey’s national welfare 
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under each case. Kalt (1988) studies the case in which trade barriers are implemented 
on the United States-Canada bilateral trade in the timber industry. The United States 
consume a high share of Canadian timber and benefit from a monopsony power. An 
import tariff implemented by the US government would increase (reduce) the US 
(Canadian) welfare. But an export tax implemented by the Canadian government would 
reduce the US welfare, while the Canadian welfare would increase owing to further 
public revenues. Each policy instrument would reduce the cumulative welfare of both 
countries. Finally, considering that each instrument is implemented, the effect on 
welfares would be negative. Dick (1994) makes an empirical study for 213 commodities 
in the United States in 1970. The implementation of an import tariff in these industries 
does not significantly increase US exports. Bhagwati (1994) argues in favor of free 
trade in spite of the negative impact on unskilled labor. But fair trade is another crucial 
issue for producers.  
Rodrik (1995) illustrates the relative success of the implementation of export subsidies 
via several examples. There are two examples of success: South Korea during the 1970s 
and Brazil during the 1980s. Subsidies increased automobile exports in these countries. 
However, there are two examples of failure: Bolivia and Kenya during the 1980s. 
Subsidies increased the level of corruption. Finally, there are two intermediary 
examples: India during the 1960s and Turkey during the 1980s. Export subsidies 
increased exports but they also involved corporate-related abuses in terms of price. 
Domestic firms did not reduce their prices. The author mentions “the dilemma of the 
weak state” defined as the difficulty for governments to encourage domestic firms to 
increase their exports by implementing subsidies and to avoid abuses. According to 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999), a non-cooperative trade policy that aims to increase the 
terms-of-trade is not efficient. Conversely, a trade agreement on reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination may be efficient. 
Grossman and Helpman (1994) integrate political aspects. Lobbies may influence 
governments’ trade policies. “Organized industries” i.e. lobbies are protected by import 
tariffs and benefit from export subsidies. However, “non-organized industries” do not 
benefit from such supports. Therefore, “special-interest groups” benefit from trade 
policies at the expense of other industries. The authors also show that an increase in the 
size of the lobby leads to a drop in the governmental support. Free trade is optimal when 
all voters represent one lobby.  
Other limits of policy instruments are trade disputes and trade wars among countries. 
Each Government implements trade policies because the other does the same thing. 
There is a dilemma of prisoners. A non-cooperative equilibrium appears. Governments 
maintain policy instruments in force while free trade is optimal for maximizing the 
cooperative cumulative welfare (Baldwin and Krugman, 1986; Brander, 1986; 
Staiger, 1995). Tariff wars generally lead to welfare losses. But the effect may become 
positive. It depends on the price-elasticity of imports (Johnson, 1953) and on the nature 
of exported and imported goods (Kennan et Riezman, 1988). Irwin (1998) studies the 
specific example of the US Smoot-Hawley tariff implemented in the 1930s while 
European countries retaliated. He designs a general equilibrium model. Such a tariff 
reduced US imports. But exports also decreased. Furthermore, the level of 
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unemployment sharply increased while the tariff was supposed to protect the labor 
factor. The Smoot-Hawley tariff reduced the US national welfare. Crucini and Kahn 
(2003) use the same framework and show that such a tariff involved a sharp drop in the 
US output, consumption and investment.  
0.4.2. Innovations 
The first studies on the role of innovations are those of the liberal trend in the 18th 
century. Authors have considered that innovations are the only way for an economy to 
leave the “steady-state” equilibrium. Innovations lead to the growth of productivity and 
production. Smith (1776) explains the role of innovations in terms of labor organization 
by introducing the “division of labor” based on the specialization of workers who perform 
specific tasks. Ricardo (1817) extends such a topic by introducing the “international 
division of labor” with the specialization at the international scale. This is a first vision 
of the international fragmentation of the production process in the 20th century. 
Malthus (1798) mentions that countries stay in a steady-state of poverty called a 
“Malthusian catastrophe” because the growth of population is generally higher than that 
of subsistence. The only way to leave such a steady-state situation for a country is to 
innovate in order to increase agricultural crops.  
Schumpeter (1942) studies the role of several forms of innovation: for example, product 
innovations, process innovations, and organization innovations. He introduces the 
concept of “innovation clusters.” A major innovation involves further innovations. He 
mentions the crucial role of entrepreneurship as the main source of innovation and 
productivity in a country that may increase workers’ wage. Nevertheless, he also 
introduces the concept of “creative destruction.” Innovations also involve the destruction 
of the oldest structures of the economy. 
R&D Expenditures 
During the 1980s, the economic literature started to study the economic impact of R&D 
expenditures, especially cost-reducing R&D. The main motivation of these analyses was 
that “firms perceive strategic considerations beyond the simple desire to minimize total 
costs [Brander and Spencer, 1983, p. 225].”  
The first studies have designed partial equilibrium theoretical models under R&D 
competition. There are two traditional modes of competition: Cournot (output) and 
Bertrand (price). For example, under Cournot competition, firms select the optimal level 
of output that maximizes their profit. Under R&D competition, they select the optimal 
level of R&D. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) show that firms invest more in R&D under 
R&D competition compared to Cournot competition.  
Brander and Spencer (1983) design an international duopoly with R&D competition. 
They show that firms overinvest in R&D. Such an overinvestment involves a loss of 
productive efficiency. The conclusion of the study illustrates a paradox. The authors 
make the assumption of cost-reducing R&D. The marginal cost decreases with the R&D 
investment. In the same time, firms do not minimize their total production cost which 
increases compared to Cournot competition. The reason is that R&D investments 
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encourage firms to increase their output. Therefore, firms’ profits decrease compared to 
Cournot competition. Nevertheless, other studies prove that R&D overinvestment may 
not be theoretically and empirically viable (Griliches, 1992; Jones and Williams, 
1998; Jones and Williams, 2000).  
Dixit (1984) illustrates the impact of innovations in a North-South theoretical model by 
considering a cost-reducing investment. Income inequalities between the two countries 
decrease in the case of high “elasticities of substitution in variable and fixed costs [p. 
114].” The fixed cost depends on the size of plants while the variable cost depends on the 
labor force. In this case, elasticities of substitution illustrate that there is a relationship 
between the quantity of labor and the size of plants. The previous result is a paradox 
because the economic vulnerability of Southern countries increases with the level of the 
elasticity of substitution. Furthermore, innovations may reduce the Southern country’s 
terms-of-trade for commodities. But the number of varieties increases (decreases) in the 
Southern (Northern) country. The effect of innovations on the Southern country’s welfare 
is positive with a high level for the elasticity of substitution. Romer (1986) studies the 
impact of R&D expenditures (via the human capital) on the growth of the Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) in an oligopoly with ܰ firms. Human capital involves increasing 
returns. This study illustrates the positive correlation between R&D and productivity.  
Empirical studies have also analyzed the impact of R&D on the economic environment. 
Griliches (1980) studies the potential causal link between the evolution of R&D and 
productivity for 39 US industries over 1959-1977. The drop in R&D expenditures may 
have explained the drop in productivity in the US in the 1960s. Griliches (1986) 
implements an empirical study on the impact of 1000 firms’ R&D expenditures over 
1957-1977 on their productivity, value added, profit, and revenues. The effect on 
productivity is positive. The effect is higher with private-funded R&D investments 
compared to public funding. The effect on revenues, value added, and profit is also 
positive. Hall and Mairesse (1995) study the impact of 351 French firms’ R&D capital 
over 1980-1987. The effect is significantly positive on the value added per worker and on 
the total factor productivity. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) study the impact of R&D 
expenditures on the difference in value added between the states of the United States in 
1982. There is a significant positive impact. Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen 
(2004) design a wide study on the relationship between productivity and R&D for 12 
OECD countries over 1974-1990. They find a positive and significant correlation. R&D 
may also reduce the technological gap among countries. Ang and Madsen (2011) also 
find a positive impact of R&D expenditures on productivity for the specific case of the 
Asian miracle economies (Japan, South Korea, China, India, Singapore and Taiwan) over 
1953-2006 by designing an endogenous growth model. Asian firms’ productivity has 
increased with both R&D cooperation and R&D competition for several industries like 
high-tech and industrial equipment (Fukao et al., 2011).  
The economic literature has also focused on the impact of firm size on R&D investments 
(Symeonidis, 1996). The first studies illustrate a positive correlation (Schumpeter, 
1942; Galbraith, 1957). Scherer (1984) finds such a positive correlation for US firms 
in 1974. But the positive correlation is not significant in all studies. Bound et al. (1984) 
find that the correlation is, first, negative, and then, positive. Levin, Cohen and 
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Mowery (1985) find opposite results. At first, an increase in the concentration of firms 
leads to an increase in their R&D expenditures. Then, these expenditures decrease. 
Cohen, Levin, and Mowery (1987) demonstrate that firm size does not significantly 
influence the intensity of R&D investments with an empirical analysis. But firm size 
seems to increase the probability of R&D investment. Pavitt et al. (1987) find that the 
correlation may depend on the type of industry for British firms over 1945-1983. 
Innovations are higher for firms with more than 50,000 employees. But for industries 
like machinery and electricity, small firms are innovative. Acs and Audretsch (1987) 
find a negative correlation between firm size and innovations for US firms. The main 
problem with such a result is that firm size may be endogenous and may depend on R&D 
expenditures (Scherer, 1992).  
Considering these previous results, it seems complex to conclude to a positive or negative 
correlation. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2002) mention the crucial impact of public 
research like academic research on industrial research. There is a positive correlation. 
Furthermore, firm size significantly increases the share of private R&D projects that 
collaborate with public research. Several studies criticize the result that illustrates a 
positive correlation between firm size and R&D expenditures. Size is a simple proxy 
(Bottazi et al., 2010).  
Other factors are also mentioned. There is a positive correlation between R&D 
expenditures and internal resources control (Barney, 1991; Galende and Suarez, 
1999). These internal resources are: financial resources (Kim and Park, 2012), 
profitability (Coad and Rao, 2010), human resources (Fleming, 2001), intellectual 
property with patent filings (Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen, 2008), export ability 
(Wakelin, 1998), and firm size. Lai, Lin and Lin (2015) verify whether or not these 
positive relationships hold for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in 2011. The results 
generally hold except for the impacts of financial resources for Japan, profitability for 
Japan and Korea, and human capital for Taiwan.  
The economic literature has also studied the issue of firms’ R&D cooperation. Veugelers 
(1998) reviews these studies. R&D cooperation is generally measured by Research Joint 
Ventures. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) design a theoretical duopoly with 
partial equilibrium and analyze the impact of R&D cooperation. They find that R&D 
cooperation with strong spillovers involves an increase in R&D investments, output, 
profits and national welfares. Other studies find the same results (De Bondt and 
Veugelers, 1991; Motta, 1992; Leahy and Neary, 1997).  
Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) introduce two types of cooperation: R&D Joint 
Ventures and R&D Cartels. Under R&D Joint Ventures, firms share the R&D gain but 
may select their own level of R&D. Under R&D Cartels, firms select the optimal level of 
R&D that maximizes their cumulative profit. Qiu and Tao (1998) also consider two 
types of R&D cooperation: coordination and cooperation. Under coordination, firms aim 
to reduce R&D overinvestment in order to increase productive efficiency. Under 
collaboration, they share profit gains from R&D cooperation. An R&D subsidy may not 
reduce the foreign firm’s R&D investment under collaboration while the effect is always 
negative under coordination. The economic literature also mentions the risk of cheating 
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with R&D Joint Ventures. Even if cooperation may be optimal, when firms implement 
R&D Joint Ventures, they may dissimulate their level of R&D (Shapiro and Willig, 
1990; Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994).  
Dynamic studies on R&D cooperation have been implemented (Martin, 2002; 
Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002; Cellini and Lambertini, 2009). Firms often cooperate on 
process innovations rather than product innovations. According to Miyagiwa and Ohno 
(2002), R&D expenditures increase with R&D cooperation and strong spillovers. 
Empirical studies have also been implemented. Fritsch and Franke (2004) study the 
potential relationship between R&D cooperation, spillovers and innovations for 1,800 
firms from three German regions. Differences between regions show that spillovers 
intensity may be a significant determinant of innovations. But the effect of R&D 
cooperation on spillovers and innovations is low.  
Policy Instruments and R&D 
The theoretical economic literature studies the impact of trade policy instruments on 
R&D expenditures. Spencer and Brander (1983) analyze the impact of the 
implementation of an R&D subsidy by the domestic government while the foreign 
government is not policy active. The results show that the R&D subsidy increases 
(reduces) the domestic (foreign) firm’s R&D expenditures. It also increases (reduces) the 
domestic (foreign) country’s national welfare. Nevertheless, if the domestic government 
also implements a production subsidy, it is encouraged to tax R&D expenditures. Leahy 
and Neary (1997) show that a government that subsidizes the domestic firm’s 
production may be encouraged to subsidize R&D expenditures when domestic and 
foreign firms cooperate. The government is not encouraged to subsidize R&D 
expenditures, otherwise. Krugman (1984) show that the implementation of an import 
tariff increases (reduces) the domestic (foreign) firm’s R&D expenditures.  
Several studies analyze the difference between an import tariff and an import quota. A 
quota changes the strategic relationship among firms (Bhagwati, 1968; Krishna, 
1989). Reitzes (1991) analyzes such policy instruments in a duopoly. An import tariff 
increases the domestic firm’s R&D investment while an import quota reduces it. Firms 
are encouraged to reduce their R&D expenditures with a quota because the level of 
competition decreases. Costa Cabral, Kujal and Petrakis (1998) design a theoretical 
model in which two firms select their optimal cost-reducing R&D investment and, then, 
compete in prices (Bertrand competition). The domestic (foreign) firm’s R&D decreases 
(increases) with the implementation of a quota close to the free trade level. Authors 
mention that these results differ from the “infant industry” argument. Bouët (2001) 
finds the same difference between a tariff and a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER). The 
main contribution is that the author introduces uncertainty in the model. He designs a 
North-South duopoly. The Southern firm benefits from a lower labor cost. The Northern 
firm faces competition from the Southern firm on the Northern market. The Northern 
firm invests in R&D owing to a competitive disadvantage. The Southern firm does not 
invest in R&D. The success of the Northern firm’s R&D investment is uncertain. There 
is a probability of R&D success.  
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A share of the economic literature also studies the difference between the impact of 
direct supports to firms like subsidies and that of indirect instruments like tax cuts and 
tax credits. David, Hall and Toole (2000) design a microeconomic structure and show 
that both direct supports and tax cuts increase R&D expenditures. Tax credits also 
increase R&D expenditures. Hall and Van Reenen (2000) review the economic 
literature and mention the positive relationship for US firms (Mansfield, 1986; Berger, 
1993; Hall, 1993), Canadian firms (Mansfield and Switzer, 1985; Bernstein, 1986), 
Swedish firms (Mansfield, 1986) and nine OECD countries (Bloom et al., 2002).  
Carvalho (2011) mentions some advantages and disadvantages for direct and indirect 
instruments. Direct supports allow governments to select and to implement investment 
projects by subsidizing firms. But such instruments are really costly. Indirect 
instruments allow firms to select their own investment projects. The cost is lower for 
governments. Nevertheless, the impact may be lower for firms that benefit from high 
levels of profit.  
A lot of studies mention the positive impact of direct instruments on R&D expenditures 
(Levy and Terleckyj, 1983; Lichtenberg, 1987; Falk, 2006; Shin, 2006). Some 
studies mention a negative impact (Levy, 1990; Montmartin, 2013). The studies of 
indirect instruments also illustrate opposite results. Montmartin (2013) shows that 
indirect instruments increase (reduce) R&D expenditures in the short-run (long-run). 
According to the author, direct and indirect supports are substitutes.  
Product Innovations and Vertical Differentiation 
Product R&D influences features of finished goods such as quality and involves vertical 
differentiation. Mussa and Rosen (1978) design an important model with product R&D 
and product quality. They compare the levels of quality under two market structures: 
monopoly and competition. The main conclusion is that producers sell less quality goods 
under monopoly compared to competition. Such a result explains why the negative effect 
of the monopoly on the consumer surplus increases with the taste for quality. Prices are 
also higher under monopoly. Shaked and Sutton (1982) also study the choice of quality 
in a theoretical model. First, firms set the optimal level of quality. Then, they select the 
optimal level of price. Under duopoly, firms select different levels of quality. They select 
the same level when the number of firms is greater than two.   
As it has been shown empirically, firms invest in both product and process R&D (Capon 
et al., 1992; Landau and Rosenberg, 1992). Studies show that firms invest in product 
R&D at the beginning of a product’s lifecycle and invest in process R&D at the end 
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Klepper, 1996). Product R&D expenditures are 
particularly high in high-tech industries like automobile and electricity (Scherer and 
Ross, 1990; Fritsch and Meschede; 2001; Park, 2001; Toshimitsu, 2003; Chenavaz, 
2011 ; Jinji and Toshimitsu, 2013).  
The theoretical economic literature also studies the case of vertical differentiation with 
an asymmetric framework with a high-tech firm from a rich country and a low-tech firm 
from a developing country (Das and Donnenfeld, 1989; Park, 2001; Zhou, Spencer 
and Vertinsky, 2002; Moraga-Gonzalez and Viaene, 2005; Ishii, 2014).  
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Park (2001) designs a model in which each firm sells its finished good in a third 
country. The level of quality depends on R&D expenditures. The author shows that the 
government of the developing (rich) country is encouraged to subsidize (tax) its domestic 
firm’s R&D expenditures under Bertrand competition, but to tax (subsidize) such 
expenditures under Cournot competition. Therefore, the results depend on the mode of 
competition. Zhou, Spencer and Vertinsky (2002) find the same results. 
Nevertheless, empirical examples of R&D taxes are really scarce (Audretsch and 
Yamawaki, 1988; Gabriele, 2002; Impullitti, 2010). Ishii (2014) also designs a model 
in which firms invest in product R&D and export their goods to a third market. He 
studies the impact of R&D subsidies implemented by each government. The results 
illustrate that the intensity of quality-price competition increases (decreases) with the 
developing (developed) country’s subsidy.  
0.4.3. Technology Diffusion 
Keller (2004) reviews measures and determinants of technology diffusion in the 
economic literature. One primary determinant of technology diffusion is R&D 
investment owing to R&D spillovers. Innovations measured by R&D expenditures lead to 
technology diffusion measured by R&D spillovers. 
The speed of technology diffusion between two countries also increases with the volume 
of bilateral trade (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; 
Eaton and Kortum, 2002). The bilateral trade in intermediate goods is a significant 
determinant. Developing countries import intermediate goods from developed countries 
and need to use modern technology to produce finished goods. Usually, international 
trade involves information flows among countries due to business interactions. Coe and 
Helpman (1995) design an empirical study and find the same results. The R&D 
spillovers effect increases with the openness of international trade. The role of “learning-
by-exporting” is also mentioned in several studies (Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell, 
1984; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Keller, 2004; 
Keller, 2010).  
The speed of technology diffusion between two countries also increases with the Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) stock owing to FDI spillovers (Griliches and Hausman, 
1986; Keller, 2002; Griffith, Redding and Simpson, 2003; Keller, 2010). For 
example, Japanese R&D investments in Asian developing economies increased nine-fold 
from 1993 to 2007 (UNCTAD, 2011). Developing countries like China, Korea and India 
benefited from these Japanese investments. Multinational Firms (MNF) locate in foreign 
countries and hire the local labor force. Spillovers among countries appear due to worker 
training put forward by MNF (Aitken and Harrisson, 1999; Fosfuri, Motta and 
Rønde, 2001). This is the reason why the relationship between MNF and subsidiaries 
located in foreign countries clearly influences FDI (Markusen, 2002).  
International trade and FDI represent two important factors of technology diffusion. 
Ethier and Markusen (1996) design a dynamic theoretical framework with 
technological externalities and study the choice between international trade and FDI for 
a firm that wishes to sell its product in a foreign country. A firm from the domestic 
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country creates a new product and benefits from a temporary monopoly (equal to two 
periods in the model). Firms from the foreign country do not invest in research in order 
to discover new products. The domestic firm has a choice between exporting from its 
domestic country and locating a part of its output in the foreign country. According to 
the authors, localization involves greater absorption of information for other firms in the 
foreign country. Technology diffusion seems to be faster with localization than with 
exports. But it represents a cost for the domestic firm because the new product is no 
longer in a monopoly situation. The choice between exporting and locating depends on 
the transport cost of exports and the monopoly rent of localization. 
The economic literature analyzes the impact of public policies (especially trade policies) 
on technology diffusion. Cheng (1987) designs a framework close to Spencer and 
Brander (1983) within a dynamic model. Considering international technology 
diffusion, he shows that the R&D subsidy that only satisfies the domestic interest may 
benefit from the foreign firm. It may also enhance diffusion. Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) implement a theoretical macroeconomic model with technological spillovers and 
study the economic impact of trade openness for a small country. They show that trade 
policies that reduce (promote) international trade, especially trade in intermediate 
goods, like tariffs and quotas (subsidies) have a negative (positive) effect on innovations 
and technology diffusion via knowledge spillovers. For example, a tariff cut involves an 
increase in trade volume, trade through variety of intermediate goods and stock of 
human capital through variety. Spillovers to foreign countries are greater. Miyagiwa 
and Ohno (1997) design a dynamic theoretical model and analyze the impact of 
subsidies on R&D and welfare. Initially, two firms use an old technology. At each point 
in time, they invest in R&D to discover a new technology. There is a likelihood of 
discovering it at each point in time for each firm. When one firm discovers the new 
technology, it no longer invests in R&D. But the other firm continues to invest until it 
also discovers the new technology. The former firm benefits from an exogenous monopoly 
period with the new technology that corresponds to the speed of diffusion.  
Reppelin-Hill (1999) makes an econometric study of the relationship between the trade 
openness and the speed of clean technology diffusion by using the example of the steel 
industry. He demonstrates that clean technology diffusion is “faster in countries that 
have more open trade policy regimes [p. 284].” Geroski (2000) reviews some 
determinants of technology diffusion. Information diffusion involves technology 
diffusion. He suggests that governments subsidize technological externalities “to promote 
... communication … and to motivate them [p. 621].”  Van Dijk and Szirmai (2006) 
show a preponderant role of industrial policies on technology diffusion in the case of 
Indonesian paper-making machinery over 1923-2000. Policies like import-substituting 
industrialization over 1974-1984 or export-oriented industrialization over 1984-1997 
involved an increase in technology diffusion. Battisti (2008) also uses the example of 
the environment and establishes that technology diffusion is a slow process. 
Governments’ policies may increase R&D investment but “should also look at the 
adoption and the extent of use of innovations because that is the place where the 
generation of the benefits from inventions takes place [p. 528].” Bustos (2011) shows that 
the MERCOSUR integration of Argentina involved a technological upgrading of domestic 
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firms because free trade may accelerate the adoption of new technologies and increase 
the productivity. 
The economic literature also studies the impact of other variables that influence the 
speed of technology diffusion. Geographic distance between two countries has an impact 
on technology diffusion because of its effect on bilateral trade. Generally, previous 
studies have proven that technology diffusion is faster within one country than between 
two countries (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; Eaton and Kortum, 1999; 
Branstetter, 2001). There is a border effect. Nevertheless, Irwin and Klenow (1994) 
find that the speed of technology diffusion did not significantly differ for US firms 
compared to foreign firms in the semi-conductor industry from 1974 to 1992. Other 
papers study the significant negative effect of the distance in kilometers on the speed of 
technology diffusion (Keller, 2002; Bottazi and Peri, 2003).  
Furthermore, there is a high correlation between technology diffusion and industrial 
protection. For example, patents impact diffusion because they protect information and 
technological endowment for firms. A patent may slow down technology diffusion by 
giving a product or process monopoly to firms from developed countries. However, citing 
patents may be a measure of technology diffusion. Eaton and Kortum (1999) consider 
that patent filings in a foreign country represent another (imperfect) measure. They 
prove that diffusion depends on the ability to file patents in the foreign country and on 
the level of patent filing costs. Pakes (1986) also mentions the role of patent costs when 
agents want to maintain the patent in force.  
The economic literature has also designed models with patents by studying the impact 
on national welfare. Such patents may involve monopoly rents for patentees. They may 
also encourage innovations because firms have to discover new processes or new 
products. One section of the literature considers that competitors’ imitations are never a 
threat and finds that policy makers select an optimal finite patent length (Nordhaus, 
1969; Scherer, 1972). Another section considers that imitations are costless and 
introduces patent length and breadth (Tandon, 1982; Klemperer, 1990; Gilbert and 
Shapiro, 1990). According to Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), patent breadth cannot be 
clearly defined: “a broader patent allows the innovator to earn a higher flow rate of profit 
during the lifetime of the patent [p. 107].” Even if patent breadth leads to deadweight 
loss, they demonstrate that the optimal patent length is infinite because it minimizes 
social costs. Gallini (1992) introduces an endogenous imitation cost by considering “the 
ability of competitors to invent around [p. 52].” He finds that the optimal patent length is 
short in order to avoid imitation. Such a result contradicts previous studies. Futagami 
and Iwaisako (2007) design a theoretical endogenous growth model in which 
innovators file patent on new goods. They determine the optimal patent length that 
maximizes households’ social welfare. They show that the social welfare decreases with 
an infinite patent length compared to a finite patent length.  
Mathew and Mukherjee (2014) study the impact of the patent regime on inward FDI 
in a North-South structure. The incentive of Northern firms’ FDI in the Southern 
country increases with a strong patent regime, especially when the costs of Southern 
innovations are high. A strong patent regime is a case in which only the patent holder 
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can sell its product. Here, the impact of the patent regime on the technology diffusion is 
ambiguous because it may increase FDI inwards in the Southern country, but it may 
also increase the monopoly period for Northern firms relative to the sales of new 
products 
The economic literature has also studied the case of patent collaborations. They are a 
potential measure of technology diffusion for collaborations between developed and 
emerging countries. For example, social network structures influence knowledge flows 
and actors’ performances (Cowan and Jonard, 2004; Schilling and Phelps, 2007). 
Fleming et al. (2007) prove that patent collaborations enhance productivity by 
considering regional small-world structures defined as “cohesive clusters connected by 
occasional nonlocal ties [p. 938].” Guan and Chen (2012) show that non OECD 
members improved their technological performances with collaborations with OECD 
members. Breschi and Lissoni (2009) study the relationship between geography and 
knowledge diffusion by illustrating that co-invention networks depend on the fact that 
researchers are not likely to relocate.  
The economic literature also uses gravity equations to find potential determinants of 
technological collaborations. Technological distance, common language and common 
border are significant determinants (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2001; Picci, 2010). Maggioni, Nosvelli and Uberti (2007) find a significant and 
negative impact of geographical and technological distances for 109 European regions 
over 1998-2002. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) study the specific case of emerging 
countries. They find a negative and significant effect of geographic distance and a 
positive and significant effect of technological proximity and common language. They 
also illustrate that stronger intellectual property rights increase international 
technological collaborations from multinational firms’ subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we 
have to mention an important limit in using patent collaborations as the explained 
variable. According to Bergek and Bruzelius (2010), patent collaboration statistics 
may be the result of simple inventor movements.  
0.5. Presentation of the Study 
This study aims to answer the following questions: 
§ Are firms from developed countries encouraged to innovate when their domestic 
government implements policy instruments? 
§ Do results hold with both process and product R&D? 
§ Do such policy instruments accelerate or slow down technology diffusion to emerging 
countries? 
§ What are the significant empirical determinants of technology diffusion? 
Chapter 1 illustrates the study of the impact of policy instruments (import tariff, 
production subsidy, R&D subsidy, quota, VER and minimum price) on R&D 
expenditures in a North-South theoretical framework. We consider a duopoly with a firm 
from a Northern country and another from a Southern country. The Southern firm 
benefits from a competitive advantage with a lower labor cost. The Northern firm invests 
in process R&D in order to reduce its marginal cost. Here, R&D expenditures are cost-
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reducing. We introduce uncertainty. We set a probability that the Northern firm’s R&D 
is successful and reduces its marginal cost. The results illustrate that each policy 
instrument increases the Northern firm’s R&D investment except for the import quota.  
Chapter 2 studies the impact of policy instruments on product R&D expenditures. We 
introduce vertical differentiation between goods by considering the same North-South 
duopoly. We analyze the impact of the same policy instruments as in Chapter 1 and of a 
quality standard. The results are generally the same.  
Chapter 3 introduces technology diffusion via a dynamic theoretical model. We consider 
that the Northern firm benefits from a technological advantage. It uses a new technology 
while the Southern firm only uses an old technology. Furthermore, the Northern firm 
files a patent that slows down the new technology diffusion and selects the optimal 
patent length. We study the impact of policy instruments implemented by the North on 
the speed of the new technology diffusion through the impact on the patent length. Since 
the main issue of this chapter is Southern countries’ economic development through 
technology diffusion, we also study the impact of policy instruments implemented by the 
South. The results show that policy instruments implemented by the North slow down 
the new technology diffusion except for the import quota. Policy instruments 
implemented by the South accelerate the new technology diffusion.  
In these theoretical chapters, we use the same structure, even if the model is dynamic in 
Chapter 3. Despite the possibility of drawing criticism on the use of a similar model 
structure, we stand by our choice since our framework is operational and allows us to 
easily achieve clear and targeted results.  
Chapter 4 makes an empirical study on potential determinants of technology diffusion. 
We analyze the impact of Eastern European countries’ European Union integration on 
their patent collaborations with Western European countries. We run econometric 
estimations for 13 Eastern and 7 Western European countries over 2000-2011. We study 
the impact on both the probability and the intensity of patent collaborations. The main 
result is that the European Union integration does not significantly increase the 
probability of patent collaborations but does significantly increase the intensity of such 
collaborations.  
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-CHAPTER 1- 
Policy Instruments, Cost-Reducing 
Research and Development, and 
Uncertainty in a North-South Duopoly6 
1.1. Introduction 
For many high-income countries, the issue of economic competitiveness in the face of 
growing globalization has been at the center of public debate for more than a decade. 
Competitiveness is an essential element of a country’s market shares and exports, as 
well as its production and employment levels. Determining the right policies to improve 
the competitiveness of a sector is complex, especially in the context of globalization. In 
particular, there is much debate over how to ensure that the private industrial sector 
can compete with imports coming from countries with low production costs. As we have 
mentioned in the general introduction (Chapter 0), the technological dimension is a key 
issue because R&D expenditures can lead to either reduced production costs or increased 
product quality. In that sense, R&D may be one way in which high-income countries’ 
private industrial sectors may react to growing competition from countries with lower 
production costs.  
Consequently, it becomes crucial to determine whether a high-income country’s 
government is in a position to support its domestic firms’ R&D expenditures. The 
objective of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of various “behind-the-border” and “at-
the-border” policy instruments on domestic firms’ R&D. We also evaluate the impact of 
these instruments on other variables like domestic production and profits, consumer 
surplus, and public revenues. Finally, we conduct a welfare analysis. We focus on cost-
reducing R&D investment in this chapter. R&D may be also undertaken with other 
objectives like the design of a new product (see Chapter 2).  
The model that we develop is based on Bouët (2001) by introducing uncertainty in the 
impact of R&D in a simple way. Such an uncertainty makes the model more realistic, 
which is an advantage over Spencer and Brander (1983) and Reitzes (1991). 
Moreover, this theoretical structure may be extended to Bertrand competition. A 
generalization to Bertrand competition is important. From its modeling features, this 
model is close to the broader set of strategic trade policy models. These models have been 
highly criticized for their lack of robustness, in particular the mode of competition.7 
Therefore, it is important to study the impact of the same policy instruments under both 
                                                          
6 A French version of this chapter has been written with Antoine Bouët (LAREFI, University of 
Bordeaux; IFPRI, Washington) and published in Revue Économique (Berthoumieu and Bouët, 
2016). An English version is available in an IFPRI Discussion Paper (Berthoumieu and Bouët, 
2015). 
7 See Brander and Spencer (1985) where the optimal export subsidy is positive under Cournot 
competition, and Eaton and Grossman (1986) where it is negative under Bertrand competition. 
An export tax is optimal under the second case. Other modeling features are identical.  
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Cournot and Bertrand competitions. A criticism may be raised against this theoretical 
structure since it is a partial equilibrium model. In short, this partial equilibrium model 
is not able to draw any general equilibrium conclusion. However, we can consider small-
sized industries. We can also argue that this theoretical structure is much more 
tractable than a general equilibrium model. 
We use a North-South structure with a Northern firm and a Southern firm. The 
Southern country is an emerging country. Each firm produces in its domestic country. 
The South benefits from a competitive advantage with lower production costs. The 
Northern firm implements cost-reducing R&D expenditures in order to reduce its 
production costs. But the R&D outcome is uncertain. It may be successful. In this case, 
the Northern firm benefits from a low marginal cost. But it may also be unsuccessful. In 
this case, the marginal cost is high. The Southern firm’s marginal cost is low. A possible 
interpretation is that it benefits from a lower labor cost. Therefore, the Southern firm 
does not invest in R&D. We set a probability that the Northern firm’s marginal cost is 
low. Such a probability increases with the R&D investment. 
We analyze the impact of six policy instruments implemented by the Northern 
government: (i) three “at-the-border” instruments (an import tariff, an import quota, and 
a minimum price); (ii) two “behind-the-border” instruments (a production subsidy and an 
R&D subsidy). Some of these effects have never been studied before in such a theoretical 
framework, specifically the quota, the minimum price and the production and R&D 
subsidies. While trade policy is traditionally understood as a set of policy instruments 
implemented “at-the-border” such as import tariffs, quotas, and VERs, we also study the 
impact of other barriers implemented “behind-the-border” such as production subsidies, 
R&D subsidies, public R&D investment and minimum prices.  
These “behind-the-border” policies are typically implemented with the objective of 
benefiting domestic firms over foreign firms. R&D subsidies in particular are becoming 
more and more common. The European Union implemented programs of technological 
development support in the 1980s (Luukkonen, 2000). The economic literature has 
introduced the concept of additionality i.e. “the difference which government-sponsored 
programs have made to the recipients, particularly companies, in terms of R&D activities 
[Luukkonen, 2000, p. 711].” In 2013, the French government created a Public 
Investment Bank (Banque Publique d’Investissement) in charge of funding innovating firms.8 
Also in 2013, “Romi,” a Brazilian firm, received a governmental loan of BRL 27 million 
with a below-market interest rate in order to invest in innovations.9  
Another form of “behind-the-border” policy is the implementation of business clusters, 
initiated or even subsidized by governments. A business cluster is a geographic 
concentration of firms interconnected in a particular field. It is based on the model of 
Porter (2000). In 2008, 71 business clusters (Pôles de Compétitivité) existed in France. 
They connect private companies with universities and private/public research centers. 
                                                          
8 See the article “Tailored funding with the Public Investment Bank” (December 5, 2013) by 
France Diplomatie, the official website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
9 See the newspaper article “Protectionism: The hidden persuaders” in The Economist (October 
10, 2013). 
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They have received USD 1.3 billion of public subsidies from 2005 to 2008. Broekel et al. 
(2015) study the case of the German biotechnology industry and show that “firms in 
(technology) clusters as compared to outside firms are particularly prone to receive 
support from the 6th EU-Framework Programs [p. 1441].” We also consider the 
implementation of a production subsidy. The WTO tries to prevent production subsidies 
because they may create trade distortions. However, governments can easily subsidize 
indirectly a domestic firm’s production via tax cuts and employment subsidies. A good 
example of production subsidies is European agricultural subsidies with the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 2014, the EU spends EUR 58 billion for agricultural 
subsidies (Source: Europa, European Commission Website).  
We also consider the implementation of “at-the-border” policy instruments. We study the 
impact of an import tariff even if it represents a traditional form of policy instrument. 
Governments still implement non-null import tariffs. For example, in 2014, the Most 
Favored Nation (MNF) applied tariff equaled 5.3 percent for the EU (WTO, ITC and 
UNCTAD, 2015). We also include quantitative restrictions like quotas and VER. 
Currently, 11 quantitative restrictions barriers on imports are in force for the EU 
(Source: WTO, Non-Tariff Measures Database). Finally, we study the impact of a 
minimum price agreement on R&D, as well as on domestic profits, production, and 
consumer surplus. This type of agreement has recently been implemented in the 
European Union. In 2013, the European Commission set a minimum price on imports of 
solar panels from China. Just prior to this agreement, the European Commission 
threatened Chinese exporters with a 47.6 percent antidumping duty (Source: Europa, 
European Commission Website).  
We conclude that each policy instrument increases the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
except for an import quota. In this case, the Northern firm reduces R&D expenditures. 
Furthermore, each policy instrument always increases the Northern country’s national 
welfare up to an optimal level except for the minimum price under several cases. These 
instruments often reduce the Southern country’s national welfare. Under Cournot 
(Bertrand) competition, the Northern government’s favorite policy instrument is the 
production subsidy (import tariff). 
Section 1.2 presents the model under Cournot competition and Section 1.3 analyzes the 
impact of the six policy instruments under this mode of competition. After explaining 
how the model is modified under Bertrand competition, Section 1.4 analyzes the impact 
of four trade policy instruments under this alternate mode of competition. We discuss 
the results and we make a welfare analysis in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes. 
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1.2. The Model under Cournot Competition 
Consider a partial equilibrium model with two countries. There is competition between a 
firm from a Northern country and another from a Southern country. There are two 
segmented markets. Each firm sells one share of its output domestically and exports the 
other share to the foreign market.  
The framework relates to an empirical example, for instance the automobile industry in 
which firms may innovate in terms of product and process. Firms export their finished 
good to foreign markets. The North-South duopoly works because Northern automobile 
firms face competition from Southern automobile firms. A significant example is Tata, an 
Indian firm which sells on its domestic market and exports to Northern markets. The 
firm operates “in over 175 markets” and has “over 6,600 sales and service touch points 
[Source: Tata Motors 69th Annual Report 2013-2014, p. 16].” The European Union 
represents an important market. Maruti Suzuki is another good example. Competition 
from Southern automobile firms is growing owing to lower production costs compared to 
Northern firms. The Indian market symmetrically represents a great opportunity for 
Northern automobile firms like Renault and Honda. For example, Renault sold 43,384 
vehicles between January and April 2015 (Source: The Economic Times).10 It also 
launched a new car model called “Kwid” for the Indian market on September 2015. 
Furthermore, the automobile industry is a good example because firms invest in both 
product and process R&D. Finally, we can legitimize the implementation of policy 
instruments. For example, in 2014, the European Union’s ad-valorem import tariff 
equals 10 percent in the automobile industry (Source: MAcMap). Developed countries 
also implement import quotas in such an industry. The number of quantitative 
restrictions in force on imports in 2015 is 18 in Australia, 6 in Canada, 4 in the 
European Union, 12 in Japan, 8 in New-Zealand, and 7 in Switzerland (Source: WTO).  
We denote by ݔ௡ (respectively, ݔ௦) the Northern firm’s domestic sales (respectively, 
exports to the Southern market), and ݕ௦ (respectively, ݕ௡) the Southern firm’s domestic 
sales (respectively, exports to the Northern market). We denote by ܺ௡ (ܺ௦) the total 
supply on the Northern (Southern) market such as: ܺ௡ ൌ ݔ௡ ൅ ݕ௡ (ܺ௦ ൌ ݔ௦ ൅ ݕ௦). The 
Northern market price is denoted by ݌௡ while the Southern market price is denoted by ݌௦. The Southern firm’s marginal production cost is low while the Northern firm’s 
marginal cost is low conditional to the success of an investment in R&D.  
Assumption 1.1: There is a Cournot competition on both markets. Each firm selects the 
optimal levels of domestic sales and exports. Prices depend on quantities and are given 
by inverse demand functions: ݌௜ ൌ ݌௜ሺ ௜ܺሻ ൌ ݌௜ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݕ௜ሻǡ ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ. The price decreases 
with the total supply on each market: ݌௜ᇱ ൌ ݌௜ሺ ௜ܺሻ  ௜ܺΤ ൏ Ͳǡ ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ.  
Assumption 1.2: Each firm’s production cost function is linear. Marginal production 
costs and unit transport costs are constant.  
                                                          
10 See the article “10 notable facts about Indian automobile market” in The Economic Times (June 
2, 2015). 
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Consider the following production cost functions: ܥሺݔ௡ ൅ ݔ௦ሻ ൌ ܿሺݔ௡ ൅ ݔ௦ሻ ൅ ݃ݔ௦ ൅ ܨ  ܥכሺݕ௡ ൅ ݔ௦ሻ ൌ ܿכሺݕ௡ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ ൅ ݃כݕ௡ ൅ ܨכ  
where ܿ (ܿכ) denotes the Northern (Southern) firm’s constant marginal production cost 
and ܨ (ܨכ) the Northern (Southern) firm’s fixed cost. We introduce fixed costs in order to 
include increasing returns. We have: ܿכ ൌ ܿ௟, where ܿ௟ denotes the value of a low 
marginal cost.  
The Northern firm invests in R&D. If such an R&D investment succeeds, its marginal 
cost is: ܿ ൌ ܿ௟. If it does not succeed, its marginal cost is: ܿ ൌ ܿ௛, with ܿ௛ ൐ ܿ௟, where ܿ௛ 
denotes the value of a high marginal cost.  
We denote by ݃ (݃כ) the Northern (Southern) firm’s unit transport cost. Introducing a 
transport cost is more credible for this model. Exports involve higher costs compared to 
domestic sales. Such a transport cost depends on the geographic distance between 
countries. We do not consider that R&D influences transport cost. Note that we could 
also have considered iceberg transport costs (Samuelson, 1954).  
The Northern firm invests a level ݎ of R&D, with a constant unit R&D cost denoted by ݒ. 
We have:  ൣ൫ܿ ൌ ܿ௟൯ ݎΤ ൧ ൌ ߙሺݎሻǢ ൣ൫ܿ ൌ ܿ௛൯ ݎΤ ൧ ൌ ͳ െ ߙሺݎሻǢ Ͳ ൏ ߙ ൏ ͳ    (1.1) 
Assumption 1.3: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases the probability ߙ that 
its marginal cost is low: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ߙሺݎሻ ݎΤ ൐ Ͳ. However, the returns of the R&D 
investment are decreasing: ߙᇱᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ଶߙሺݎሻ ݎଶΤ ൑ Ͳ.  
The economic literature also considers decreasing returns for R&D expenditures 
(Spencer and Brander, 1983; Reitzes, 1991).11 A good example of process R&D 
investment is the acquisition of cost-reducing production equipment. In this case, 
decreasing returns mean that the marginal effect of equipment decreases with the level 
of output. This assumption is important since it conditions a broad set of results, in 
particular how policy instruments affect R&D (positively or negatively). An implicit 
assumption is that the Southern firm learns the outcome of the Northern firm’s R&D in 
a first stage. This is the simplest and most straightforward assumption. However, we 
may consider another situation in particular whether the domestic firm has an incentive 
to share information with its rival about R&D success or failure.  
The Northern firm first sets the optimal level of R&D and, then, selects the optimal 
levels of domestic sales and exports. We begin by analyzing the second stage in which 
firms compete in production. Then, we study the first stage in which the Northern firm 
selects the optimal level of R&D that maximizes its expected profit. 
                                                          
11 For example, Spencer and Brander (1983) consider cost-reducing R&D expenditures. They 
assume that the second derivative of total production costs with respect to R&D expenditures is 
negative.  
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1.2.1. Optimal Domestic Sales and Exports 
In the second stage, each firm selects the optimal levels of domestic sales and exports 
that maximize their profit regardless of the level of the Northern firm’s marginal cost. 
The profit expressions are: ȫሺݔ௡ǡ ݔ௦ǡ ݕ௡ǡ ݕ௦ሻ ൌ ݔ௡݌௡ሺݔ௡ ൅ ݕ௡ሻ ൅ ݔ௦݌௦ሺݔ௦ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ܿሺݔ௡ ൅ ݔ௦ሻ െ ݃ݔ௦ െ ܨ െ ݒݎ  (1.2) ȫכሺݔ௡ǡ ݔ௦ǡ ݕ௡ǡ ݕ௦ሻ ൌ ݕ௡݌௡ሺݔ௡ ൅ ݕ௡ሻ ൅ ݕ௦݌௦ሺݔ௦ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ܿכሺݕ௡ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ݃כݕ௡ െ ܨכ  (1.3) 
The first order conditions lead to the following reaction functions:  ݔ௡ሺݕ௡ሻ ൌ ௖ି௣೙௣೙ᇲ Ǣ ݔ௦ሺݕ௦ሻ ൌ ௖ା௚ି௣ೞ௣ೞᇲ Ǣ ݕ௡ሺݔ௡ሻ ൌ ௖כା௚כି௣೙௣೙ᇲ Ǣ ݕ௦ሺݔ௦ሻ ൌ ௖כି௣ೞ௣ೞᇲ   
Assumption 1.4: The second order conditions are verified on each market ݅: ȫ௫೔௫೔ ൌݔ௜݌௜ᇱᇱ ൅ ʹ݌௜ᇱ ൏ ͲǢȫ௬೔௬೔כ ൌ ݕ௜݌௜ᇱᇱ ൅ ʹ݌௜ᇱ ൏ Ͳ. Cross effects are also negative: ȫ௫೔௬೔ ൌ ݔ௜݌௜ᇱᇱ ൅ ݌௜ᇱ ൏ͲǢȫ௬೔௫೔כ ൌ ݕ௜݌௜ᇱᇱ ൅ ݌௜ᇱ ൏ Ͳ. Own effects are greater than cross effects: หȫ௫೔௫೔ห ൐ หȫ௫೔௬೔หǢ หȫ௬೔௬೔כ ห ൐ หȫ௬೔௫೔כ ห.12  
The previous assumption implies that reaction functions are decreasing in the ሺݔ௜ǡ ݕ௜ሻ 
space and that the Nash equilibrium’s stability condition is verified on each market ݅. 
The slope of the Northern (Southern) firm’s reaction function is greater in absolute value 
than that of the foreign firm on the Northern (Southern) market. We have: ܦ௜ ൌȫ௫೔௫೔ȫ௬೔௬೔כ െ ȫ௫೔௬೔ȫ௬೔௫೔כ ൐ Ͳ. 
Let us demonstrate that the Northern firm is encouraged to invest in R&D by studying 
the impact of a change in ܿ. Differentiating the first order conditions, we find: ݔ௜ ܿΤ ൌȫ௬೔௬೔כ ܦ௜Τ ൏ ͲǢ ݕ௜ ܿΤ ൌ െȫ௬೔௫೔כ ܦ௜Τ ൐ ͲǢ  ௜ܺ ܿΤ ൌ ൫ȫ௬೔௬೔כ െ ȫ௬೔௫೔כ ൯ ܦ௜Τ ൏ Ͳ. The Northern 
(Southern) firm’s domestic sales and exports decreases (increases) with the Northern 
firm’s marginal cost. The total supply decreases with the Northern firm’s marginal cost. 
As a consequence, each market price increases with ܿ: ݌௜ ܿΤ ൌ ݌௜ᇱ  ௜ܺ ܿΤ ൐ Ͳ. Finally, we 
study the impact on each profit. We denote by ݔො௡ (ݕො௦) the optimal level of the Northern 
(Southern) firm’s domestic sales and ݔො௦ (ݕො௡) the optimal level of its exports. We also 
denote by ȫ෡ (ȫ෡כ) the Northern (Southern) firm’s maximum profit such as it implements 
the optimal levels of domestic sales and exports: ȫ෡ ൌ ȫሺݔො௡ǡ ݔො௦ሻǢ ȫ෡כ ൌ ȫכሺݕො௡ǡ ݕො௦ሻ. We have:  ୢஈ෡ሺ௖ሻୢ௖ ൌ பஈሺ௫ො೙ǡ௫ොೞሻப௖ ൅ பஈሺ௫ො೙ǡ௫ොೞሻப௫ො೙ ୢ௫ො೙ୢ௖ ൅ பஈሺ௫ො೙ǡ௫ොೞሻப௫ොೞ ୢ௫ොೞୢ௖ ൌ െቀ௫ො೙ஈೣ೙ೣ೙ஈ೤೙೤೙כ஽೙ ൅ ௫ොೞஈೣೞೣೞஈ೤ೞ೤ೞכ஽ೞ ቁ ൏ Ͳ  (1.4) ୢஈ෡כሺ௖ሻୢ௖ ൌ பஈכሺ௬ො೙ǡ௬ොೞሻப௖ ൅ பஈሺ௬ො೙ǡ௬ොೞሻப௬ො೙ ୢ௬ො೙ୢ௖ ൅ பஈሺ௬ො೙ǡ௬ොೞሻப௬ොೞ ୢ௬ොೞୢ௖ ൌ ௬ො೙ஈ೤೙೤೙כ ஈ೤೙ೣ೙כ஽೙ ൅ ௬ොೞஈ೤ೞ೤ೞכ ஈ೤ೞೣೞכ஽ೞ ൐ Ͳ  (1.5) 
The Northern (Southern) firm’s profit decreases (increases) with the Northern firm’s 
marginal cost. Therefore, the Northern firm is encouraged to invest in R&D in order to 
benefit from a low marginal cost and to increase its profit. 
                                                          
12 Subscripts denote partial derivatives.  
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1.2.2. A Linear Example 
In the body of this chapter, we use specific inverse demand functions in order to have a 
clear outcome. Consider linear inverse demand functions: ݌௜ሺ ௜ܺሻ ൌ ܽ௜ െ ௜ܺ, where ܽ௜ 
denotes the fixed part of the inverse demand function. Each firm selects the optimal 
levels of domestic sales and exports that maximize their profit, denoted by ݔො௡, ݔො௦, ݕො௡ and ݕො௦.13 We have: ݔො௡ ൌ ௔೙ିଶ௖ା௖כା௚כଷ Ǣ ݔො௦ ൌ ௔ೞିଶ௖ା௖כିଶ௚ଷ Ǣ ݕො௡ ൌ ௔೙ା௖ିଶ௖כିଶ௚כଷ Ǣ ݕො௦ ൌ ௔ೞା௖ିଶ௖כା௚ଷ    (1.6) 
The equilibrium market prices denoted by ݌Ƹ௡ and ݌Ƹ௦ are:  ݌Ƹ௡ ൌ ௔೙ା௖ା௖כା௚כଷ Ǣ ݌Ƹ௦ ൌ ௔ೞା௖ା௖כା௚ଷ         (1.7) 
Finally, the equilibrium profits ȫ෡ and ȫ෡כ are: ȫ෡ ൌ ሺ௔೙ିଶ௖ା௖כା௚כሻమଽ ൅ ሺ௔ೞିଶ௖ା௖כିଶ௚ሻమଽ െ ܨ െ ݒݎǢȫ෡כ ൌ ሺ௔೙ା௖ିଶ௖כିଶ௚כሻమଽ ൅ ሺ௔ೞା௖ିଶ௖כା௚ሻమଽ െ ܨכ (1.8) 
According to these expressions, the marginal cost ܿ reduces (increases) the Northern 
(Southern) firm’s domestic sales, exports and profit. It also increases each market price. 
1.2.3. Optimal R&D Investment 
The R&D outcome is uncertain. The Northern firm’s marginal cost may be either low or 
high. In the first stage, the Northern firm selects the optimal level of R&D that 
maximizes its expected profit by anticipating the previous results. We denote by ߨ௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ the Northern firm’s profit that depends on the value of its marginal cost ܿ௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ, R&D and fixed costs excluded.14 We have: ߨො௝ ൌ ݔො௡௝݌Ƹ௡௝ ൅ ݔො௦௝݌Ƹ௦௝ െ ܿ௝൫ݔො௡௝ ൅ ݔො௦௝൯. 
Let us call ܧሾǤ ሿ the expectation operator with respect to the R&D outcome. We have: ܧሾȫሺݎሻሿ ൌ ߙሺݎሻߨො ௟ ൅ ሾͳ െ ߙሺݎሻሿߨො௛ െ ܨ െ ݒݎ       (1.9) 
The first order condition gives: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ௩గෝ೗ିగෝ೓           (1.10) 
Using the specific linear inverse demand functions, the difference in profit equals:  ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛ ൌ ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ሺ௔೙ା௔ೞିଶ௖೓ିଶ௚ା௚כሻଽ          
Then, we have: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ଽ௩ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ሺ௔೙ା௔ೞିଶ௖೓ିଶ௚ା௚כሻ         
                                                          
13 In each chapter, the hat operator denotes the equilibrium expression for the variable. 
14 Each endogenous variable depends on the Northern firm’s marginal cost ܿ௝. Therefore, we use 
the superscript ݆. For example, ݔො௡௝  denotes the Northern firm’s equilibrium domestic sales when 
its marginal cost is ܿ௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ. 
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A simple interpretation of the previous equation stems for rewriting the Northern firm’s 
R&D investment as a function of the difference in profit ൫ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛൯ and of the unit R&D 
cost ݒ: ݎ ൌ ߰ൣݒǡ ൫ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛൯൧, with ߲߰ ߲൫ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛൯Τ ൐ Ͳ and ߲߰ ߲ݒΤ ൏ Ͳ. Therefore, we can 
study the impact of any policy instrument on the R&D investment by analyzing the 
impact on the difference in profit and on the total cost of R&D.  
1.3. Policy Instruments Implemented by the Northern Government 
We study the impact of several policy instruments implemented by the government of 
the Northern country on domestic R&D: an import tariff, a production subsidy, an R&D 
subsidy, an import quota, a VER and a minimum price. The implementation of policy 
instruments aim to increase both the probability of successful R&D and the national 
welfare. We make a welfare analysis in Section 1.5 to ascertain whether or not 
governments are encouraged to implement such policy instruments. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the timing of the model.  
-Figure 1.1- 
Structure of the Model under Cournot Competition 
 
Source: author.  
First, the Northern government selects the optimal level of the policy instruments that 
maximizes the Northern country’s national welfare by anticipating the levels of R&D, 
domestic sales and exports. We have:  ܧሺሻ ൌ ܧሺȫሻ ൅ ܧሺሻ ൅ ܧሺሻ        (1.11) 
The term  denotes the Northern country’s national welfare;  the Northern country’s 
consumer surplus; and  the Northern country’s public revenues.  
Second, the Northern firm selects the optimal level of R&D that maximizes its expected 
profit by anticipating each level of exports and domestic sales. Third, each firm selects 
the optimal levels of domestic sales and exports that maximize their profit. Note that we 
solve the model by starting with the third stage for each instrument. Then, we find the 
optimal level of R&D. We finish by finding the optimal level of the public policy 
instrument because we need to know the equilibrium expression for each variable.  
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1.3.1. An Import Tariff 
The Northern government implements an import tariff. We denote by ݐ the Northern 
government’s specific import tariff. The Southern firm’s profit expression, fixed and R&D 
costs excluded, is modified into: ߨכ௝ ൌ ݕ௡௝݌௡௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݕ௡௝൯ ൅ ݕ௦௝݌௦௝൫ݔ௦௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ܿ௟൫ݕ௡௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ሺ݃כ ൅ ݐሻݕ௡௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ  (1.12) 
In the second stage, the economic impact of the import tariff is the same as that of an 
increase in the Southern firm’s unit transport cost. According to previous equilibrium 
expressions, we can find the impact of the import tariff. The Northern (Southern) firm’s 
domestic sales (exports) increase (decrease) with the import tariff as compared to free 
trade. The total supply decreases on the Northern market. The Northern market price 
increases. There is a direct negative impact on the Northern country’s consumer surplus. 
Note that the import tariff has only an impact on the Northern market. Therefore, it 
does not directly influence the Northern firm’s exports, the Southern firm’s domestic 
sales and the Southern market price. Finally, the Northern (Southern) firm’s profit 
increases (decreases) with the tariff.  
In the first stage, the Northern firm selects the optimal level of R&D expenditures that 
maximizes its expected profit. The first order condition involves the same expression as 
under free trade, but the difference in profit now depends on the import tariff: ߨො ௟ሺݐሻ െߨො௛ሺݐሻ.  
Proposition 1.1: With the specific inverse demand functions, the Northern firm’s R&D 
investment increases with the implementation of the Northern government’s import 
tariff as compared to free trade.  
Proof: □ We have:  ߨො௝ሺݐሻ ൌ ൫௔೙ିଶ௖ೕା௖೗ା௚כା௧൯మା൫௔ೞିଶ௖ೕା௖೗ିଶ௚൯మଽ   
Hence, the difference in profit equals: ߨො ௟ሺݐሻ െ ߨො௛ሺݐሻ ൌ ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ሺ௔೙ା௔ೞିଶ௖೓ିଶ௚ା௚כା௧ሻଽ   
Therefore, the difference in profit increases with the tariff:  ୢൣగෝ೗ሺ௧ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௧ሻ൧ୢ௧ ൌ ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ଽ ൐ Ͳ  
The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the Northern government’s import 
tariff. □ 
Let us explain such a result. The import tariff reduces the Southern firm’s exports. The 
Northern firm’s profit increases when the Southern firm’s exports decrease. The direct 
impact of such a drop on the Northern firm’s profit equals its domestic sales: ߲ߨ௝ ߲ݕ௡௝Τ ൌെݔ௡௝ ൏ Ͳ. Furthermore, the Northern firm’s domestic sales are greater when its marginal 
cost is low which means that the positive impact of the drop in the Southern firm’s 
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exports on the Northern firm’s profit is greater when the marginal cost is low. As a 
consequence, the difference in profit and the R&D investment increases with the import 
tariff.  
However, we cannot find this result by using general forms for inverse demand 
functions. The effect of the tariff on the R&D is always positive with any other linear 
form. But under nonlinear forms, we cannot demonstrate that the effect is always 
positive (see Appendix 1.A). 
The positive impact of the import tariff relates to the results illustrated in the economic 
literature (Krugman, 1984; Reitzes, 1991; Bouët, 2001). The tariff involves a profit-
shifting from the South to the North. Such a profit-shifting is greater when the R&D is 
successful. The Northern firm is encouraged to innovate. Governments may improve 
their domestic price-competitiveness by implementing trade policy instruments like 
tariffs. 
1.3.2. A Production Subsidy 
Consider that the Northern government subsidizes the domestic firm’s production i.e. 
both domestic sales and exports. We denote by ݏ the specific production subsidy. The 
domestic firm’s profit is modified into:  ߨ௝ ൌ ݔ௡௝݌௡௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݕ௡௝൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝݌௦௝൫ݔ௦௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ൫ܿ௝ െ ݏ൯൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݔ௦௝൯ െ ݃ݔ௦௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ  (1.13) 
The economic impact of the production subsidy is the same as that of a drop in the 
Northern firm’s marginal cost. According to the impact of ܿ, we can find the effect of ݏ on 
domestic sales, exports, prices and profits. The Northern (Southern) firm’s domestic 
sales and exports increase (decrease) with the production subsidy. The effect on the total 
supply is positive on each market. The production subsidy reduces each market price. 
Therefore, there is a direct positive impact on each country’s consumer surplus. The 
production subsidy also increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) firm’s profit. 
Finally, it involves further public expenditures for the Northern government. The effect 
on public revenues is negative. 
Now, let us study the impact of the production subsidy on the Northern firm’s R&D 
investment via the effect on the difference in profit. 
Proposition 1.2: With the specific inverse demand functions, the Northern firm’s R&D 
investment increases with the implementation of the Northern government’s production 
subsidy as compared to free trade. 
Proof: □ We have:  ߨො௝ሺݏሻ ൌ ൫௔೙ିଶ௖ೕା௖೗ା௚כାଶ௦൯మା൫௔ೞିଶ௖ೕା௖೗ିଶ௚ାଶ௦൯మଽ   
Hence, the difference in profit equals: ߨො ௟ሺݏሻ െ ߨො௛ሺݏሻ ൌ ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯൫௔೙ା௔ೞିଶ௖೓ିଶ௚ା௚כାସ௦൯ଽ   
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Therefore, the difference in profit increases with the production subsidy: ୢൣగෝ೗ሺ௦ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௦ሻ൧ୢ௦ ൌ ଵ଺൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ଽ ൐ Ͳ  
The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the Northern government’s 
production subsidy. □ 
Let us explain such a result. The direct positive impact of the production subsidy on the 
Northern firm’s profit equals its output: ߲ߨ௝ ߲ݏΤ ൌ ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݔ௦௝ ൐ Ͳ. Furthermore, the 
Northern firm’s domestic sales and exports are greater when its marginal cost is low. 
The difference in profit and the R&D investment are stronger with the production 
subsidy as compared to free trade.  
Note that the effect seems to be stronger than the impact of an import tariff. The reason 
is that the production subsidy has a direct positive impact on the Northern firm’s profit 
while the tariff has only an indirect positive impact by reducing competition from the 
South.  
However, we cannot demonstrate such a result with general forms for inverse demand 
functions. The effect is positive for any other linear form, but uncertain for nonlinear 
functions (see Appendix 1.A). 
1.3.3. An R&D Subsidy 
The Northern government may also subsidize R&D expenditures. We denote by ߪ the 
R&D subsidy. The Northern firm’s profit is: ߨ௝ ൌ ݔ௡௝݌௡௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݕ௡௝൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝݌௦௝൫ݔ௦௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ܿ௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݔ௦௝൯ െ ܨ െ ሺݒ െ ߪሻݎǢ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ  (1.14) 
The first and second order conditions do not change compared to the initial situation 
without R&D subsidy. Furthermore, we have: ߨ௫೔ఙ௝ ൌ Ͳ; which leads to: ݔ௜௝ ߪΤ ൌ Ͳ. 
Therefore, the R&D subsidy does not directly modify domestic sales, exports, price and 
profits.  
In the first stage, the R&D subsidy influences the R&D investment. The first order 
condition gives: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ௩ିఙగෝ೗ିగෝ೓           (1.15) 
Proposition 1.3: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the 
implementation of the Northern government’s R&D subsidy.  
Proof: □ The R&D subsidy reduces the numerator of the previous equation. Therefore, it 
increases the R&D investment since ߙᇱᇱሺݎሻ ൑ Ͳ. The reason is that the R&D subsidy 
reduces the domestic firm’s R&D cost which now equals: ሺݒ െ ߪሻݎ. Such a result holds 
under general forms for the inverse demand function. □ 
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1.3.4. A Public R&D Investment 
It can be argued that the previous policy instrument is unrealistic. The distinction 
between R&D in volume (ݎ) and price (ݒ) may be difficult to identify in reality. 
Consequently, a public intervention aimed at directly increasing R&D would take 
another form. Consider now that the Northern government’s intervention consists in an 
additional public R&D investment in volume denoted by ݎ.  
Proposition 1.4: The Northern firm’s private R&D investment decreases with the 
Northern government’s public R&D investment. The total (public and private) R&D is 
unchanged as compared to the initial situation without public R&D.  
Proof: □ Such an additional public R&D investment ݎ does not influence the Northern 
firm’s profit. However, it changes the first order condition by selecting its optimal level of 
R&D. It becomes: ߙᇱሺݎ ൅ ݎሻ ൌ ݒ ൫ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛൯Τ . Since the right side of the previous equation is 
unchanged and ߙᇱᇱ ൑ Ͳ, the public R&D investment reduces the Northern firm’s private 
R&D investment by the same amount. The total (public and private) R&D is unchanged. 
It is a pure transfer from the Northern government to the Northern firm. □ 
1.3.5. An Import Quota 
Consider that the Northern government implements an import quota. We assume that 
the quota does not create public revenues because imports licenses are free. An 
introduction of quota revenues under imperfect competition is a really a complex issue. 
For Matschke (2003), in a duopolistic context under Cournot competition, “modeling the 
quota revenue is somewhat arbitrary [p. 212].” Many academic articles proceed along the 
same assumption. See for example Bouët and Cassagnard (2013).  
Let us suppose that the quota is binding and that ݍ denotes the quota level (i.e. the 
Southern firm’s maximum exports). If the Southern firm’s exports equal ݍ, the profit 
expressions are now: ߨ௝ ൌ ݔ௡௝݌௡௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݍ൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝݌௦௝൫ݔ௦௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ܿ௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݔ௦௝൯ െ ݃ݔ௦௝Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ   (1.16) ߨכ௝ ൌ ݍ݌௡௝൫ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݍ൯ ൅ ݕ௦௝݌௦௝൫ݔ௦௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ܿ௟൫ݕ௡௝ ൅ ݕ௦௝൯ െ ݃כݍǢ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ   (1.17) 
In the second stage, the Southern firm cannot select the optimal level of exports that 
maximizes its profit. The Northern firm’s domestic sales and the total supply on the 
Northern market equal:  ݔො௡௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ି௖ೕି௤ଶ Ǣ ෠ܺ௡௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ି௖ೕା௤ଶ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ      (1.18) 
A binding quota increases the Northern firm’s domestic sales. The Northern firm is 
encouraged to increase its domestic sales because competition from the South decreases. 
The total supply decreases as compared to free trade because the quota is binding.  
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The Northern market price equals:  ݌Ƹ௡௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ା௖ೕି௤ଶ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ         (1.19) 
The Northern market price increases as compared to free trade because the Southern 
firm’s exports are lower.  
Note that the quota has no direct impact on the Southern market. There is only an 
indirect effect by changing the level of R&D. The Northern (Southern) firm’s domestic 
sales (exports), the total supply on the Southern market and the Southern market price 
equal free trade levels.  
The equilibrium profits are:  ߨො௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ൫௔೙ି௖ೕି௤൯మସ ൅ ൫௔ೞିଶ௖ೕା௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మଽ Ǣ ߨොכ௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௤൫௔೙ା௖ೕିଶ௖೗ିଶ௚כି௤൯ସ ൅ ൫௔ೞା௖ೕିଶ௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మଽ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ
            (1.20) 
The Northern firm’s profit increases as compared to free trade owing to the drop in 
competition from the Southern country. The Southern firm’s profit decreases because the 
level of exports is no longer optimal.  
We consider two cases for the quota level. The first case corresponds to a relatively 
binding quota while the second corresponds to a strongly binding quota.  
§ First case: ݕො௡௟ ൑ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௛. The quota is relatively binding. If the Northern firm’s 
marginal cost is low, the quota is greater than the Southern firm’s optimal exports. 
In this case, the Northern profit does not change. But, if such a marginal cost is high, 
the quota is binding and the Southern firm has to export less than the free trade 
equilibrium level. The quota only increases the Northern firm’s profit under an 
unsuccessful R&D. The effect is null under a successful R&D. Denoting as ߨො௝ሺݍሻ the 
Northern firm’s profit with the quota and ߨො௝ its free trade profit with ݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ, we 
have: ߨො ௟ሺݍሻ ൌ ߨො ௟Ǣ ߨො௛ሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො௛. 
§ Second case: ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௟ . The quota is strongly binding. Under both cases, the quota is 
lower than the Southern firm’s free trade exports. In this case, the Northern firm’s 
profit increases regardless of the R&D outcome. We have: ߨො ௟ሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො ௟Ǣ ߨො௛ሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො௛. 
We omit the case in which the quota is not binding at all i.e. ݍ ൒ ݕො௡௛. In this case, the 
Northern firm’s profit remains the same as under free trade regardless of the R&D 
outcome. 
The Northern firm selects the optimal level of R&D investment. We have: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ௩గෝ೗ሺ௤ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௤ሻ          (1.21) 
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Proposition 1.5: The Northern firm’s R&D investment always decreases as compared to 
free trade with a relatively binding quota (first case). With a strongly binding quota, 
there is a non-null level of quota ݍ such as the R&D investment equals the free trade 
level. Therefore, the Northern firm’s R&D investment decreases as compared to free 
trade if ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡௟൯, levels off if ݍ ൌ ݍ, and increases if ݍ א ሾͲǡ ݍሻ. With a prohibitive quota, 
the R&D investment always increases.  
Proof: □ Let us study the two cases: 
§ With a relatively binding quota (first case), the Northern firm’s profit increases only 
when the R&D is unsuccessful. The difference in profit decreases with the quota as 
compared to free trade. Therefore, the R&D investment also decreases.  
§ With a strongly binding quota (second case), the Northern firm’s profit increases 
whatever the R&D outcome. The difference in profit equals: ߨ௟ሺݍሻ െ ߨ௛ሺݍሻ ൌ ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯൫ଶ௔೙ି௖೗ି௖೓ିଶ௤൯ସ ൅ ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯൫௔ೞି௖೓ିଶ௚൯ଽ   
Then, we have:  ୢൣగ೗ሺ௤ሻିగ೓ሺ௤ሻ൧ୢ௤ ൌ െ ௖೓ି௖೗ଶ ൏ Ͳ  
The difference in profit increases when the quota ݍ decreases. But, since a relatively 
binding quota reduces the R&D, such a result is not sufficient to prove that the 
difference in profit always increases as compared to free trade. There is a non-null 
level of quota, denoted by ݍ, such as the previous expression equals the free trade 
level: ݍ ൌ ଶ௔೙ିଽ௖೗ା଻௖೓ିଵ଺௚כଵ଼ ൐ Ͳ  
The value of such a quota ݍ is lower than ݕො௡௟ : ݍ െ ݕො௡௟ ൌ െ ൫ସ௔೙ାଷ௖೗ି଻௖೓ାସ௚כ൯ଵ଼ ൏ Ͳ  
Therefore, the difference in profit decreases with a strongly binding quota as 
compared to free trade if ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡௟൯. The difference in profit increases with a strongly 
binding quota, otherwise. For example, it increases with a prohibitive quota.  
A relatively binding quota always reduces the Northern firm’s R&D investment. The 
firm is encouraged to reduce its investment because the competition only decreases when 
the R&D is unsuccessful. A strongly binding quota either increases or reduces the 
Northern firm’s R&D investment as compared to free trade because there is a threshold ݍ such as the Northern firm’s R&D increases with a lower level for ݍ.  
Let us use a numerical example: ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǡ ݒ ൌͷͲͲ. Under free trade, we have: ݕො௡௟ ൌ ͳͳǤ͸͸͸͹Ǣ ݕො௡௟ ൌ ͳ͵Ǥ͸͸͸͹. Figure 1.2 illustrates the 
evolution of the R&D investment when the level of the quota varies. The grey line 
illustrates the free trade level. Here, we find ݍ ൎ ͷǤͷͷͷ͸, with Ͳ ൏ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௟ . Under such a 
numerical example, the R&D investment decreases with a strongly binding quota as 
compared to free trade if ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡௟൯. It levels off if ݍ ൌ ݍ. It increases if ݍ א ሾͲǡ ݍሻ. □ 
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-Figure 1.2- 
Evolution of the Northern Firm’s R&D Investment When ࢗ Varies under 
Cournot Competition 
 
Source: author. 
Note: ߙሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௞Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǡ ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. 
Comparing the impact of an import quota and that of an import tariff is interesting. The 
effect of the first (second) on the R&D investment is either positive or negative (always 
positive). However, both instruments reduce competition from the Southern country.  
The negative impact of import quotas on R&D investments has already been illustrated 
in the theoretical economic literature (Reitzes, 1991; Bouët, 2001). Authors also find a 
positive (negative) impact of an import tariff (quota) implemented by the domestic 
government. The economic literature explains the difference between these instruments 
by mentioning that quotas change the strategic relationship among firms while tariffs do 
not (Bhagwati, 1968; Krishna, 1989).  
With a quota, the Northern firm benefits from an advantage in terms of information. 
Since the quota is binding, it already knows the level of its competitor’s exports before 
selecting its domestic sales. The Southern firm no longer sets the optimal level of 
exports. On the Northern market, the Northern firm selects the optimal level of domestic 
sales without considering the Southern firm’s first order condition. 
1.3.6. A Voluntary Exports Restraint (VER) 
Quantitative restrictions can also take the form of Voluntary Exports Restraints (VER). 
Because such a policy is “voluntary,” it must be implemented by the Southern country. 
According to Bouët (2001), in the same theoretical structure, a VER has a strategic 
interest. The Southern government implements a VER denoted by ݍ௩ such as: ݕො௡௟ ൑ ݍ௩ ൏ݕො௡௛. Therefore, the Northern firm’s R&D decreases as compared to free trade because its 
profit only increases if its marginal cost is high. It decreases the marginal gain of an 
R&D investment. Bouët (2001) shows that a VER can increase the Southern firm’s 
expected profit because the probability of R&D success is lower. Therefore, a VER must 
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be such as ݕො௡௟ ൑ ݍ௩ ൏ ݕො௡௛. The Southern firm’s profit is always lower regardless of the 
impact on the R&D investment, otherwise.  
Proposition 1.6: The Northern firm’s R&D investment decreases with the Southern 
government’s VER. 
1.4. Bertrand Competition 
Let us introduce now price competition. Maggi (1996) proved that “the optimal trade 
policy depends on the mode of competition [p. 251].” Therefore, we verify whether or not 
our previous results hold under Bertrand competition.  
Figure 1.3 illustrates the structure of the model under price competition. 
-Figure 1.3- 
Structure of the Model under Bertrand Competition 
 
Source: authors. 
We denote by ݌௡ (݌௦) the Northern firm’s price on the Northern (Southern) market and ݌௡כ  
(݌௦כ) the Southern firm’s price on the Northern (Southern) market. To avoid a “Bertrand 
Paradox,” we assume that goods are slightly differentiated.  
Assumption 1.5: Both firms produce slightly differentiated goods. There is Bertrand 
competition on each market. Domestic sales and exports depend on both domestic and 
foreign prices: ݔ௜ ൌ ݔ௜ሺ݌௜ǡ ݌௜כሻǢ ݕ௜ ൌ ݕ௜ሺ݌௜ ǡ ݌௜כሻ. Each firm’s domestic sales and exports 
decreases (increases) with the domestic (foreign) price: ߲ݔ௜ ߲݌௜Τ ൏ ͲǢ ߲ݔ௜ ߲݌௜כΤ ൐ͲǢ ߲ݕ௜ ߲݌௜Τ ൐ ͲǢ ߲ݕ௜ ߲݌௜כΤ ൏ Ͳ. We have: ȁ߲ݔ௜ ߲݌௜Τ ȁ ൐ ߲ݔ௜ ߲݌௜כΤ Ǣ ߲ݕ௜ ߲݌௜Τ ൏ ȁ߲ݕ௜ ߲݌௜כΤ ȁ. 
In the second stage, each firm selects the optimal levels of price that maximize its profit. 
Each level of price, domestic sales, exports and profit depends on the R&D outcome. 
Therefore, we use the superscript ݆ again. The profit expressions are: ߨ௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௦௝ǡ ݌௡כ௝ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ ൌ ݌௡௝ݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݌௦௝ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௝ൣݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ݃ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ         (1.22) ߨכ௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ ൌ ݌௡כ௝ݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݌௦כ௝ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௟ൣݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ݃כݕ௡௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ         (1.23) 
The first order condition leads to: ݌௜௝൫݌௜כ௝൯ ൌ ܿ௝ െ ݔ௜௝ ݔ௜௝௣೔ൗ Ǣ ݌௜כ௝൫݌௜௝൯ ൌ ܿ௟ െ ݕ௜௝ ݕ௜௝௣೔כൗ .  
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Assumption 1.6: The second order conditions are verified: ߨ௣೔௣೔௝ ൌ ݔ௜௝௣೔௣೔൫݌௜௝ െ ܿ௝൯ ൅ʹݔ௜௝௣೔ ൏ ͲǢ ߨ௣೔כ௣೔ככ௝ ൌ ݕ௜௝௣೔כ௣೔כ൫݌௜כ௝ െ ܿ௟൯ ൅ ʹݕ௜௝௣೔כ ൏ Ͳ. Cross effects are positive: ߨ௣೔௣೔כ௝ ൌݔ௜௝௣೔௣೔כ൫݌௜௝ െ ܿ௝൯ ൅ ʹݔ௜௝௣೔כ ൐ ͲǢ ߨ௣೔כ௣೔כ௝ ൌ ݕ௜௝௣೔כ௣೔൫݌௜כ௝ െ ܿ௟൯ ൅ ʹݕ௜௝௣೔ ൐ Ͳ. Nevertheless, own effects 
are greater than cross effects: หߨ௣೔௣೔௝ ห ൐ ߨ௣೔௣೔כ௝ Ǣ ቚߨ௣೔כ௣೔ככ௝ ቚ ൐ ߨ௣೔כ௣೔כ௝ .  
Such an assumption involves the Nash equilibrium’s stability condition on each market: ܧ௜௝ ൌ ߨ௣೔௣೔௝ ߨ௣೔כ௣೔ככ௝ െ ߨ௣೔௣೔כ௝ ߨ௣೔כ௣೔כ௝ ൐ Ͳ.  
1.4.1. A Linear Example 
Consider the following linear demand functions on each market: ݔ௜௝ ൌ ܽ௜ െ ܾ௜݌௜௝ ൅ ݌௜כ௝Ǣ ݕ௜௝ ൌܽ௜ ൅ ݌௜௝ െ ܾ௜݌௜כ௝, where ܽ௜ denotes the fixed part of demand functions and ܾ௜ the horizontal 
differentiation with ܾ௜ ൐ ͳǢ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ. Each firm selects the optimal levels of price: ݌Ƹ௡௝ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻାଶ௕೙మ௖ೕା௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯ସ௕೙మିଵ Ǣ ݌Ƹ௦௝ ൌ ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻାଶ௕ೞమ൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗ସ௕ೞమିଵ Ǣ  ݌Ƹ௡כ௝ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖ೕାଶ௕೙మ൫௖೗ା௚כ൯ସ௕೙మିଵ Ǣ ݌Ƹ௦כ௝ ൌ ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖ೕା௚൯ାଶ௕ೞమ௖೗ସ௕ೞమିଵ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ   (1.24) 
Each level of price increases with the Northern firm’s marginal cost and is lower when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟.  
The levels of domestic sales and exports are:  ݔො௡௝ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖ೕା௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧ସ௕೙మିଵ Ǣ ݔො௦௝ ൌ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧ସ௕ೞమିଵ Ǣ  ݕො௡௝ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖ೕି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧ସ௕೙మିଵ Ǣ ݕො௦௝ ൌ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖ೕା௚൯ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖೗൧ସ௕ೞమିଵ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.25) 
The Northern (Southern) firm’s domestic sales and exports decrease (increase) with the 
marginal cost ܿ௝. The Northern (Southern) firm’s market shares are greater (lower) when 
the Northern marginal cost is low.  
The expressions of equilibrium profit are: ߨො௝ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖ೕା௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧మ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ  ߨොכ௝ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖ೕି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧మ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖ೕା௚൯ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.26) 
The Northern (Southern) firm’s profit increases (decreases) with the Northern firm’s 
marginal cost. The Northern (Southern) firm’s profit is higher (lower) when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟.  
The Northern firm’s difference in profit equals: ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛ ൌ ௕೙ሺଶ௕೙మିଵሻ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻିሺଶ௕೙మିଵሻ൫௖೗ା௖೓൯ାଶ௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧ሺସ௕೙మିଵሻమ ൅ ௕ೞሺଶ௕ೞమିଵሻ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻିሺଶ௕ೞమିଵሻ൫௖೗ା௖೓ାଶ௚൯ାଶ௕ೞ௖೗൧ሺସ௕ೞమିଵሻమ   
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            (1.27) 
We study the impact of each policy instrument under Bertrand competition in order to 
verify whether or not the results hold. Nevertheless, we do not study the impact of the 
R&D subsidy because it does not influence the profit, R&D and fixed costs excluded. We 
also study the impact of a minimum price.  
1.4.2. An Import Tariff 
Consider a specific import tariff implemented by the Northern government. The 
Southern firm’s profit expression is now: ߨכ௝ ൌ ݌௡כ௝ݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݌௦כ௝ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௟ൣݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ሺ݃כ ൅ ݐሻݕ௡௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ
            (1.28) 
According to the impact of ݃כ, the tariff increases each level of price on the Northern 
market. It increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) firm’s domestic sales (exports) 
and profit. The total level of supply decreases on the Northern market. Therefore, there 
is a positive direct impact on the Northern country’s consumer surplus.  
Proposition 1.7: Under Bertrand competition, the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
increases with the implementation of the Northern government’s import tariff as 
compared to free trade.  
Proof: □ We have: ߨො௝ሺݐሻ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖ೕା௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כା௧൯൧మ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ  
The difference in profit equals:  ߨො ௟ሺݐሻ െ ߨො௛ሺݐሻ ൌ ௕೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓൯ାଶ௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כା௧൯൧൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞ൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓ାଶ௚൯ାଶ௕ೞ௖೗൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ   
The difference in profit increases with the tariff:  ୢൣగෝ೗ሺ௧ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௧ሻ൧ୢ௧ ൌ ଶ௕೙మ൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൐ Ͳ  
Therefore, the Northern firm increases its R&D investment. □ 
The tariff reduces competition from the South and increases in the Southern firm’s price 
on the Northern market. The effect of the increase in the Southern firm’s price of exports 
on the Northern firm’s profit equals: ߲ߨ௝ ߲݌௡כ௝Τ ൌ ൫݌௡௝ െ ܿ௝൯ ൐ Ͳ. Such a positive impact is 
greater when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟. This is the reason why the Northern firm is encouraged to increase 
its R&D investment.  
As under Cournot competition, we cannot make general conclusions. The result holds 
under any other linear form for demand functions. But, we cannot demonstrate that they 
hold under nonlinear forms (see Appendix 1.B).  
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1.4.3. A Production Subsidy 
Consider a production subsidy implemented by the Northern government. The Northern 
firm’s profit expression now equals: ߨ௝ ൌ ݌௡௝ݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݌௦௝ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ሺܿ௝ െ ݏሻൣݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௡כ௝൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ݃ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.29) 
According to the impact of the Northern firm’s marginal cost, the production subsidy 
reduces each level of price. It increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) firm’s 
domestic sales, exports and profit. The effect on the total supply is positive on each 
market.  
Proposition 1.8: Under Bertrand competition, the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
increases with the implementation of the Northern government’s production subsidy.  
Proof: □ We have: ߨො௝ሺݏሻ ൌ ௕೙ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖ೕି௦൯ା௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧మ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚ି௦൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ   
The difference in profit equals:  ߨො ௟ሺݏሻ െ ߨො௛ሺݏሻ ൌ ௕೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓ିଶ௦൯ାଶ௕೙൫௖೗ା௚כ൯൧൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞ൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓ାଶ௚ିଶ௦൯ାଶ௕ೞ௖೗൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ   
The difference in profit increases with the tariff:  
ୢൣగෝ೗ሺ௦ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௦ሻ൧ୢ௦ ൌ ʹ൫ܿ௛ െ ܿ௟൯ ൤௕೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯మ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మ ൅ ௕ೞ൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ ൨ ൐ Ͳ  
The Northern firm is encouraged to increase its R&D investment. □ 
The positive impact of the production subsidy on the Northern firm’s profit equals its 
total output: ߲ߨ௝ ߲ݏΤ ൌ ݔ௡௝ ൅ ݔ௦௝ ൐ Ͳ. The Northern firm’s domestic sales and exports are 
greater when its marginal cost is low. The positive impact of the subsidy is greater when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟. The difference in profit and the R&D investment increases as compared to free 
trade.  
1.4.4. An Import Quota 
Consider that the Northern government implements an import quota as under Cournot 
competition. We still denote by ݍ the maximum level for the Southern firm’s exports to 
the Northern market. Consider that the quota is binding again. Studying the impact of a 
quota under Bertrand competition is complex because the levels of domestic sales and 
exports depend on each price. With a binding quota, a competitive situation is moved to a 
collusive situation (Harris, 1985; Krishna, 1989; Karikari, 1991; Boccard and 
Wauthy, 2006). 
Using the Southern firm’s free trade demand function for exports, we can express the 
Southern firm’s price of exports as a function of the Northern firm’s price of domestic 
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sales and of the Southern firm’s exports: ݌௡כ௝ ൌ ൫ܽ௡ ൅ ݌௡௝ െ ݕ௡൯ ܾ௡ൗ . With a binding quota 
such as ݍ ൏ ݕො௡, we have: ݌௡כ௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݍ൯ ൌ ൫ܽ௡ ൅ ݌௡௝ െ ݍ൯ ܾ௡ൗ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ       (1.30) 
The previous expression is the best-response to the Northern firm’s price of domestic 
sales. According to Karikari (1991), when the domestic country implements an import 
quota, “the output of the foreign firm is fixed” and “an increase in the price of the domestic 
firm leads to an increase in the price of the foreign price [p. 232].”  
The Southern firm no longer maximizes its profit with respect to its price of exports. 
Such a price only depends on ݌௡௝  and ݍ. The quota has a direct impact on the Southern 
firm’s price of exports and an indirect impact through the Northern firm’s price of 
domestic sales.  
The demand function for the Northern firm’s domestic sales is now a function of the price ݌௡ and the quota ݍ:  ݔ௡௝ሺ݌௡ǡ ݍሻ ൌ ൣܽ௡ሺܾ௡ ൅ ͳሻ െ ݌௡௝ሺܾ௡ଶ െ ͳሻ െ ݍ൧ ܾ௡ൗ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ     (1.31) 
The profit expressions are: ߨ௝ ൌ ݌௡௝ݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݍ൯ ൅ ݌௦௝ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௝ൣݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݍ൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ݃ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.32) ߨ௝כ ൌ ݍ݌௡כ௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݍ൯ ൅ ݌௦כ௝ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௟ൣݍ ൅ ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ݃כݍǢ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ   (1.33) 
The Northern firm benefits from a from a Stackelberg leadership on its home market 
(Harris, 1985) and selects the two optimal levels of price. The Southern firm only selects 
the optimal level of the price of domestic sales. The outcome on the Southern country is 
the same as compared to free trade. The Northern firm’s optimal price of domestic sales 
equals:  ݌Ƹ௡௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻା௖ೕ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤ଶ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ       (1.34) 
The Northern firm’s price of domestic sales increases with a binding quota as compared 
to free trade. The Southern firm’s price of exports is: ݌Ƹ௡௝כሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௖ೕ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ଶ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ     (1.35) 
Such a level of price is the Southern firm’s best-response on the Northern market. The 
equilibrium level of the Northern firm’s domestic sales equals: ݔො௡௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି௖ೕ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤ଶ௕೙ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ       (1.36) 
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The Northern firm’s domestic sales increase with a binding quota as compared to free 
trade. The equilibrium levels of profit are:  ߨො௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି௖ೕ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤൧మସ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ  ߨො כ௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ௤ሾ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௖ೕ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ିଶ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௚כ൯ି௤൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ଶ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖ೕା௚൯ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ
            (1.37) 
The Northern firm’s profit increases with a binding quota as compared to free trade 
while the Southern firm’s profit decreases because it no longer sets the optimal price of 
exports. Let us study the impact of the quota on the Northern firm’s R&D investment.  
We consider the same two cases as under Cournot competition. First, we consider a 
relatively binding quota that only reduces imports when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௛. Then, we consider a 
strongly binding quota that is binding regardless of the Northern firm’s marginal cost.  
Proposition 1.9: Under Bertrand competition, the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
decreases with a relatively binding quota as compared to free trade. With a strongly 
binding quota, the results are the same compared to Cournot competition if ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௟ . A 
strongly binding quota always increases the R&D investment, otherwise.  
Proof: □ Let us study the two cases: 
§ First case: a relatively binding quota. The Northern firm’s profit only increases when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௛. The difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade. 
§ Second case: a strongly binding quota. The Northern firm’s profit increases 
regardless of the level of its marginal cost. The difference in profit equals: ߨ௟ሺݍሻ െ ߨ௛ሺݍሻ ൌ ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି൫௖೗ା௖೓൯൫௕೙మିଵ൯ିଶ௤൧ସ௕೙ ൅ ௕ೞ൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓ାଶ௚൯ାଶ௕ೞ௖೗൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ   
There is a non-null quota ݍ such as the R&D investment equals the free trade level: ݍ ൌ ௕೙൛൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ൣ௫ො೙೗ ሺ௤ୀ଴ሻା௫ො೙೓ሺ௤ୀ଴ሻ൧ିଶ൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൫௫ො೙೗ ା௫ො೙೓൯ൟ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ ൐ Ͳ  
where ݔො௡௟ ሺݍ ൌ Ͳሻ and ݔො௡௛ሺݍ ൌ Ͳሻ denote the level of the Northern firm’s domestic sales 
when the Northern government implements a prohibitive quota such as ݍ ൌ Ͳ.  
Such levels are higher than free trade levels. Nevertheless, it is complex to 
demonstrate that such a quota is lower than ݕො௡௟ . The results are the same compared 
to Cournot competition if ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௟ . A strongly binding quota always increases the 
difference in profit, otherwise.  
Figure 1.4 illustrates a numerical example as under Cournot competition. We use the 
same numerical values for parameters and we set: ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹ. Under free trade, we 
have: ݕො௡௟ ൌ ͳͺǤʹ͸͸͹Ǣ ݕො௡௛ ൌ ͳͻǤͺ͸͸͹. Here, we find ݍ ൎ ͳͻǤ͵͸ͺͻ, with Ͳ ൏ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௟ . Under such 
a numerical example, the R&D investment decreases with a strongly binding quota as 
compared to free trade if ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡௟൯. It levels off if ݍ ൌ ݍ. It increases if ݍ א ሾͲǡ ݍሻ. The 
results are the same as those of Costa Cabral, Kujal and Petrakis (1998) in which 
the implementation of a quota close to the free trade level reduces the domestic R&D 
investment. □ 
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-Figure 1.4- 
Evolution of the Northern firm’s R&D Investment When ࢗ Varies under 
Bertrand Competition 
 
Source: authors. 
Note: ߙሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௞Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǢ ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. 
1.4.5. A Minimum price 
We now introduce a minimum price implemented by the Northern government. We 
denote by ݌௠௜௡ the minimum price such as the Southern firm cannot sell its product on 
the Northern market at a lower price. Consider that the minimum price is binding i.e. 
higher than ݌Ƹ௡כ௟. The profit expressions are: ߨ௝ ൌ ݌௡௝ݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௠௜௡൯ ൅ ݌௦௝ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௝ൣݔ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௠௜௡൯ ൅ ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ݃ݔ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.38) ߨכ௝ ൌ ݌௠௜௡ݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௠௜௡൯ ൅ ݌௦௝ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯ െ ܿ௟ൣݕ௡௝൫݌௡௝ ǡ ݌௠௜௡൯ ൅ ݕ௦௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯൧ െ ݃כݕ௡௝൫݌௦௝ ǡ ݌௦כ௝൯Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ (1.39) 
As the import tariff and the quota, the minimum price has an impact only on the 
Northern market. Since the minimum price is binding, the Southern firm no longer sets 
the optimal level of price of exports. The Northern firm’s price of domestic sales now 
equals:  ݌Ƹ௡௝ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ା௕೙௖ೕା௣೘೔೙ଶ௕೙ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ        (1.40) 
The Northern firm’s price of domestic sales increases with the minimum price. 
Therefore, each level of price is higher as compared to free trade on the Northern 
market.  ݔො௡௝ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ି௕೙௖ೕା௣೘೔೙ଶ Ǣ ݕො௡௝ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖ೕି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௣೘೔೙ଶ௕೙ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ  (1.41) 
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The Northern (Southern) firm’s domestic sales (exports) increase (decrease) with the 
minimum price. ߨො௝ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ൫௔೙ି௕೙௖ೕା௣೘೔೙൯మସ௕೙ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖ೕା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ  ߨොכ௝ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖ೕି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௣೘೔೙൧൫௣೘೔೙ି௖೗ି௚כ൯ଶ௕೙ ൅ ௕ೞൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖ೕା௚൯ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖೗൧మ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ Ǣ ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݈ǡ ݄ሽ
            (1.42) 
The Northern firm’s profit increases with the minimum price. The Southern firm’s profit 
decreases as compared to free trade because the firm no longer sets the optimal level of 
price of exports.  
Let us consider two cases again. In the first case, the minimum price is relatively 
binding. In the second case, it is strongly binding. 
§ First case: ݌Ƹ௡כ௟ ൏ ݌௠௜௡ ൑ ݌Ƹ௡כ௛. The minimum price is relatively binding because the 
Southern firm’s price of exports only increases when the Northern firm’s marginal 
cost is low. The Northern firm’s profit only increases when its marginal cost is low: ߨො ௟ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൐ ߨො ௟Ǣ ߨො௛ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ߨො௛.  
§ Second case: ݌௠௜௡ ൐ ݌Ƹ௡כ௛. The minimum price is strongly binding because the 
Southern firm’s price of exports increases regardless of the level of the marginal cost. 
The Northern firm’s profit increases under both cases: ߨො ௟ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൐ ߨො ௟Ǣ ߨො௛ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൐ ߨො௛.  
Proposition 1.10: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the minimum 
price as compared to free trade. The result holds under both a strongly binding and a 
relatively binding minimum price.  
Proof: □ We study the two cases: 
§ First case: a relatively binding minimum price. The minimum price is only binding 
when the Northern firm’s marginal cost is low. The Northern firm’s profit only 
increases in such a case. The difference in profit increases with the relatively binding 
minimum price: ߨො ௟ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ െ ߨො௛ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൐ ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛.  
§ Second case: a strongly binding minimum price. The minimum price is binding under 
both cases i.e. the Northern firm’s profit increases under both cases. The difference in 
profit equals:  ߨො ௟ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ െ ߨො௛ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௕೙൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔೙ି௕೙൫௖೓ା௖೗൯ାଶ௣೘೔೙൧ସ௕೙ ൅ ௕ೞ൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ൣଶ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೗ା௖೓ାଶ௚൯ାଶ௕ೞ௖೗൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మ   
Since the difference in profit increases with a relatively binding minimum price, we 
have to find the derivative of the difference in profit with respect to ݌௠௜௡ in order to 
study the impact of such an instrument as compared to free trade. The difference in 
profit increases with the strongly binding minimum price:  ୢൣగෝ೗ሺ௣೘೔೙ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௣೘೔೙ሻ൧ୢ௣೘೔೙ ൌ ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ଶ ൐ Ͳ  
We have again: ߨො ௟ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ െ ߨො௛ሺ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൐ ߨො ௟ െ ߨො௛.  
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Under both cases, the difference in profit increases with the minimum price as compared 
to free trade. The Northern firm increases its R&D investment. □ 
The positive effect of the minimum price on the Northern firm’s profit equals: ߲ߨ௝ ߲݌௠௜௡Τ ൌ ݌௡௝ െ ܿ௝. Such a positive impact is greater when its marginal cost is low. 
This is the reason why the Northern firm is encouraged to increase its R&D investment 
as compared to free trade.  
The results allow us to discuss the difference between a quota and a minimum price. A 
quota either increases or reduces innovations while a minimum price always increases 
it. Both instruments reduce competition from a firm that benefit from a competitive 
advantage. But a relatively binding quota reduces the R&D expenditures because it is 
only binding when the marginal cost is high. The quota may create a rent such as the 
Northern firm’s profit only increases with a high marginal cost. The relatively binding 
minimum price is only binding when the marginal cost is low. The Northern firm is 
encouraged to increase its investment.  
1.5. Welfare Analysis 
We have studied the impact of several potential policy instruments implemented by the 
Northern government on the Northern firm’s R&D investment. Let us study the 
economic impact of each policy instrument through the effect on the expected profits, the 
expected consumer surplus and the expected public revenues. We also analyze the 
impact on expected national welfares in order to verify whether or not the Northern 
government is encouraged to implement each policy instrument.  
1.5.1. General Framework under Free Trade with Cournot Competition 
Consider a concave function for the probability of R&D success: ߙሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௞,with Ͳ ൏ ݇ ൑ ͳ. 
Under free trade, the equilibrium expression of the Northern firm’s R&D investment is:  
ݎƸ ൌ ൤ସ൫௖೓ି௖೗൯ሺ௔೙ା௔ೞି௖೓ିଶ௚ା௚כሻଽ௩ ൨ భభషೖ  
The equilibrium expected profits are:  ܧൣȫ෡ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ݎƸ௞ ൫௔೙ି௖೗ା௚כ൯మା൫௔ೞି௖೗ିଶ௚൯మଽ ൅ ൫ͳ െ ݎƸ௞൯ ൫௔೙ିଶ௖೓ା௖೗ା௚כ൯మା൫௔ೞିଶ௖೓ା௖೗ିଶ௚൯మଽ െ ݒݎƸ െ ܨ  ܧൣȫ෡כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ݎƸ௞ ൫௔೙ି௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మା൫௔ೞି௖೗ା௚൯మଽ ൅ ൫ͳ െ ݎƸ௞൯ ൫௔೙ା௖೓ିଶ௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మା൫௔ೞା௖೓ିଶ௖೗ା௚൯మଽ െ ܨכ  
The expected consumer surpluses are:  ܧൣ෢ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ݎƸ௞ ൫௔೙ି௖೗ା௚כ൯మା൫௔೙ି௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మ଺ ൅ ൫ͳ െ ݎƸ௞൯ ൫௔೙ିଶ௖೓ା௖೗ା௚כ൯మା൫௔೙ା௖೓ିଶ௖೗ିଶ௚כ൯మ଺   ܧൣ෢כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ݎƸ௞ ൫௔ೞି௖೗ିଶ௚൯మା൫௔ೞି௖೗ା௚൯మ଺ ൅ ൫ͳ െ ݎƸ௞൯ ൫௔ೞିଶ௖೓ା௖೗ିଶ௚൯మା൫௔ೞା௖೓ିଶ௖೗ା௚൯మ଺   
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We suppose that the domestic country’s welfare is the un-weighted sum of the domestic 
firm’s profit, domestic consumer surplus and public revenues. The Southern country does 
not benefit from public revenues since it does not implement any policy instrument. This 
assumption may be criticized on the basis of political economy’s consideration. However, 
this is the simplest and most straightforward assumption. Under free trade, expected 
national welfares equal sums of the expected domestic profit and the expected domestic 
consumer surplus: ܧൣ෡ ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ܧൣȫ෡ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൅ ܧൣ෢ሺݎƸሻ൧Ǣ ܧൣ෡ כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ܧൣȫ෡כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൅ ܧൣ෢כሺݎƸሻ൧.  
1.5.2. Discussion 
Table 1.1 illustrates the economic impact of each policy instrument.  
-Table 1.1- 
Economic Impact of Each Policy Instrument 
Instrument ݎ ܧሺȫሻ ܧሺȫכሻ ܧሺሻ ܧሺכሻ ܧሺሻ 
Import Tariff + + – +/– + + 
Production Subsidy + + – + + – 
R&D Subsidy + + – + + – 
Import Quota +/– +/– +/– +/– +/– 0 
Minimum Price + + – +/– + 0 
Source: author.  
Each policy instrument implemented by the Northern government increases the 
Northern firm’s R&D investment except for an import quota. The impact of a quota is 
ambiguous. Each policy instrument increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) firm’s 
expected profit. But the effect of a relatively binding quota is ambiguous because it 
reduces the probability of R&D success.  
The effect of an import tariff on the Northern country’s expected consumer surplus is 
ambiguous: there is a negative direct impact by increasing the level of the Northern 
market price and a positive indirect impact by increasing the probability of R&D success. 
The total effect may be either positive of negative. The effect on the Southern firm’s 
expected consumer surplus is positive because it increases the probability of R&D 
success.  
The effect of the production subsidy on each expected consumer surplus is positive. The 
production subsidy has a direct positive impact on the Northern country’s consumer 
surplus by reducing the Northern market price and an indirect positive impact by 
increasing the probability of R&D success. There is an indirect positive impact on the 
Southern country’s consumer surplus.  
The Northern government’s R&D subsidy increases each country’s expected consumer 
surplus by increasing the probability of R&D success.  
The impact of a minimum price on the Northern country’s expected consumer surplus is 
either positive or negative while the impact on the Southern country’s expected 
consumer surplus is positive.  
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A relatively binding quota reduces each expected consumer surplus while the effect of a 
strongly binding quota is ambiguous.  
Finally, a production and an R&D subsidy reduce the Northern government’s public 
revenues via further public expenditures while an import tariff increases it. The impact 
of a quota and a minimum price is null.  
1.5.3. Optimal Policy Instruments under Numerical Simulations 
A welfare analysis is supposed to specify the optimal level of each instrument, the 
welfare associated with it, and a selection of the best instrument in terms of achieving 
the maximum welfare. It looks difficult if not impossible to get general demonstration 
since the domestic country’s welfare is expected based on a probability which is a strictly 
concave function of R&D. Specific values have been given to parameters.  
The values of ܽ and ܽכ must be high enough such as firms are encouraged to sell on each 
market. We set: ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵Ͳ, where ܽ௡ ൐ ܽ௦ because prices are generally higher in 
Northern markets owing to an higher market size. We set the following levels of 
marginal costs: ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵. Each firm’s unit transport cost equals one: ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳ. 
Since the function of the probability of R&D success is concave, we set: ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷ. We set a 
high value for the R&D unit cost because the level of R&D investment must be lower 
than one: ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. Finally, under Bertrand competition, we set: ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹ. Then, we 
modify the values given to these parameters, considering successively increased and 
decreased parameter ܽ௦, increased and decreased difference between ܿ௛ and ܿ௟, and 
increased and decreased ݇ (see Appendix 1.C and 1.D). Table 1.2 illustrates the optimal 
level of each policy instrument when the Northern government maximizes the expected 
domestic national welfare.  
-Table 1.2- 
Optimal Policy Instruments 
 Instrument Optimal Value οܧሺሻ οܧሺכሻ 
Cournot Import Tariff 17.4999 156.694581 -178.32866 
Production Subsidy 27.9999 555.044276 -6.4969288 
R&D Subsidy 56.5217391 0.15022222 -1.51377778 
Import Quota 0 162.153667 -180.498222 
Bertrand Import Tariff 16.3249918 176.231066 -265.452474 
Production Subsidy 2.8110735 6.26554886 -22.7749721 
R&D Subsidy 86.0051985 0.89662009 -1.90842309 
Import Quota 0 65.8124372 -313.056386 
Minimum price 16.6666667 0.15202836 -0.18499058 
Source: author.  
Note: ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃௡ ൌ ݃௦ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǢ ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. 
Each Policy instrument implemented by the Northern government increases (decreases) 
the Northern (Southern) country’s expected national welfare. We can compare each 
policy instrument.  
§ Under Cournot competition, the best instrument seems to be the production subsidy. 
But under Bertrand competition, it is the import tariff. Bertrand competition is too 
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competitive compared to Cournot competition. Under Bertrand, a production subsidy 
involves a high drop in the Northern firm’s prices. The demand for the Northern 
firm’s product increases sharply. Public expenditures become too high. They lower 
the positive effect on the Northern national welfare compared to an import tariff.  
§ The optimal quota is always prohibitive because: (i) it removes competition from the 
Southern country; (ii) it always increases the Northern firm’s R&D investment. 
Nevertheless, there is a negative effect on the Northern country’s consumer surplus 
by reducing the total supply. Furthermore, it does not involve further public 
revenues compared to a tariff. This is the reason why the prohibitive quota is never 
the best instrument.  
§ The minimum price is never the best instrument for the same reasons. The effect on 
public revenues is null and there is a negative effect on the consumer surplus. But a 
minimum price is worse than a prohibitive quota because it does not remove 
competition from the Southern country. It only increases the Southern firm’s price of 
exports. The minimum price may reduce the Northern country’s national welfare 
under several cases. 
§ The R&D subsidy is always worse than the tariff and the production subsidy. In the 
selected framework, an R&D subsidy only affects (positively) the probability of R&D 
success, here denoted by ߙሺݎሻ. Indeed, the R&D subsidy decreases the domestic firm’s 
total cost, in particular its R&D cost. But in terms of public revenues, it costs exactly 
the same amount such that the domestic welfare is unchanged. In particular, an 
R&D subsidy does not change the domestic firm’s output (in the Cournot case) or its 
price (in the Bertrand case) once the domestic firm’s marginal cost is known. It only 
modifies the R&D implemented by the domestic firm and consequently, the 
probability of reaching a low marginal cost. 
These results hold when parameters vary (see Appendix 1.C and 1.D). Therefore, we can 
conclude that the Northern country’s favorite instrument is the production subsidy 
under Cournot competition and the import tariff under Bertrand competition. 
1.6. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter was to evaluate the potential impact of various “at-the-
border” and “behind-the-border” policy instruments on local R&D. From a theoretical 
point of view, this chapter is based on a duopolistic model (under either Bertrand or 
Cournot competition) with a specific feature (compared to the literature); the impact of 
R&D is uncertain. The R&D investment increases the probability of R&D success, which 
we think is a realistic assumption. In that sense, this chapter is largely innovative. The 
analysis of the impact of an import quota and of a minimum price on R&D is particularly 
innovative. 
Each policy instrument increases the Northern firm’s R&D investment except for an 
import quota (and a VER). As a consequence, policy instruments are ways to support 
domestic firms that face growing competition from low costs countries. As we have 
mentioned in the general introduction, the empirical economic literature has also 
illustrated a positive impact of direct supports and tax cuts (Mansfield, 1986; Berger, 
-CHAPTER 1- 
58 
 
1993; Hall, 1993; Bloom et al., 2002). Nevertheless, we realize that there is no 
empirical evidence on the negative impact of an import quota.  
Another way of enhancing local R&D is to improve the quality of the environment in 
terms of law, property rights, knowledge diffusions, inventions, and innovations from 
(public and private) research centers to the private sector. An illustration is the US 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 which changed the ownership of inventions made with federal 
funding. In our model, this structural policy would imply a modification of the 
probability of successful R&D. The function would become more convex. Each dollar 
spent in R&D would lead to a more probable drop in the marginal production cost. 
What is the best instrument amongst all those considered here? We concluded on the 
superiority, in terms of welfare, of the production subsidy under Cournot and of the 
import tariff under Bertrand. This conclusion deserves a discussion. First, it is based on 
a specific government’s objective function. The specification of a government’s objective 
is always arbitrary since it is difficult to state the importance of consumer surplus, 
profits, and public revenues in a political process. Second, an important aspect of R&D 
expenditures is externalities, which should be included in governments’ objective. Third, 
dynamic considerations matter since R&D expenditures may have a long-term impact on 
competitiveness. If we consider a game over several periods, a failure of R&D today may 
reinforce the attractiveness of R&D tomorrow, while a success of R&D today may 
weaken a government’s interest in such expenditures tomorrow. 
R&D subsidies are an appealing policy instrument because their impact on R&D 
investments is systematically positive regardless of the form of demand functions. 
Furthermore, R&D subsidies may be more easily implemented than other policies. The 
use of instruments like quotas is forbidden by the WTO and the use of tariffs is not 
totally free. They are bound. Production subsidies are not prohibited since according to 
the WTO law, they are “actionable” but their implementation is under severe control 
since they may be implemented in specific circumstances for a limited period of time. 
Instruments like R&D subsidies and minimum price are not prohibited by the WTO as 
long as they do not have a negative impact on international trade. It may be difficult to 
demonstrate that a policy like an R&D subsidy has a negative impact on trade flows. 
Even if it is the case, international institutions are relatively tolerant. For example, in 
2012, the European Commission approved a French state assistance in the car sector 
even though it concluded that the measure would affect international trade flows 
(Evenett, 2013). In our model, we show that these policies have a negative impact on 
international trade, but they are “behind-the-border” policies and therefore are much 
less visible. The WTO members are not obligated to notify the implementation of such 
policies, unlike changes in tariffs and the implementation of quotas (“at-the-border” 
policies), which do have to be brought to the attention of the WTO. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
1.A. General Forms for Demand Functions under Cournot Competition 
Using general forms, we have: 
ୢగෝೕୢ௧ ൌ ௫ො೙ೕగೣ೙ೣ೙ೕ గೣ೙೤೙ೕ஽೙ೕ ൐ Ͳ ୢగෝೕୢ௦ ൌ ௫ො೙ೕగೣ೙ೣ೙ೕ గ೤೙೤೙כೕ஽೙ೕ ൅ ௫ොೞೕగೣೞೣೞೕ గ೤ೞ೤ೞכೕ஽ೞೕ ൐ Ͳ  
Under linear demand function, the only terms that depend on ܿ௝ are ݔො௡௝  and ݔො௦௝. In 
Section 1.2, we proved that the Northern firm’s domestic sales and exports decrease with 
its marginal cost. The positive effect of ݏ and ݐ on ߨ௝ is greater when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟. The 
production subsidy and the tariff implemented by the Northern government increase the 
difference in profit. But under nonlinear demand function, it is complex to find general 
results because each term depends on ܿ௝. In this case, each instrument may increase or 
decrease the difference in profit. Nevertheless, we did not find any nonlinear example in 
which the effects of ݏ and ݐ are negative.  
1.B. General Forms for Demand Functions under Bertrand Competition 
We have: 
ୢగೕୢ௧ ൌ ൫݌Ƹ௡௝ െ ܿ௝൯ ௬೙ೕ೛೙כ గ೛೙೛೙ೕ గ೛೙೛೙כೕ஻೙ೕ ൐ Ͳ  
ୢగೕୢ௦ ൌ െቈݔ௡௝௣೙൫݌Ƹ௡௝ െ ܿ௝ ൅ ݏ൯ ቆͳ െ గ೛೙೛೙כೕ గ೛೙כ ೛೙כೕ஻೙ೕ ቇ ൅ ݔ௦௝௣ೞ൫݌Ƹ௦௝ െ ܿ௝ ൅ ݏ൯ ቆͳ െ గ೛ೞ೛ೞכೕ గ೛ೞכ೛ೞכೕ஻ೞೕ ቇ቉ ൐ Ͳ  
Under linear forms, the only terms that depend on ܿ௝ are ൫݌Ƹ௡௝ െ ܿ௝൯ and ൫݌Ƹ௦௝ െ ܿ௝൯. Such 
terms are lower when the marginal cost increases. The positive impact of the tariff and 
the production subsidy is higher when ܿ௝ ൌ ܿ௟. The difference in profit increases with an 
import tariff and with a production subsidy. Nevertheless, under nonlinear forms, other 
terms also depend on ܿ௝. It is complex to conclude. The effect may be either positive or 
negative.  
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1.C. Welfare Analysis under Cournot Competition 
-Table 1.3- 
Optimal Policy Instruments When Parameters Vary (Cournot Competition) 
 Instrument Optimal Value οܧሺሻ οܧሺכሻ οܽ௦ ൌ ͳͲ Import Tariff 17.4999 158.250128 -177.395332 
Production Subsidy 34.9999 854.260938 76.4230361 
R&D Subsidy 48.1481462 0.15022222 -1.62933326 
Import Quota 0 163.495889 -179.258222 οܽ௦ ൌ ʹͲ Import Tariff 17.4999 159.805675 -176.462004 
Production Subsidy 34.9999 940.127359 77.667477 
R&D Subsidy 41.9354726 0.15022222 -1.74488838 
Import Quota 0 164.838111 -178.018222 οܿ௛ ൌ െ͵ Import Tariff 17.4999 178.371131 -158.040433 
Production Subsidy 27.9999 632.529389 34.7377213 
R&D Subsidy 64.0535365 0.06234722 -0.43736111 
Import Quota 0 184.483229 -158.692764 οܿ௛ ൌ ͵ Import Tariff 17.4999 137.872455 -198.725781 
Production Subsidy 27.9999 496.250615 -41.6587988 
R&D Subsidy 46.5994954 0.171125 -2.67324995 
Import Quota 0 137.72484 -202.872486 οܿ௟ ൌ െʹ Import Tariff 18.5 164.930012 -210.170963 
Production Subsidy 29.9999 609.762918 -15.8114829 
R&D Subsidy 50.6607919 0.20898765 -2.6532345 
Import Quota 0 167.795395 -213.274568 οܿ௟ ൌ ʹ Import Tariff 16.4999 150.555727 -148.325469 
Production Subsidy 25.9999 515.71914 8.33458123 
R&D Subsidy 62.2317335 0.08306173 -0.66449351 
Import Quota 0 156.644432 -149.476642 ο݇ ൌ ͲǤʹͷ Import Tariff 17.4999 147.419237 -182.872629 
Production Subsidy 27.9999 500.471542 -20.3797781 
R&D Subsidy 56.5217322 0.03059891 -0.32115396 
Import Quota 0 154.954443 -186.476677 ο݇ ൌ െͲǤʹͷ Import Tariff 17.4999 172.368071 -165.445103 
Production Subsidy 27.9999 616.251901 22.6681564 
R&D Subsidy 56.5217322 0.14623855 -1.45425606 
Import Quota 0 175.816914 -166.68535 
Source: author. 
Note: ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃௡ ൌ ݃௦ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǢ ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. 
-CHAPTER 1- 
61 
 
1.D. Welfare Analysis under Bertrand Competition 
-Table 1.4- 
Optimal Policy Instruments When Parameters Vary (Bertrand Competition) 
 Instrument Optimal Value οܧሺሻ οܧሺכሻ οܽ௦ ൌ ͳͲ Import Tariff 16.3641356 177.077206 -264.831061 
Production Subsidy 2.5797741 5.27689128 -19.5340494 
R&D Subsidy 74.6802106 0.89662009 -1.79549866 
Import Quota 0 67.4581528 -311.513453 
Minimum price 16.6666667 0.11307724 -0.11139058 οܽ௦ ൌ ʹͲ Import Tariff 16.4032794 177.925372 -264.203631 
Production Subsidy 2.34847488 4.37307218 -16.5382484 
R&D Subsidy 65.9906898 0.89662009 -1.68257417 
Import Quota 0 69.1038684 -309.970519 
Minimum price 16.6666667 0.07412613 -0.03779058 οܿ௛ ൌ െ͵ Import Tariff 16.6403524 183.304051 -259.148738 
Production Subsidy 3.16770375 7.7086204 -20.3069075 
R&D Subsidy 87.5338215 0.27128969 -0.46058685 
Import Quota 0 80.9602001 -298.829647 
Minimum price 16.2666667 0.02671674 0.00505662 οܿ௛ ൌ ͵ Import Tariff 16.1090108 171.288797 -271.141505 
Production Subsidy 2.59467535 5.6148374 -25.4347352 
R&D Subsidy 84.2074094 1.6336328 -4.33729984 
Import Quota 0 53.0880204 -325.311563 
Minimum price 17.0666667 0.42144425 -0.839548 οܿ௟ ൌ െʹ Import Tariff 17.1471747 194.210721 -298.888101 
Production Subsidy 2.88264153 6.80123247 -26.9124797 
R&D Subsidy 84.2026818 1.58196875 -3.77592537 
Import Quota 0 50.9386172 -381.878863 
Minimum price 15.6 0.31702155 -0.55554402 οܿ௟ ൌ ʹ Import Tariff 15.5737218 160.512892 -233.569325 
Production Subsidy 2.83981947 6.24697585 -19.3026191 
R&D Subsidy 87.8720873 0.40151482 -0.75164362 
Import Quota 0 66.1957339 -272.127866 
Minimum price 17.7333333 0.05597551 -0.02925353 ο݇ ൌ ͲǤʹͷ Import Tariff 16.106178 171.611904 -267.385802 
Production Subsidy 2.49764147 4.79965447 -21.6266148 
R&D Subsidy 86.0051939 0.43216462 -0.98121932 
Import Quota 0 56.9989457 -319.848486 
Minimum price 16.6666667 0.13093983 -0.15876898 ο݇ ൌ െͲǤʹͷ Import Tariff 16.5807505 181.896113 -261.102683 
Production Subsidy 3.1116528 7.6145443 -21.5736699 
R&D Subsidy 86.0051939 0.65573436 -1.36705455 
Import Quota 0 76.8587753 -302.676564 
Minimum price 16.6666667 -0.21302942 0.25437606 
Source: author.  
Note: ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͻǢ ܿ௟ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃௡ ൌ ݃௦ ൌ ͳǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǢ ݒ ൌ ͷͲͲ. 
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-CHAPTER 2- 
Policy Instruments, Product Research and 
Development, Vertical Differentiation, and 
Uncertainty in a North-South Duopoly15 
2.1. Introduction 
The increase in non-price competitiveness is another crucial issue for high income 
countries. For example, Switzerland tops the Global Competitiveness Index 2014-2015 in 
terms of “Innovation and Sophistication Factors” owing to high expenditures in R&D by 
both domestic firms and institutions  (Schwab, 2014).  
Product innovations measured by product R&D investments may significantly influence 
the features of finished goods. Firms may invest in R&D in order to increase product 
quality. Vertical differentiation represents a way to face competition from low-cost 
countries.  
There is still some debate about the role of policy instruments in the increase of non-
price competitiveness (see the review of the economic literature on product R&D in 
Chapter 0, Subsection 0.4.2). Therefore, the study of the impact of such instruments on 
product R&D expenditures is really important.  
In this chapter, we design the same North-South duopoly in which firms with 
asymmetric production costs compete on both markets. But we focus on Bertrand 
competition. The Northern firm invests in product R&D in order to differentiate its 
product compared to that of the Southern competitor. The outcome of this investment is 
also uncertain. If successful, the Northern firm produces a higher-quality version of the 
same good. If unsuccessful, then, no quality improvement is implemented. Our modeling 
of uncertainty is based on Chapter 1. We believe it yields more realistic results, which is 
one of the contributions of this chapter to the existing literature.  
We study the impact of the implementation of the same policy instruments by the 
Northern government as in Chapter 1. We also study the impact of a further instrument: 
a quality standard. A good example of quality standards in the automobile industry is 
the ISO technical specification ISI/TS16949 aimed at quality improvement and defect 
prevention. 
Our model involves a three-stage game. First, the Northern firm's government selects 
the optimal level of the policy instrument level by anticipating the Northern firm's 
product R&D investment and levels of price. Second, the Northern firm decides on the 
optimal product R&D investment that maximizes its expected profit. In the final stage, 
firms set their levels of price.  
                                                          
15 This chapter has been written with another PhD candidate, Viola Lamani (LAREFI, University 
of Bordeaux) and published in a LAREFI Working Paper (Berthoumieu and Lamani, 2016).  
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The main finding of our analysis is that each policy instrument increases the Northern 
firm's R&D expenditure except for the import quota. Therefore, a government whose 
only aim is to enhance non-price competitiveness by encouraging product R&D 
investments should implement one of these policy instruments. Nevertheless, the latter 
may have opposite effects on the expected consumer surplus, public revenues and 
welfare. We illustrate this result through numerical simulations. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the theoretical 
model. Section 2.3 presents an example under linear demand functions. Section 2.4 
analyzes the impact of six different policy instruments on the Northern firms' R&D 
investment. Section 2.5 conducts a welfare analysis and compares the efficiency of the 
policy instruments. Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2. General Framework 
Consider the same North-South duopoly as in Chapter 1 with two segmented markets.  
Assumption 2.1: There is Bertrand competition on each market. Firms select the 
optimal levels of price. 
Now, the Northern firm invests in product R&D (instead of process R&D) in order to 
increase the quality of its product compared to that of the Southern firm. The framework 
also relates to the automobile industry in which firms also innovate in terms of product 
by investing in product R&D. As we said previously, the economic literature shows that 
firms invest more in product R&D than in process R&D for high-tech industries 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990; Fritsch and Meschede; 2001; Park, 2001; Toshimitsu, 
2003; Jinji and Toshimitsu, 2013). R&D expenditures are generally higher for 
Northern firms compared to Southern firms. It explains why the quality of Northern 
automobile firms’ vehicles is generally higher compared to Southern automobile firms’.  
The outcome of the Northern firm's R&D investment is again uncertain. If successful, 
two different quality levels of the same commodity variety are on markets. We denote by ߶ the degree of differentiation between the two products. In this case, ߶ ൐ Ͳ. If 
unsuccessful, goods produced by both firms are similar in terms of quality if R&D. In 
this case, ߶ ൌ Ͳ. In this model, there are two levels of quality. The Northern firm does 
not select an optimal level of quality. It only invests in R&D in order to benefit from the 
vertical differentiation.  
Consider a probability of R&D success. We use the superscript ݀ to denote the case of a 
successful R&D (i.e. with vertical differentiation) and the superscript݄, otherwise. For 
example, ݌௡ௗ (݌௡௛) denotes the Northern firm’s price of domestic sales when the R&D 
outcome is successful (unsuccessful).  
Assumption 2.2: The probability of R&D success is still denoted by ߙ. The probability 
that the R&D investment fails is ሺͳ െ ߙሻ. The probability of success depends on the R&D 
investment level denoted by ݎ: ߙ ൌ ߙሺݎሻ. It increases with the R&D level: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൐ Ͳ. 
Nevertheless, the returns are decreasing: ߙᇱᇱሺݎሻ ൑ Ͳ. 
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The economic literature has also considered decreasing returns for R&D expenditures. A 
product R&D investment is an investment in knowledge. A good example is labor 
training that ensures the increase in the quality of the output. In this case, decreasing 
returns mean that the marginal effect of training may decrease over time. This 
assumption is really important since it influences a broad set of our results, in particular 
the impact of any policy instrument on the Northern firm’s R&D.  
The total cost of the Northern firm’s R&D investment is ݒݎ, where ݒdenotes the unit cost 
of the R&D investment. The Northern firm faces such a cost regardless of the R&D 
outcome. 
When no trade policy instrument is implemented, our model involves a two-stage game. 
First, the Northern firm selects the level of R&D investment that maximizes its expected 
profit by anticipating the levels of price. Second, each firm sets the levels of price that 
maximize its profit. The equilibrium solution is obtained by backward induction from the 
second stage of price competition. We analyze separately the case in which the R&D 
outcome is successful, and subsequently in which it is unsuccessful. 
2.2.1. Successful R&D 
First, consider the case of a successful R&D investment. We use the superscript ݀ for 
each variable. Goods are vertically differentiated.  
Assumption 2.3: Firms produce vertically differentiated goods. Consumers have a 
preference for quality denoted by ߠ that increases with ߶: ߠ ൌ ߠሺ߶ሻ. To simplify the 
demonstration, consider that the preference for quality is the same for each consumer in 
both the North and the South. The demand for a given good depends on each price and 
on the preference for quality: ݔ௜ௗ ൌ ݔ௜ௗൣ݌௜ௗ ǡ ݌௜כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻ൧Ǣ ݕ௜ௗ ൌ ݕ௜ௗൣ݌௜ௗ ǡ ݌௜כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻ൧Ǣ ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ. The 
demand for the Northern (Southern) firm’s product increases (decreases) with the degree 
of differentiation: ߲ݔ݅݀ ߲߶Τ ൐ ͲǢ ߲ݕ݅݀ ߲߶Τ ൏ Ͳ.  
We denote by ܥௗ (ܥכௗ) the Northern (Southern) firm’s total production cost. Consider 
linear total production costs functions such as marginal costs are constant. We denote by ܿௗ (ܿכ) the Northern (Southern) firm’s marginal cost. The level of ܿכ does not depend on 
the R&D outcome. 
Assumption 2.4: The Northern firm’s production cost depends on the degree of vertical 
differentiation. Producing a high quality good is costly: ߲ܥௗ ߲߶Τ ൐ Ͳ. The marginal cost 
also depends on the degree of vertical differentiation and increases with it: ܿௗ ൌܿௗሺ߶ሻǢ ܿௗ ߶Τ ൐ Ͳ. 
The economic literature considers that quality improvement influences either variable 
costs or fixed costs (Maskus et al., 2013; Cheng, 2014). Here, we consider an 
endogenous variable cost for the Northern firm. Its marginal cost increases with its level 
of quality. The total cost functions are the following: ܥௗ ൌ ܿௗሺ߶ሻሼݔ௡ௗሾ݌௡ௗǡ ݌௡כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿ ൅ ݔ௦ௗሾ݌௦ௗ ǡ ݌௦כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿሽ ൅ ݃ݔ௦ௗሾ݌௦ௗ ǡ ݌௦כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿ ൅ ܨ  ܥכௗ ൌ ܿכሼݕ௡ௗሾ݌௡ௗǡ ݌௡כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿ ൅ ݕ௦ௗሾ݌௦ௗ ǡ ݌௦כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿሽ ൅ ݃כݕ௡ௗሾ݌௡ௗ ǡ ݌௡כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿ ൅ ܨכ  
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ȫௗ (ȫכௗ) denotes the Northern (Southern) firm’s profit with a successful R&D i.e. with 
vertical differentiation. To simplify profit expressions, we set: ݔ௡ௗ ൌ ݔ௡ௗሾ݌௡ௗ ǡ ݌௡כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿǢ ݔ௦ௗ ൌݔ௦ௗሾ݌௦ௗ ǡ ݌௦כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿǢ ܿௗ ൌ ܿௗሺ߶ሻǢ ݕ௡ௗ ൌ ݕ௡ௗሾ݌௡ௗ ǡ ݌௡כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿǢ ݕ௦ௗ ൌ ݕ௦ௗሾ݌௦ௗ ǡ ݌௦כௗ ǡ ߠሺ߶ሻሿ. We have: ȫௗ ൌ ݌௡ௗݔ௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦ௗݔ௦ௗ െ ܿௗ൫ݔ௡ௗ ൅ ݔ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃ݔ௦ௗ െ ܨ െ ݒݎ      (2.1) ȫכௗ ൌ ݌௡כௗݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦כௗݕ௦ௗ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݕ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃כݕ௡ௗ െ ܨכ      (2.2) 
2.2.2. Unsuccessful R&D 
Consider now the case in which the R&D is unsuccessful. We use the superscript ݄ for 
each variable. We denote by ܥ௛ (ܥכ௛) the Northern (Southern) firm’s total production 
cost. The parameter ܿ௛ denotes the Northern firm’s constant marginal cost. According to 
Assumption 2.4, we have: ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൐ ܿ௛. The Northern firm’s total production cost no longer 
depends on the degree of vertical differentiation. Demand functions only depend on 
prices (see Assumption 1.5 in Chapter 1). 
Profit expressions are the following: ȫ௛ ൌ ݌௡௛ݔ௡௛ ൅ ݌௦௛ݔ௦௛ െ ܿ௛൫ݔ௡௛ ൅ ݔ௦௛൯ െ ݃ݔ௦௛ െ ܨ െ ݒݎ      (2.3) ȫכ௛ ൌ ݌௡כ௛ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݌௦כ௛ݕ௦௛ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݕ௦௛൯ െ ݃כݕ௡௛ െ ܨכ      (2.4) 
2.2.3. Choice of R&D Investment 
Assumption 2.5: The Northern firm is encouraged to differentiate its product with 
respect to the product of its competitor. The Northern firm’s profit increases with the 
degree of differentiation: ߨௗ ߶Τ ൐ Ͳ. The profit is greater in case of a successful R&D:  ߨௗ ൐ ߨ௛. The Northern firm would not be encouraged to invest in R&D, otherwise. We 
also consider that the marginal profit is stronger when the R&D is successful:  ݌௜ௗ െ ܿௗ ൐݌௜௛ െ ܿ௛ ǡ ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ.   
The Northern firm’s expected profit is: ܧሾȫሺݎሻሿ ൌ ߙሺݎሻߨොௗ ൅ ሾͳ െ ߙሺݎሻሿߨො௛ െ ܨ െ ݒݎ       (2.5) 
The Northern firm selects the optimal R&D investment level that maximizes such an 
expected profit. From the first order condition, we have: ߙᇱሺݎሻ ൌ ݒ ൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯Τ           (2.6) 
A simple interpretation of the previous equation stems from rewriting the Northern 
firm’s R&D investment as a function of the difference in profit ൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯ and of the R&D 
unit cost ݒ: ݎ ൌ ߰ൣݒǡ ൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯൧, with ߲߰ ߲൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯Τ ൐ ͲǢ ߲߰ ߲ݒΤ ൏ Ͳ. Therefore, we can 
study the impact of policy instruments on the R&D investment by analyzing its impact 
on the difference in profit. 
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2.3. Equilibrium with Specific Linear Demand Functions 
Let us use now linear examples for demand functions and total cost functions for an 
easier demonstration. First, consider the following function of consumers’ preference for 
quality on each market: ߠሺ߶ሻ ൌ ߶ߟ           (2.7) 
The parameter ߟ denotes the sensitivity of the preference for quality with respect to the 
degree of differentiation, with Ͳ ൏ ߟ ൑ ͳ. Demands now depend on ߶ߟ. For each market ݅, 
we set the following demand functions: ݔ௜ ൌ ቊ ݔ௜௛൫݌௜௛ǡ ݌௜כ௛൯ ൌ ܽ௜ െ ܾ௜݌௜௛ ൅ ݌௜כ௛ ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳݔ௜ௗ൫݌௜ௗ ǡ ݌௜כௗ ǡ ߶ߟ൯ ൌ ܽ௜ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ െ ܾ௜ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ݌௜ௗ ൅ ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ݌௜כௗ ǡ Ǥ  (2.8) ݕ௜ ൌ ቊ ݕ௜௛൫݌௜௛ǡ ݌௜כ௛൯ ൌ ܽ௜ ൅ ݌௜௛ െ ܾ௜݌௜כ௛ ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳݕ௜ௗ൫݌௜ௗ ǡ ݌௜כௗ ǡ ߶ߟ൯ ൌ ܽ௜ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ݌௜ௗ െ ܾ௜ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ݌௜כௗ ǡ Ǥ  (2.9) 
The parameter ܽ௜ denotes the fixed part of demand functions that does not depend on 
prices and quality. The parameter ܾ௜ denotes the horizontal differentiation between the 
two goods on the market ݅. We have: ܾ௜ ൐ ͳ. Under the unsuccessful case, each demand is 
more sensitive to the domestic firm’s price compared to the foreign firm’s price. Under 
the successful case, the following condition is necessary: ܾ௜ ൐ ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻΤ .  
Note that in previous studies, authors first set a utility function to infer demand 
functions (Sutton, 1997; Symeonidis, 2003). Our methodology is reversed. We first set 
demand functions. The expression of consumer surplus is then given by integrating the 
demand functions. The consumer surplus increases with ߶ߟ (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). 
Each firm selects the optimal levels of price that maximize its profit. Under a successful 
R&D, we have: ݌Ƹ௡ௗ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻାଶ௕೙మ௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻାథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻିଶ௕೙మ௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ   ݌Ƹ௡כௗ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻାଶ௕೙మሺ௖כା௚כሻିథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻିଶ௕೙మሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵାథఎሻ Ǣ     ݌Ƹ௦ௗ ൌ ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻାଶ௕ೞమൣ௖೏ሺథሻା௚൧ା௕ೞ௖כାథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻିଶ௕ೞమ൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖כ൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ     ݌Ƹ௦כௗ ൌ ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞሾ௖೏ሺథሻା௚ሿାଶ௕ೞమ௖כିథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ାଶ௕ೞమ௖כ൧൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯ሺଵାథఎሻ     (2.10) 
The Northern (Southern) firm’s prices increase (decrease) with the degree of 
differentiation. When two goods are vertically differentiated, the higher quality good is 
more expensive. The difference in price between the two goods increases with the degree 
of differentiation.  
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The levels of domestic sales and exports for each firm are: ݔො௡ௗ ൌ ௕೙൛௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻାథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧ൟ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ Ǣ   ݕො௡ௗ ൌ ௕೙൛௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺ௖כା௚כሻିథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧ൟ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ Ǣ   ݔො௦ௗ ൌ ௕ೞ൛௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯ൣ௖೏ሺథሻା௚൧ା௕ೞ௖כାథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻା൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖כ൧ൟ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯ Ǣ    ݕො௦ௗ ൌ ௕ೞ൛௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞൣ௖೏ሺథሻା௚൧ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖כିథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ା൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖כ൧ൟ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯    (2.11) 
Finally, consider that each firm's profit equals the sum of the profit earned on the 
domestic market and the profit earned on the foreign market: ߨොௗ ൌ ߨො௡ௗ ൅ ߨො௦ௗǢ ߨොכௗ ൌ ߨො௡כௗ ൅ߨො௦כௗ. We have: ߨො௡ௗ ൌ ௕೙൛௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻାథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻା௕೙ሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧ൟమ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ   ߨො௦ௗ ൌ ௕ೞ൛௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯ൣ௖೏ሺథሻା௚൧ା௕ೞ௖כାథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻା൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ା௕ೞ௖כ൧ൟమ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ    ߨො௡כௗ ൌ ௕೙൛௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻି൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺ௖כା௚כሻିథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺ௖כା௚כሻ൧ൟమ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯మሺଵାథఎሻ Ǣ   ߨො௦כௗ ൌ ௕ೞ൛௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞାଵሻା௕ೞൣ௖೏ሺథሻା௚൧ି൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖כିథఎൣ௔ೞሺଶ௕ೞିଵሻା௕ೞ൫௖೏ሺథሻା௚൯ା൫ଶ௕ೞమିଵ൯௖כ൧ൟమ൫ସ௕ೞమିଵ൯మሺଵାథఎሻ    (2.12) 
According to Assumption 2.5, the Northern (Southern) firm’s profit increases (decreases) 
with the degree of differentiation. Therefore, the difference in profit ൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯ is positive.  
Under an unsuccessful R&D, we can find equilibrium expressions of prices, outputs and 
profits by setting ߶ ൌ Ͳ and ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the positive impact of the degree of differentiation on the difference 
in profit mentioned in Assumption 2.5 with numerical values: ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅߶Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌǢܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ Ͳ. The positive impact increases 
with ߟ.  
The Northern firm selects the optimal level of R&D investment that maximizes its 
expected profit by taking into account the previous results. We know now the 
expressions of ߨොௗand ߨො௛. We use the same function for the probability of R&D success: ߙሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௞,with Ͳ ൏ ݇ ൑ ͳ. 
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-Figure 2.1- 
Evolution of the Difference in Profit ൫࣊ෝࢊ െ ࣊ෝࢎ൯ When ࣘ Varies 
 
Source: authors. 
Note: We set:ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅ ߶Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌǢܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ Ͳ. 
2.4. Policy Instruments Implemented by the Northern Government 
Let us study the impact of six policy instruments: an import tariff, a production subsidy, 
an R&D subsidy, a quality standard, a minimum price and an import quota. The 
Northern government may justify the implementation of these instruments by the 
increasing competition from an emerging country that benefits from a competitive 
advantage. Policy instruments aim to enhance the Northern firm’s non-price 
competitiveness by increasing the probability of a successful R&D outcome and to 
increase the Northern country’s national welfare. The structure of the model is the same 
compared to Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.3). The Northern government implements trade 
policy instruments that maximize the expected national welfare. We use the same 
function of expected national welfare as in Chapter 1. It depends on the domestic profit, 
the domestic consumer surplus and the domestic public revenues.   
First, we look for the equilibrium levels of price. Then, we evaluate the impact of each 
policy instrument on the R&D investment. Finally, we find the optimal level for each 
policy instrument (see Section 2.5). 
2.4.1. An Import Tariff 
Consider that the Northern government implements an import tariff. The Southern 
firm’s profit expression changes as compared to free trade: ߨכ ൌ ቊ ߨכ௛ ൌ ݌௡כ௛ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݌௦כ௛ݕ௦௛ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݕ௦௛൯ െ ሺݐ ൅ ݃כሻݕ௡௛ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨכௗ ൌ ݌௡כௗݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦כௗݕ௦ௗ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݕ௦ௗ൯ െ ሺݐ ൅ ݃כሻݕ௡ௗ ǡ Ǥ   (2.13) 
Proposition 2.1: Under the specific functions, the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
increases with its domestic government’s import tariff as compared to free trade.  
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Proof: □ Let us study the impact of the tariff on the difference in profit ሾߨොௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݐሻ െߨො௛ሺݐሻሿ. Note that the derivative of the difference is the difference of the derivatives:  ୢൣగෝ೏ሺథǡఎǡ௧ሻିగෝ೓ሺ௧ሻ൧ୢ௧ ൌ ୢగෝ೏ሺథǡఎǡ௧ሻୢ௧ െ ୢగෝ೓ሺ௧ሻୢ௧   
Furthermore, we already know that the Northern firm’s profit increases with the tariff 
regardless of the outcome of the R&D. We can study the impact of the degree of vertical 
differentiation on the positive impact of the tariff on the Northern firm’s profit. Then, we 
have to study the sign of the second derivative ଶߨොௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݐሻ ሺݐ߶ሻΤ . In this case, we 
analyze the impact of an increase in ߶ from 0 to 1 on ߨොௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݐሻ ݐΤ . A positive result 
means that the positive impact of the tariff is higher when ߶ ൌ ͳ compared to the 
unsuccessful case in which ߶ ൌ Ͳ. To simplify expressions, we set:  ߨොௗ ൌ ߨොௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݐሻ. We 
have:  
ୢమగෝ೏ୢ௧ୢథ ൌ ௕೙యȀమ൫గෝ೏൯భ మΤ ቄଶఎାቂ൫ୢగෝ೏ ୢథൗ ൯൫గෝ೏൯షభାఎሺଵିథఎሻషభቃሺଵାథఎሻቅ൫ସ௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻభ మΤ ൐ Ͳ  
The previous expression is positive because, from Assumption 2.5, we have:  ߨොௗ ߶Τ ൐ Ͳ. 
The other terms are positive. Therefore, the vertical differentiation increases the positive 
impact of the tariff on the Northern firm’s profit. It can be deduced then, that the 
difference in profit increases with the tariff as compared to free trade. The Northern 
firm’s R&D expenditures also increase. □ 
The tariff leads to a gain for the Northern firm. It is encouraged to invest more in order 
to benefit from a stronger gain. This can be explained by the drop in the intensity of 
competition from the Southern country. Since the tariff reduces imports from the low-
cost country, the Northern firm is encouraged to increase its R&D investment in order to 
increase the probability of vertical differentiation and further reduce its competitor’s 
exports. As a result, the cost of the tariff on the Southern firm's profit is greater in case 
of a successful R&D, because the effect is all the more negative on its market share.  
Nevertheless, we cannot demonstrate that these results hold under general forms for 
demand functions. The effect of the tariff on the difference in profit is always positive 
under any other linear form for demand functions. But under nonlinear forms, we cannot 
prove that the result is always positive (see Appendix 2.A). 
2.4.2. A Production Subsidy 
Consider now that the Northern government decides to subsidize the Northern firm’s 
output (both domestic sales and exports). The Northern firm’s profit expression changes 
compared to free trade: ߨ ൌ ቊ ߨ௛ ൌ ݌௡௛ݔ௡௛ ൅ ݌௦௛ݔ௦௛ െ ൫ܿ௛ ൅ ݏ൯൫ݔ௡௛ ൅ ݔ௦௛൯ െ ݃ݔ௦௛ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨௗ ൌ ݌௡ௗݔ௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦ௗݔ௦ௗ െ ൫ܿௗ ൅ ݏ൯൫ݔ௡ௗ ൅ ݔ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃ݔ௦ௗ ǡ Ǥ    (2.14) 
In contrast to the specific tariff, the implementation of a production subsidy has 
repercussions on both the Northern and Southern markets. Its economic impact is the 
same as that of a decrease of the marginal cost for the Northern firm. This results in a 
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drop in prices on both markets. While, the impact of the subsidy on the Northern firm's 
output and profit is positive, its Southern competitor's domestic sales, exports and profit 
decrease. Nevertheless, the overall sales on the Northern and Southern markets both 
increase. There is a direct positive impact on the Northern country’s consumer surplus. 
Proposition 2.2: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases if the following 
condition were verified: ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ൫ߨො௜ௗ ߶Τ ൯ ൐ ߟߨො௜ௗ. It decreases, otherwise. Using 
numerical simulations, we only find cases in which the effect is positive.  
Proof: □ Since the derivative of a sum is the sum of the derivatives, we have: ୢమగෝ೏ሺథǡఎǡ௦ሻୢ௦ୢథ ൌ ୢమగෝ೙೏ ሺథǡఎǡ௦ሻୢ௦ୢథ ൅ ୢమగෝೞ೏ሺథǡఎǡ௦ሻୢ௦ୢథ   
We denote by ߨ௜ǡ ׊݅ ൌ ሼ݊ǡ ݏሽ the Northern firm’s profit share earned on the market ݅. 
Setting ߨො௜ௗ ൌ ߨො௜ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݏሻ to simplify expressions, we have:  
ୢమగෝ೔೏ୢ௦ୢథ ൌ ௕೔యȀమ൫ଶ௕೔మିଵ൯గෝ೔೏భ మΤ ቂሺଵିథఎሻ൫ௗగෝ೔೏ ௗథൗ ൯గෝ೔೏షభିఎቃሺସ௕೔మିଵሻሺଵିథఎሻభ మΤ    
The sign of the term in brackets is undetermined. Therefore, we cannot demonstrate 
that the impact is always positive. The expression above would be positive if the 
following condition were verified: ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ൫ߨො ݅݀ ߶ൗ ൯ ൐ ߟߨො ݅݀ . □ 
We offer the following economic explanation to this inconclusive mathematical result. 
Following the implementation of the production subsidy by the Northern government, 
both markets experience a fall in prices. The magnitude of the effect is however, greater 
for the Northern firm. As a result, its domestic sales and exports increase. The increase 
is even bigger compared to a tariff. As stated previously, the main feature of vertical 
differentiation is the change in demand functions. In case of a production subsidy, the 
increase of demand for the Northern firm’s good is such as the Northern firm may be less 
encouraged to increase its R&D investment.  
Nevertheless, taking numerical values for parameters, we always find a positive impact 
of the production subsidy on the difference in profit. The Northern firm is generally 
encouraged to increase its R&D investment because the revenues of the subsidy increase 
with the level of output. Such a level increases with vertical differentiation. The effect of 
the production subsidy on the R&D investment is positive in this case, because the 
output effect is stronger than the price effect. 
2.4.3. An R&D Subsidy 
Consider now the case in which the Northern government subsidizes its domestic firm's 
R&D investment. Such a specific subsidy reduces the total R&D cost. The Northern 
firm’s expected profit changes compared to free trade: ܧሾȫሺݎǡ ߪሻሿ ൌ ߙሺݎሻߨොௗ ൅ ሾͳ െ ߙሺݎሻሿߨො௛ െ ሺݒ െ ߪሻݎ      (2.15) 
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The optimal R&D investment is now: 
ݎሺߪሻ ൌ ൤௞൫గෝ೏ିగෝ೓൯௩ିఙ ൨ భభషೖ          (2.16) 
The R&D subsidy does not directly influence prices and outputs. But there is an indirect 
impact by influencing the Northern firm’s R&D expenditures and the probability of R&D 
success.  
Proposition 2.3: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with its government’s 
R&D subsidy as compared to the initial situation without subsidy.  
Proof: □ The subsidy ߪ reduces the denominator of ݎሺߪሻ. Therefore, the R&D investment 
increases with the R&D subsidy: ݎሺߪሻ ߪΤ ൐ Ͳ. The Northern firm increases its R&D 
investment because the total R&D cost is lower. □ 
2.4.4. A Quality Standard 
The Northern government may decide to implement a quality standard on the domestic 
market regardless of the outcome of the R&D. In this case, the introduction of a quality 
standard gives the Northern firm a monopoly power on the Northern market if the R&D 
is successful, since its competitor produces a lower quality good and does not meet the 
standard. Therefore, the demand for the Northern firm’s product no longer depends on 
the Southern firm’s price. But if the R&D is unsuccessful, there is no market in the 
Northern country.  
We use the superscripts ݄ݏ and ݀ݏ for variables with the quality standard. Under the 
successful case, we set ݕ௡ௗ௦ ൌ Ͳ in order to express ݌௡כௗ as a function of ݌௡ௗ . We deduce the 
following demand function for the Northern firm’s product sold on its domestic market:  ݔ௡ௗ௦൫݌௡ௗ௦ǡ ߶ߟ൯ ൌ ሼܽ௡ሾܾ௡ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ൅ ͳ െ ߶ߟሿ െ ሺܾ௡ଶ െ ͳሻሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ݌௡ௗ௦ሽ ܾΤ    (2.17) 
Prices and demand functions on the Southern market are unchanged. For example, ݔ௦ௗ 
still denotes the Northern firm’s exports. The profit expressions are: ߨ ൌ ቊ ߨ௛௦ ൌ ݌௦௛ݔ௦௛ െ ൫ܿ௛ ൅ ݃൯ݔ௦௛ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨௗ௦ ൌ ݌௡ௗ௦ݔ௡ௗ௦ ൅ ݌௦ௗݔ௦ௗ െ ܿௗ൫ݔ௡ௗ௦ ൅ ݔ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃ݔ௦ௗ ǡ Ǥ    (2.18) ߨכ ൌ ቊ ߨכௗ௛ ൌ ݌௦כ௛ݕ௦௛ െ ܿכݕ௦௛ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨכௗ௦ ൌ ݌௦כௗݕ௦ௗ െ ܿכݕ௦ௗ ǡ Ǥ       (2.19) 
With a successful R&D, the Northern firm’s equilibrium price of domestic sales is: ݌Ƹ௡ௗ௦ሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻା൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻାథఎൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ିଵሻି൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻ൧ଶ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ      (2.20) 
Since there is no longer competition from the Southern firm, the Northern firm's price on 
its domestic market increases as compared to free trade in case of a successful R&D 
investment. The monopoly situation relates to a case in which the Southern firm sets a 
level of price of exports approaching infinity because the demand for its product would 
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tend toward zero in this case. According to the reaction functions under the initial case 
without quality standard, the Northern firm's domestic price increases with the 
Southern firm's foreign price: ݌௡ௗ ݌௡כௗΤ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ሾʹܾ௡ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻሿΤ ൐ Ͳ. This result entails 
that the Northern firm's domestic price is higher as compared to the initial case.  
The Northern firm's domestic sales are:  ݔො௡ௗ௦ሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻାథఎൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ିଵሻା൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻ൧ଶ௕೙      (2.21) 
The Northern firm’s domestic sales also increase when a quality standard is 
implemented. By the same reasoning as above we have: ݔ௡ௗ ݌௡כௗΤ ൌ ൫߲ݔ௡ௗ ߲݌௡ௗΤ ൯൫݌௡ௗ ݌௡כௗΤ ൯ ൅ ߲ݔ௡ௗ ߲݌௡כௗΤ ൌ ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ʹΤ ൐ Ͳ. However, total sales on 
the Northern market decrease because the Southern firm leaves the market and the 
domestic price increases.  
Finally, the Northern firm’s profit earned on its domestic market equals: ߨො௡ௗ௦ሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻାథఎൣ௔ሺ௕೙ିଵሻା൫௕೙మିଵ൯௖೏ሺథሻ൧ସ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ      (2.22) 
Given the monopoly situation, the Northern firm's optimal level of profit is greater than 
the free trade level. Moreover, the Northern firm sets a higher price and its marginal 
profit increases. Its level of output is also stronger.  
We now look for the impact of the quality standard on the Northern firm’s R&D 
investment. The equilibrium level of R&D is given by: 
ݎ ൌ ൤௞൫గෝ೏ೞିగෝ೓ೞ൯௩ ൨ భభషೖ          (2.23) 
Proposition 2.4: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the 
implementation of the quality standard. 
Proof: □ The quality standard only increases the Northern firm’s profit if the R&D is 
successful. With an unsuccessful R&D, such a profit decreases because there is no 
market in the North while the profit earned in the South is the same as compared to the 
initial case. Therefore, the difference in profit increases as compared to the initial case: ൫ߨොௗ௦ െ ߨො௛௦൯ ൐ ൫ߨොௗ െ ߨො௛൯. The Northern firm increases its R&D investment in order to 
increase the probability of R&D success, and then, to benefit from the monopoly in the 
North with the quality standard. □ 
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2.4.5. A Minimum price 
The quality standard is a prohibitive quota in case of a successful R&D. The Northern 
government may also implement price restrictions. Consider a minimum price such as 
the Southern firm cannot sell its product on the Northern market with a lower price. The 
Southern firm’s profit expression is: ߨכ ൌ ቊ ߨכ௛ ൌ ݌௠௜௡ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݌௦כ௛ݕ௦௛ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡௛ ൅ ݕ௦௛൯ െ ݃כݕ௡௛ ǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨכௗ ൌ ݌௠௜௡ݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦כௗݕ௦ௗ െ ܿכ൫ݕ௡ௗ ൅ ݕ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃כݕ௡ௗ ǡ Ǥ    (2.24) 
The Northern government can select two levels of minimum price: 
§ A relatively binding minimum price such as: ݌Ƹ௡כௗ ൏ ݌௠௜௡ ൑ ݌Ƹ௡כ௛. The minimum price 
has only an economic impact if the R&D is successful. There is no effect when the 
R&D is unsuccessful. 
§ A strongly binding minimum price such as:  ݌௠௜௡ ൐ ݌Ƹ௡כ௛. The minimum price has an 
impact whatever the R&D outcome.  
Note that there is a third case in which the minimum price is not binding:  ݌௠௜௡ ൑ ݌Ƹ௡כௗ. 
We do not study this case because the effect of the minimum price would be null. Only 
the Northern firm selects the optimal level of price that maximizes its profit. Under a 
successful R&D, we have: ݌Ƹ௡ሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙ାథఎൣ௔೙ି௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙൧ଶ௕೙ሺଵିథఎሻ       (2.25) 
The Northern firm's domestic sales and the Southern firm's exports are respectively: ݔො௡ሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ି௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙ାథఎൣ௔೙ା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙൧ଶ Ǣ  ݕො௡ሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻି௣೘೔೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ିథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൧ଶ௕೙   (2.26) 
The Northern firm’s domestic price increases as compared to free trade because prices 
are strategic complements under Bertrand competition. Meanwhile, the Southern firm’s 
exports decrease with the minimum price because its price of exports is higher as 
compared to a free trade. Conversely, the effect on the Northern firm’s output is positive 
even if its price also increases. The minimum price increases the Northern firm’s market 
share.  
The equilibrium profit shares earned on the Northern market are: ߨො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ൛௔೙ି௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙ାథఎൣ௔೙ା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙൧ൟమସ௕೙ሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ      ߨො௡כௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ ൌ ൛௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ାଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻି௣೘೔೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ିథఎൣ௔೙ሺଶ௕೙ିଵሻା௕೙௖೏ሺథሻା௣೘೔೙൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯൧ൟሺ௣೘೔೙ି௖כሻଶ௕೙  (2.27) 
The Northern firm’s profit increases with the minimum price. The impact is also positive 
in case of an unsuccessful R&D. The Southern firm cannot maximize its profit anymore 
on the Northern market. Therefore, its profit decreases.  
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Proposition 2.5: The Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with both a relatively 
and a strongly binding minimum price.  
Proof: □ We consider two cases: 
§ First, let us study the impact of the relatively binding minimum price. In case of an 
unsuccessful R&D investment, the Northern firm’s profit is the same as under free 
trade. This profit increases as compared to free trade with a successful R&D. The 
difference in profit increases with the relatively binding minimum price.  
§ Now, let us study the impact of the strongly binding minimum price. The Northern 
firm’s profit increases as compared to free trade whatever the R&D outcome. Since a 
relatively binding minimum price increases the difference in profit, we have to find 
the second derivative of the Northern firm’s profit with respect to the minimum price 
and to the degree of differentiation. Setting ߨො௡ௗ ൌ ߨො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݌௠௜௡ሻ to simplify 
expressions, we have:  ୢమగෝ೙೏ୢ௣೘೔೙ୢథ ൌ గෝ೙೏భȀమቄଶఎାሺଵାథఎሻ൫ୢగෝ೙೏ ୢథൗ ൯గෝ೙೏షభାఎሺଵାథఎሻሺଵିథఎሻషభቅሾସ௕೙ሺଵିథఎሻሿభ మΤ ൐ Ͳ  
The positive impact of ݌௠௜௡ on ߨො௡ௗ increases with ߶. The difference in profit also 
increases with the strongly binding minimum price.  
Therefore, the Northern firm’s R&D investment increases with the minimum price as 
compared to free trade. The impact is positive with both the relatively and strongly 
binding minimum price. □ 
2.4.6. An Import Quota 
Let us study the impact of an import quota implemented by the Northern government. 
We have analyzed the impact of a quality standard i.e. a specific prohibitive quota. But 
governments can also implement traditional quotas. Under free trade, when the R&D is 
successful, we can express the Southern firm’s price of exports as a function of the 
Northern firm’s price of domestic sales and of the Southern firm’s exports: ݌௡כௗ ൌൣ൫ܽ௡ ൅ ݌௡ௗ൯ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ െ ݕ௡ௗ൧ ሾܾ௡ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻሿΤ . With a binding quota, we have: ݌௡כௗ൫݌௡ௗ ǡ ߶ߟǡ ݍ൯ ൌ ሾሺܽ௡ ൅ ݌௡כሻሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻ െ ݍሿ ሾܾ௡ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻሿΤ      (2.28) 
Such an expression is the Southern firm’s best-response to the Northern firm’s price of 
domestic sales. It also depends on the level of the quota, since the quota is binding. The 
Southern firm no longer maximizes its profit with respect to its price of exports. It only 
reacts to the levels of ݌௡ௗ and ݍ. 
Integrating the expression of ݌௡כௗ in ݔ௡ௗ, we have: ݔ௡ௗ൫݌௡ௗ ǡ ߶ߟǡ ݍ൯ ൌ ሼܽ௡ሾܾ௡ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ൅ ͳ െ ߶ߟሿ െ ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻሺܾ௡ଶ െ ͳሻ݌௡ௗ െ ݍሽ ܾ௡Τ    (2.29) 
The demand for the Northern firm’s good on the Northern market no longer depends on 
the level of the Southern firm’s price of exports because such a price is a response to the 
Northern firm’s price of domestic sales and to the level of the quota.  
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The Southern firm’s profit expression is now: ߨכ ൌ ቊ ߨכ௛ ൌ ݍ݌௡כ௛ ൅ ݌௦כ௛ݕ௦௛ െ ܿכ൫ݍ ൅ ݕ௦௛൯ െ ݃כݍǡ ߶ ൌ Ͳߨכௗ ൌ ݍ݌௡ௗ ൅ ݌௦כௗݕ௦ௗ െ ܿכ൫ݍ ൅ ݕ௦ௗ൯ െ ݃כݍǡ Ǥ     (2.30) 
The quota does not influence the outcome on the Southern market. On the Northern 
market, the Northern firm selects the optimal price of domestic sales: ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻା௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤ାథఎൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ିଵሻି௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯൧ଶ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ      (2.31) 
The Northern firm’s price of domestic sales increases with a binding quota as compared 
to free trade owing to the drop in the competition from the Southern country.  
The Southern firm’s best-response is: ݌Ƹ௡כௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ൌ ௔೙൫ଶ௕೙మା௕೙ିଵ൯ି௤൫ଶ௕೙మିଵ൯ିథఎൣ௔೙൫ଶ௕೙మି௕೙ିଵ൯ା௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯൧ଶ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵାథఎሻ     (2.32) 
The Southern firm’s price of exports also increases with a binding quota as compared to 
free trade.  
The Northern firm’s domestic sales equal: ݔො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ൌ ௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤ାథఎൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ିଵሻା௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯൧ଶ௕೙      (2.33) 
The Northern firm’s domestic sales increase with a binding quota as compared to free 
trade.  
Finally, the equilibrium profits on the Northern market are:  ߨො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ൌ ൛௔೙ሺ௕೙ାଵሻି௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ି௤ାథఎൣ௔೙ሺ௕೙ିଵሻା௖೏ሺథሻ൫௕೙మିଵ൯൧ൟమସ௕೙൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ Ǣ     ߨො ݊כ݀ሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ൌ ݍ൛ܽ݊൫ʹܾ݊ʹ൅ܾ݊െͳ൯െʹܾ݊൫ܾ݊ʹെͳ൯ሺܿכ൅݃כሻെݍ൫ʹܾ݊ʹെͳ൯െ߶ߟൣܽ݊൫ʹܾ݊ʹെܾ݊െͳ൯൅ܿ݀ሺ߶ሻ൫ܾ݊ʹെͳ൯൅ʹܾ݊൫ܾ݊ʹെͳ൯ሺܿכ൅݃כሻ൧ൟʹܾ݊൫ܾ݊ʹെͳ൯ሺͳ൅߶ߟሻ  (2.34) 
The Northern firm’s profit increases with a binding quota as compared to free trade. The 
Southern firm’s profit decreases because it no longer sets the optimal level of price of 
exports that maximizes its profit. It only sets the best response to ݍ and ݌௡ௗ. 
We consider two cases:  
§ First case: ݕො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ ൑ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡௛. The quota is relatively binding because it only reduces 
the Southern firm’s exports when the R&D is unsuccessful. The Northern firm’s 
profit only increases as compared to free trade under this case: ߨො௡௛ሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො௡௛ ǡ ߨො௡ௗሺݍሻ ൌߨො௡ௗ.  
§ Second case: ݍ ൏ ݕො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ. The quota is strongly binding because it reduces the 
Southern firm’s exports under both cases. The Northern firm’s profit increases as 
compared to free trade regardless of the R&D outcome: ߨො௡௛ሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො௡௛ǡ ߨො௡ௗሺݍሻ ൐ ߨො௡ௗ.  
-CHAPTER 2- 
77 
 
Proposition 2.6: The Northern firm’s R&D investment decreases with a relatively 
binding quota and either increases or decreases with a strongly binding quota as 
compared to free trade. There is a non-null value of quota ݍ such as the R&D investment 
equals the free trade level. Therefore, the Northern firm’s R&D investment decreases as 
compared to free trade when ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡ௗ൯, levels off when ݍ ൌ ݍ, and increases when ݍ א ሾͲǡ ݍሻ. 
Proof: □ Let us consider the two cases: 
§ With a relatively binding quota, the quota is only binding when the R&D is 
unsuccessful. The Northern firm’s profit only increases under this case. The 
difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade: ߨො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ െ ߨො௡௛ሺݍሻ ൏ߨො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟሻ െ ߨො௡௛. 
§ With a strongly binding quota, the quota is binding under both cases. The Northern 
firm’s profit increases regardless of the R&D outcome. We have: ୢగෝ೙೏ሺథǡఎǡ௤ሻୢ௤ ൌ െ ଶ௫ො೙೏ሺథǡఎǡ௤ሻଶ൫௕೙మିଵ൯ሺଵିథఎሻ ൏ Ͳ  
The positive effect of a drop in ݍ on ߨ equals ʹݔො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ሾʹሺܾ௡ଶ െ ͳሻሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻሿΤ . Such an 
expression increases with ߶ because ݔො௡ௗሺ߶ǡ ߟǡ ݍሻ ߶Τ ൐ Ͳ. The positive effect of the 
quota on the Northern firm’s profit is greater when the R&D is successful. The 
difference in profit increases when the level of the quota decreases. But, since a 
relatively binding quota reduces the R&D, such a result is not sufficient to prove that 
the difference in profit always increases as compared to free trade.  We denote by ݍ 
the quota such as the difference in profit equals the free trade level. The difference in 
profit decreases with a strongly binding quota ݍ such as ݍ א ൫ݍǡ ݕො௡ௗ൯ if Ͳ ൏ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡ௗ. The 
difference in profit also always decreases with a strongly binding quota if  ݍ ൌ Ͳ. It 
always increases, otherwise. 
The Northern firm’s R&D investment decreases with a relatively binding quota, and 
either increases or decreases with a strongly binding quota. Let us use a numerical 
example. Figure 2.2 illustrates the evolution of the Northern firm’s R&D investment 
when the level of the quota varies. The grey line illustrates the free trade level. Here, we 
find ݍ ൎ ͳʹǤͳ͹͵ͺ, with Ͳ ൏ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡ௗ. Under such a numerical example, the R&D 
investment decreases with a strongly binding quota as compared to free trade if ݍ א൫ݍǡ ݕො௡ௗ൯. It levels off if ݍ ൌ ݍ. It increases if ݍ א ሾͲǡ ݍሻ. We have already explained these 
specific results in Chapter 1, Section 1.3.5. □ 
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-Figure 2.2- 
Evolution of the Northern firm’s Product R&D Investment When ࢗ Varies 
 
Source: authors. 
Note: ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅ ߶Ǣߙሺݎሻ ൌ ݎ௞Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ߶ ൌ ͲǤʹǢ ߟ ൌ ͳǢ ݒ ൌͷͲͲǢ ݇ ൌ ͲǤͷǢ ܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ Ͳ. 
2.5. Welfare Analysis 
We have examined the impact of six policy instruments on the Northern firm’s R&D 
investment. Let us study the economic impact of each instrument by analyzing their 
impact on expected profits, consumer surplus and public revenues. 
2.5.1. General Framework under Free Trade 
Each expected variable depends on the equilibrium expression of the R&D investment ݎƸ. 
The expected profit expressions are:  ܧൣȫ෡ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ߙሺݎƸሻߨොௗ ൅ ሾͳ െ ߙሺݎƸሻሿߨො௛ െ ݒݎǢ ܧൣȫ෡כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ߙሺݎƸሻߨොכௗ ൅ ሾͳ െ ߙሺݎƸሻሿߨොכ௛   
Let us study each country’s expected consumer surplus. We need to express the domestic 
(foreign) price as a function of the domestic (foreign) sales by turning the domestic 
(foreign) demand function and considering the foreign (domestic) price as a parameter. 
We have: ܧൣ෢ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ߙሺݎƸሻ ൤׬ ݌௡ௗ൫ݔ௡ௗ൯ݔ௡ௗ௫ො೙೏଴ െ ݌௡ௗ൫ݔො௡ௗ൯ݔො௡ௗ ൅ ׬ ݌௡כௗ൫ݕ௡ௗ൯ݕ௡ௗ௬ො೙೏଴ െ ݌௡כௗ൫ݕො௡ௗ൯ݕො௡ௗ൨ ൅ ሾͳ െߙሺݎƸሻሿ ൤׬ ݌௡௛൫ݔ௡௛൯ݔ௡௛௫ො೙೓଴ െ ݌௡௛൫ݔො௡௛൯ݔො௡௛ ൅ ׬ ݌௡כ௛൫ݕ௡௛൯ݕ௡௛௬ො೙೓଴ െ ݌௡כ௛൫ݕො௡௛൯ݕො௡௛൨     ܧൣ෢כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ߙሺݎƸሻ ൤׬ ݌௦ௗ൫ݔ௦ௗ൯ݔ௦ௗ௫ොೞ೏଴ െ ݌௦ௗ൫ݔො௦ௗ൯ݔො௦ௗ ൅ ׬ ݌௦כௗ൫ݕ௦ௗ൯ݕ௦ௗ௬ොೞ೏଴ െ ݌௦כௗ൫ݕො௦ௗ൯ݕො௦ௗ൨ ൅ ሾͳ െߙሺݎƸሻሿ ൤׬ ݌௦௛൫ݔ௦௛൯ݔ௦௛௫ොೞ೓଴ െ ݌௦௛൫ݔො௦௛൯ݔො௦௛ ൅ ׬ ݌௦כ௛൫ݕ௦௛൯ݕ௦௛௬ොೞ೓଴ െ ݌௦כ௛൫ݕො௦௛൯ݕො௦௛൨    
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-Figure 2.3- 
Evolution of the Expected Northern Consumer Surplus When the R&D 
Investment Varies 
 
Source: authors. 
Note: We set:  ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅ ߶Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ߶ ൌ ͲǤʹǢ ܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ Ͳ. 
We can study the impact of the R&D investment on the Northern country’s consumer 
surplus. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the impact is negative for a low sensitivity ߟ of 
consumers’ preference for quality improvement (for example, if ߟ ൌ ͲǤʹ). The lower ߟ, the 
lower the consumers' preference for quality. Since vertical differentiation increases the 
Northern firm's price, the effect on the consumer surplus is then negative. The impact is 
positive, otherwise. The effect on the Southern country’s expected consumer surplus is 
symmetric.  
Under free trade, the Northern country’s expected national welfare equals the sum of its 
expected profit and domestic consumer surplus: ܧൣ෡ ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ܧൣȫ෡ሺݎƸሻ൧ ൅ ܧൣ෢ሺݎƸሻ൧. Same goes 
for the Southern country's expected welfare: ܧൣ෡ כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൌ ܧൣȫ෡כሺݎƸሻ൧ ൅ ܧൣ෢כሺݎƸሻ൧. 
2.5.2. Discussion 
Table 2.1 illustrates the economic impact of each policy instrument. We also study the 
impact on the Northern country’s expected public revenues. 
-Table 2.1- 
Economic Impact of Each Policy Instrument 
Instrument ݎ ܧሺȫሻ ܧሺȫכሻ ܧሺሻ ܧሺכሻ ܧሺሻ 
Import Tariff + + – +/– +/– + 
Production Subsidy + + – + + – 
R&D Subsidy + + – +/– +/– – 
Quality Standard + +/– – +/– +/– 0 
Minimum price + + – +/– +/– 0 
Import Quota +/– +/– +/– +/– +/– 0 
Source: authors. 
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Each policy instrument increases the Northern firm’s R&D expenditures except for the 
quality standard and the import quota. A government that aims to enhance non-price 
competitiveness by encouraging product R&D investment should implement one of these 
policy instruments. Furthermore, the Northern (Southern) firm’s expected profit always 
increases (decreases) with each policy instrument. This result relates to the “profit-
shifting” mentioned in the economic literature. Nevertheless, policy instruments may 
have opposite impacts on expected consumer surplus and public revenues. The Northern 
country’s expected public revenues increase with the import tariff, decrease with the 
production subsidy and the R&D subsidy, and level off with the quality standard and the 
minimum price.  
Let us study the impact on the Northern country’s consumer surplus. It increases with 
the production subsidy because it has a direct impact by reducing the levels of price. The 
R&D subsidy has an indirect impact by increasing the probability of R&D success. But 
the impact on the expected consumer surplus may be negative if the sensitivity ߟ is low. 
The impact of the import tariff and the minimum price may be either positive or 
negative because of a direct negative impact due to the increase of levels of price and an 
indirect positive impact due to the increase of the probability of R&D success. The 
impact of each policy instrument on the Southern country’s consumer surplus is the 
same. 
The economic impact of the quality standard is uncertain. The effect on the Northern 
firm’s expected profit is unknown because the effect is positive with a successful R&D 
and negative with an unsuccessful R&D. The effect on the Northern consumer surplus is 
uncertain because it increases the Northern firm’s R&D investment but it reduces the 
total demand on the Northern market. The economic impact of a quota is also ambiguous 
because it reduces the competition from the Southern country but it either increases or 
reduces the Northern firm’s R&D investment. Therefore, the effect on each expected 
profit and consumers’ surplus is uncertain.  
Appendix 2.B illustrates the evolution of the Northern country's expected consumer 
surplus when the Northern government implements: (i) an import tariff such as ݐ ൌ ͳ; 
(ii) a quality standard; (iii) a relatively binding minimum price such as ݌݉݅݊ ൌ ݌כ݀ ൅ ݖ, 
where ݖ is a positive constant; (iv) a strongly binding minimum price such as ݌݉݅݊ ൌ݌כ݄ ൅ ݖ; (v) a prohibitive import quota.  
The effect of the tariff is often negative. Nevertheless, we find a case in which the 
expected consumer surplus increases with the tariff. The effect is positive for ߟ ൒ ʹǤ͵  
when ܾ ൌ ͵. We also find a case in which the quality standard increases the expected 
consumer surplus for ߟ ൒ ͳǤʹͷ when ܾ ൌ ͵. Finally, the relatively binding minimum price 
increases the expected consumer surplus for ߟ ൒ ͳǤͷ when ܾ ൌ ʹ, and for ߟ ൒ ͳǤ͹ͷ when ܾ ൌ ͵, while the strongly binding minimum price increases it for ߟ ൒ ͳǤʹͷ when ܾ ൌ ʹ.  
Under these cases, the indirect positive impact via the probability of R&D success is 
stronger than the direct negative impact via the increase in prices. Such a result can be 
offset against traditional results that mention a negative impact of “at-the-border” policy 
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instruments on the consumer surplus. The condition is that consumers have a high 
sensitivity on their preference for quality.  
Unlike an import tariff and a quality standard, we do not find any case in which a 
strongly binding quota increases the Northern country’s expected consumer surplus by 
using numerical simulations.  
2.5.3. Optimal Policy Instruments under Numerical Simulations 
According to the economic impact of each policy instrument, we have to verify whether or 
not the Northern government is encouraged to implement it. Let us study the impact on 
each country’s expected national welfare. We can also compare each instrument. 
Appendix 2.C illustrates the optimal level of each instrument and the expected national 
welfare as compared to free trade. The results are obtained under numerical simulations 
because analytical demonstrations seem complex.  
§ The Northern country’s national welfare is always increased with the 
implementation of an import tariff and a production subsidy. The tariff is the favorite 
policy instrument because: (i) it increases the Northern firm’s profit through the 
profit-shifting; (ii) it also increases its R&D investment; (iii) it involves further public 
revenues for the government; (iv) it may increase the expected consumer surplus 
when their preference for quality is high (the negative effect is low, otherwise). 
§ The positive impact of the production subsidy is lower even if it is the favorite policy 
instrument for the Northern consumer since it reduces prices and increases the 
probability of vertical differentiation. The reason is that it involves public 
expenditures, especially if the R&D is successful.  
§ The quality standard reduces the Northern country's expected national welfare under 
each case illustrated in Appendix 2.B. The effect may be positive with higher values 
for ߟ. But the quality standard is never the Northern government’s favorite policy 
instrument. The Northern government has a preference for the import tariff because 
we consider that the quality standard does not yield public revenues. Furthermore, 
the effect on the domestic consumer surplus is often negative. The quality standard is 
the most binding policy instrument. It is a prohibitive quota not only for the 
Southern firm but also for the Northern firm if the R&D is unsuccessful. 
§ Under four cases, the Northern country’s national welfare is not increased with the 
minimum price because the optimal level equals the free trade level of price when the 
R&D is successful. Therefore, the expected Northern welfare is the same as under 
free trade. This welfare increases with the minimum price, otherwise. The main 
difference with the import tariff is that we do not consider that the minimum price 
influences public revenues.  
§ Under two cases, the optimal R&D subsidy is negative. Therefore, the Northern 
government is encouraged to tax the Northern firm’s R&D expenditure. Note that the 
effects on the expected welfare are low because it only directly impacts the 
probability of R&D success.  
§ The quota increases the Northern country’s expected national welfare under seven 
cases. In these cases, the optimal quota is a prohibitive quota such as the Northern 
firm benefits from a monopoly on its domestic market. But the quota reduces the 
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expected national welfare under five cases. In these cases, the Northern government 
remains under free trade. 
§ Each policy instrument reduces the Southern country’s expected national welfare 
except for negative R&D subsidies i.e. R&D taxes because they increase the Southern 
firm’s profit.  
The results show that the import tariff seems to be the favorite policy instrument for the 
Northern government. The Northern government can increase its domestic firm's 
expected profit, its consumer surplus and public revenues at the same time, only by 
implementing an import tariff. However, there is a limit. Tariffs represent traditional 
forms of trade policy. Currently, governments reduce their tariff rates by implementing 
free trade agreements and use modern forms of protectionism like subsidies, quality 
standards and minimum prices. Furthermore, according to the WTO, tariffs are bound 
and cannot be increased above a certain level. Nevertheless, the level of European 
Union’s ad-valorem import tariff is high in the automobile industry. It may legitimize 
our results. 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we have designed a theoretical model of international trade in a two-
country duopoly with a Northern and Southern firm to study the impact of several trade 
policy instruments on product R&D investment and national welfares. The Southern 
firm is considered to have a competitive advantage due to lower production costs, 
encouraging the Northern competitor to invest in quality improvement. The Northern 
government is the only one policy active, having the choice between several policy 
instruments: an import tariff, a production subsidy, an R&D subsidy, a quality standard, 
a minimum price and an import quota. Firms compete in prices on both markets. 
Through our three-stage game, we show that each policy instrument increases the 
Northern firm's product R&D investment except for an import quota. Therefore, if the 
Northern government’s only aim is to enhance non-price competitiveness by encouraging 
product R&D investment, we provide evidence in favor of implementing these policy 
instruments. However, it is also argued that the effect of some of these instruments may 
hinder consumer surplus, public revenues and welfare. Their implementation might not 
therefore be socially optimal. This result is backed by numerical simulations allowing for 
a change in the levels of parameters. Based on these simulations and a comparison of the 
impact of these instruments, it appears that the Northern government would favor the 
implementation of an import tariff. By this means, the domestic expected profit, 
consumer surplus and public revenues could increase. The real implications of this result 
are limited, as the ongoing trend in the international arena is towards the reduction of 
this trade barrier. 
The possible positive effect of the import tariff on the consumer surplus is an original 
result in this chapter. The reason is that the tariff increases the Northern firm’s R&D 
and the probability of R&D success. If the consumer’s sensitivity on their preference for 
quality is high, such a positive effect may be greater than the negative effect of the 
increase in prices.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
2.A. Impact of an Import Tariff under General Forms for Demand Functions 
We use general forms for demand functions. Nevertheless, we still consider constant 
marginal costs and linear forms for total costs. According to the first order conditions, we 
have: ߨො௡௛ሺݐሻ ൌ ߨ௡௛ሾ݌Ƹ௡௛ሺݐሻሿ ൌ െݔ௡௛௣೙ሾ݌Ƹ௡௛ሺݐሻ െ ܿ௛ሿଶǡ ߨො௡ௗሺݐሻ ൌ ߨ௡ௗሾ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺݐሻሿ ൌ െݔ௡௛௣೙ሾ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺݐሻ െ ܿௗሺ߶ሻሿଶ. 
Subscripts denote partial derivatives. We have: 
ୢగෝ೙೓ሺ௧ሻୢ௧ ൌ డగ೙೓ൣ௣ො೙೓ሺ௧ሻ൧డ௧ ൅ డగ೙೓ൣ௣ො೙೓ሺ௧ሻ൧డ௣ො೙೓ሺ௧ሻ ୢ௣ො೙೓ሺ௧ሻୢ௧ ൌ ሾ݌Ƹ௡௛ሺݐሻ െ ܿ௛ሿ ௬೙೓೛೙כ గ೙೓೛೙೛೙గ೙೓೛೙೛೙כ஻೓ ൐ Ͳ  ୢగෝ೙೏ሺ௧ሻୢ௧ ൌ డగ೙೏ൣ௣ො೙೏ሺ௧ሻ൧డ௧ ൅ డగ೙೏ൣ௣ො೙೏ሺ௧ሻ൧డ௣ො೙೏ሺ௧ሻ ୢ௣ො೙೏ሺ௧ሻୢ௧ ൌ ሾ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺݐሻ െ ܿௗሺ߶ሻሿ ௬೙೏೛೙כ గ೙೏೛೙೛೙గ೙೏೛೙೛೙כ஻೏ ൐ Ͳ  
where ܤ௝ ൌ ߨ௡௝௣೙௣೙ߨ௡כ௝௣೙כ௣೙כ െ ߨ௡௝௣೙௣೙כߨ௡כ௝௣೙כ௣೙ ൐ ͲǢ׊݆ ൌ ሼ݀ǡ ݄ሽ. The previous expressions are 
positive. But it seems complex to compare such expressions. We have: ቚݕ௡ௗ௣೙כ ቚ ൐ ቚݕ௡௛௣೙כ ቚ. We 
also made the assumption that the marginal profit is higher when the R&D is successful 
(see Assumption 2.5). Then: ሾ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺݐሻ െ ܿௗሺ߶ሻሿ ൐ ሾ݌Ƹ௡௛ሺݐሻ െ ܿ௛ሿ. However, it is complex to 
compare the two last terms ߨ௡ௗ௣೙௣೙ߨ௡ௗ௣೙௣೙כ ܤௗΤ  and ߨ௡௛௣೙௣೙ߨ௡௛௣೙௣೙כ ܤ௛Τ , especially under 
nonlinear forms. First order effects are on ݕ௡ௗ௣೙כ , then on ሾ݌Ƹ௡ௗሺݐሻ െ ܿௗሺ߶ሻሿ. The probability 
that the tariff increases the difference in profit remains high. But we cannot 
demonstrate that the effect is always positive. 
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2.B. Impact of Several Policy Instruments on Expected Consumer Surplus 
-Table 2.2- 
Evolution of the Northern Country’s Expected Consumer Surplus with an 
Import Tariff, a Quality Standard, a Minimum price and an Import Quota 
 Import Tariff such as ݐ ൌ ͳ Quality Standard Relatively Binding Minimum price such 
as ݌௠௜௡ ൌ ݌Ƹ௡כௗ ൅ ݖ Strongly binding Minimum price such as ݌௠௜௡ ൌ ݌Ƹ௡כ௛ ൅ ݖ ߟ ܾ௜ ൌ ʹ ܾ௜ ൌ ͵ ܾ௜ ൌ ʹ ܾ௜ ൌ ͵ ܾ௜ ൌ ʹ ܾ௜ ൌ ͵ ܾ௜ ൌ ʹ ܾ௜ ൌ ͵ 
0.25 -8.21229 -7.79463 -130.4387 -42.57767 -0.078079 -0.036426 -2.525704 -1.837659 
0.5 -8.00433 -7.70639 -123.4294 -39.76177 -0.143377 -0.073230 -4.601448 -2.483103 
0.75 -7.56517 -7.51798 -114.4325 -35.80689 -0.177310 -0.099832 -5.927267 -3.029401 
1 -6.79448 -7.18616 -103.7716 -30.56763 -0.164147 -0.109847 -3.935780 -2.801909 
1.25 -5.55152 -6.65085 -91.95666 -23.86445 -0.081309 -0.094133 4.971923 -0.848251 
1.5 -3.63511 -5.82695 (b) -15.47525 0.104085 -0.03940 25.97255 (c) 
1.75 (a) -4.59141 (a) -5.124350 (a) 0.0740211 (a) (c) 
2 (a) -2.76199 (a) 7.531566 (a) 0.2758692 (a) (c) 
2.25 (a) -0.06126 (a) 22.92064 (a) 0.6122734 (a) (c) 
2.5 (a) 3.946958 (a) 41.57476 (a) 1.1570145 (a) (c) 
 Prohibitive Import 
Quota ݍ ൌ Ͳ       ߟ ܾ௜ ൌ ʹ ܾ௜ ൌ ͵       
0.25 -109.3169 -50.64391       
0.5 -105.7439 -49.70164       
0.75 -99.62214 -48.05294       
1 -90.91091 -45.68118       
1.25 -79.58434 -42.58450       
1.5 -65.66762 -38.79035       
1.75 (a) -34.38085       
2 (a) -29.53812       
2.25 (a) -24.62717       
2.5 (a) -20.35307       
Source: authors.  
Note: We set: ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅ ߶Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ߶ ൌ ͲǤʹǢ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ ͲǢ ݖ ൌ ͲǤͳ. (a) The 
condition ܾ ൐ ሺͳ ൅ ߶ߟሻ ሺͳ െ ߶ߟሻΤ  no longer holds. (b) The level of R&D is greater than one. (c) The Southern 
firm’s exports are negative under a successful R&D. 
2.C. Welfare Analysis 
-Table 2.3- 
Optimal Policy Instruments When Parameters Vary 
   Policy Instrument Optimal 
Value 
οܧሺሻ οܧሺכሻ ߶ ൌ ͲǤʹ  ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹ  ߟ ൌ ͲǤͷ  Import Tariff 16.5508033 183.823613 -256.897891 
Production Subsidy 3.22254028 7.78716801 -20.4513433 
R&D Subsidy 18.4727963 0.01100592 -0.546417 
Quality Standard - -211.313788 -312.268763 
Minimum price 16.2666667 1.1875101 -20.169574 
 Import Quota 0 85.1563207 -292.945854 ߟ ൌ ͳ Import Tariff 16.9565435 200.726885 -245.089359 
Production Subsidy 4.00647595 11.4775243 -20.554964 
R&D Subsidy 49.946966 0.53559784 -6.41479308 
Quality Standard - -98.1804461 -294.454869 
Minimum price 16.2667 23.4199971 -23.2201051 
 Import Quota 0 109.717667 -265.446637 ߟ ൌ ͳǤͷ Import Tariff 14.9758 253.037868 -199.319984 
Production Subsidy 6.08087264 23.6015963 -11.4295422 
R&D Subsidy 70.417448 3.77024901 -20.9086297 
Quality Standard (a) (a) (a) 
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Minimum price 18.9758242 204.613391 -142.768452 
  Import Quota 0 157.365722 -212.902476 ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ͵ ߟ ൌ ͲǤͷ Import Tariff 6.66184031 47.8342226 -95.4290047 
Production Subsidy 2.48623055 6.96309294 -5.53450378 
R&D Subsidy 10.5534091 0.00081367 -0.08308362 
Quality Standard - -111.105712 -130.812707 
Minimum price (b) 0 0 
 Import Quota 19.7142 -4.20592691 -121.906172 ߟ ൌ ͳ Import Tariff 6.6160529 48.4196891 -91.4110881 
Production Subsidy 2.77308089 8.46939228 -5.54889904 
R&D Subsidy 51.8968807 0.15109548 -1.86140376 
Quality Standard - -88.4726023 -124.694214 
Minimum price 10.5714286 2.93224468 -6.14906783 
 Import Quota 0 -2.14866568 -119.62378 ߟ ൌ ͳǤͷ Import Tariff 6.5438914 52.5547558 -81.8642383 
Production Subsidy 3.54120136 13.0938693 -3.48366639 
R&D Subsidy 75.3998268 1.23266161 -6.33003932 
Quality Standard - -54.0298708 -109.652165 
Minimum price 10.5438 20.896489 -19.7946113 
   Import Quota 0 6.74781467 -104.77343 ߶ ൌ ͲǤͳ ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ʹ ߟ ൌ ͲǤͷ Import Tariff 16.5512526 182.0127 -259.114678 
Production Subsidy 3.08585143 7.21336599 -20.155769 
R&D Subsidy -1.50253967 1.4456E-05 0.01074565 
Quality Standard - -252.250962 -309.85553 
Minimum price (b) 0 0 
 Import Quota 0 79.8616143 -298.995554 ߟ ൌ ͳ Import Tariff 16.5559191 183.987986 -256.756877 
Production Subsidy 3.23209595 7.83206911 -20.4827615 
R&D Subsidy 21.1926214 0.01556657 -0.6515713 
Quality Standard - -209.067972 -311.873928 
Minimum price 16.2666667 1.29264868 -20.6158906 
 Import Quota 0 85.4552477 -292.628827 ߟ ൌ ͳǤͷ Import Tariff 16.6589619 189.45532 -252.2658 
Production Subsidy 3.5269523 9.15483585 -20.7997863 
R&D Subsidy 37.6040891 0.14054856 -2.69642035 
Quality Standard - -157.233862 -306.64598 
Minimum price 23.8968944 74.3164759 -134.87088 
  Import Quota 0 95.4051722 -281.424933 ܾ௡ ൌ ܾ௦ ൌ ͵ ߟ ൌ ͲǤͷ Import Tariff 6.68469614 47.9021165 -96.2353464 
Production Subsidy 2.44161052 6.74865203 -5.39025547 
R&D Subsidy -17.1143338 0.00039848 0.03179986 
Quality Standard - -118.417947 -130.966365 
Minimum price (b) 0 0 
 Import Quota 19.7142 -4.34909786 -126.085379 ߟ ൌ ͳ Import Tariff 6.6619414 47.8489397 -95.3743411 
Production Subsidy 2.49138048 6.99199091 -5.5429578 
R&D Subsidy 16.120011 0.00213532 -0.13460464 
Quality Standard - -110.449222 -130.660664 
Minimum price (b) 0 0 
Import Quota 19.7142 -4.19334793 -121.534436 ߟ ൌ ͳǤͷ Import Tariff 6.63455079 47.9540953 -93.7677789 
Production Subsidy 2.59829226 7.53834851 -5.64980573 
R&D Subsidy 37.4234915 0.03524563 -0.74507873 
Quality Standard - -100.295092 -128.520187 
Minimum price 10.5714286 0.41408715 -2.84032507 
   Import Quota 19.7142 -4.00875094 -116.11896 
Source: authors. 
Note: We set: ܿௗሺ߶ሻ ൌ ܿ௛ ൅ ߶Ǣ ܽ௡ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͵ͲǢ ܿ௛ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ܨ ൌ ܨכ ൌ Ͳ. (a) The level of R&D is 
greater than one. (b) The optimal minimum price equals the free trade level of the Southern firm’s price of 
exports when the R&D is successful. Therefore, the domestic welfare does not vary as compared to free 
trade. 
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-CHAPTER 3- 
Policy Instruments, Patents and 
International Technology Diffusion in a 
North-South Duopoly16 
3.1. Introduction 
Economic development of developing countries depends on technology diffusion. Foreign 
sources of technology are crucial for these countries because domestic R&D expenditures 
are low. The share of domestic R&D expenditures in their GDP is always lower than two 
percent (source: World Bank WDI).  
There is some debate about the way to accelerate technology diffusion from rich 
countries to developing countries (see the review of the economic literature on technology 
diffusion in Chapter 0, Subsection 0.4.3). Therefore, it would be interesting to study how 
policy instruments implemented by both rich and developing countries influence the 
speed of technology diffusion.  
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of policy instruments on 
technology diffusion by using a simple theoretical framework. We also research the 
impact on other strategic variables like profits, consumer surplus and national welfares. 
We use a framework which is close to Miyagiwa and Ohno (1997) that we described in 
the general introduction. We consider a North-South duopoly like in Chapters 1 and 2. 
But we design an inter-temporal model in which time is continuous. A first difference 
with respect to Miyagiwa and Ohno (1997) is that, initially, the Northern firm already 
benefits from the new technology while the Southern firm uses the old technology. 
Developed countries benefit from a larger capital endowment while developing countries 
benefits from a larger labor endowment.  
Here, the new technology diffusion is a transfer from the Northern firm to the Southern 
firm. It occurs through the bilateral trade between the North and the South. The 
economic literature has considered endogenous technology diffusion. For example, 
Tanaka, Iwaisako and Futagami (2007) design an endogenous growth model by 
using a North-South framework in which technology diffusion from the North to the 
South occurs through licensing. Northern firms file patents if innovations are successful. 
Iwaisako, Tanaka and Futagami (2011) design another endogenous growth model in 
which the main determinant of technology diffusion is FDI. In this chapter, we consider 
a simple case in which technology diffusion is given. 
We study the case in which the Northern firm files a patent to increase the monopoly 
period with the new technology. A patent leads to protection of information for the 
Northern firm and so slows down technology diffusion. The Southern firm can use the 
                                                          
16 This study has been published in The International Trade Journal (Berthoumieu, 2016). 
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new technology only upon the term of the patent. In this sort of North-South framework, 
we consider that the Northern firm’s patent always slows down the new technology 
diffusion to the Southern firm. Patents involve disputes among firms or countries. For 
example, in 2012, the technology war between Google and Apple illustrates that patents 
are a way to prevent a firm from being competitive in a specific market and that firms 
often file lawsuit because of patent infringements.17  
We consider a simple case in which a patent involves the protection of a process. We take 
into account the fact that the Northern firm faces a patent filing cost. Papers that study 
the optimal patent length generally do not introduce this variable. Papers that introduce 
patent cost study the effect of the patent as compared to a situation without patent but 
do not study the optimal patent length. Here, we attempt to implement a new structure 
by applying both patent length and patent filing cost. Such a cost increases with the 
patent term because the Northern firm has to pay maintenance fees to keep the patent 
in force. Patents may involve prosecutions that increase expenditures.  
As a consequence, the Northern firm selects patent expenditures by choosing the patent 
term. “The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of 
twenty years counted from the filing date (Source: Article 33 of TRIPs Agreements).” 
Pharmaceutical firms have the opportunity to benefit from a Supplementary Protection 
Certificate that protects innovations for further five years. Generally, when a firm files a 
patent, there are annual maintenance fees to be paid. This is the reason why the length 
of protection may end before the stated twenty years. Moreover, firms can file utility 
models that have fewer requirements instead of classic patents. Utility models are one 
particular type of patent. They are less stringent in terms of protection length and filing 
cost. Usually, the term of utility model is around ten years. The Northern firm’s patent 
only slows down diffusion because technology diffusion is not avoidable (Keller, 2002). 
Consequently, an infinite patent length is not possible.  
We analyze the effect of policy instruments on the speed of the new technology diffusion 
through the impact on the Northern firm’s patent length. We focus on the same 
instruments as in Chapters 1 and 2. We provide a first extension with the analysis of the 
impact of the Southern government’s policy instruments. Of course, we realize that this 
section should be dramatically improved in future research.  
We also study the impact of two new policy instruments:  
§ A patent subsidy implemented by the Northern government. The Northern 
government can subsidize its domestic firm’s patent expenditures in order to reduce 
the Northern firm’s patent filing cost. In 2002, the Belgian government implemented 
subsidies for small and medium-sized businesses “to register and to maintain a 
patent.” In 2010, the subsidy rate achieved 70 percent of the patent filing cost 
(Source: Europa, European Commission Website). Munari and Xu (2011) conduct 
an overview of ten experiences of patent subsidies throughout the 2000s: “the use of 
                                                          
17 See the newspaper article “In technology wars, using the patent as a sword” in The New York 
Times (October 7, 2012). 
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patent subsidies, in particular in favor of SMEs, has recently gained an increased 
attention by policy-makers [p. 5].” 
§ A public R&D investment implemented by the Southern government. Today 
governments in the South would be interested in policies that foster innovations. 
Southern countries’ R&D expenditures are low compared to Northern countries’. As a 
consequence, we study a case in which the Southern government implements a public 
R&D program. Instead of using the old technology, the Southern firm benefits from 
an intermediate technology before the new technology diffusion. 
Finally, we introduce a second possible extension with the implementation of a licensing 
contract between the two firms. In this case, the speed of the new technology diffusion no 
longer depends on the patent length but on the date of the licensing contract.  
The results of this chapter show that policy instruments implemented by the Northern 
country slow down technology diffusion between the two firms by increasing the 
monopoly period with the new technology except for an import quota that accelerates the 
new technology diffusion. Furthermore, the Southern government’s policy instruments 
accelerate technology diffusion by reducing the monopoly period with the new technology 
and increase the domestic national welfare. Each policy always increases the domestic 
country’s national welfare up to an optimal level. 
Section 3.2 introduces the model. Section 3.3 analyzes the impact of the Northern 
government’s policy instruments on the speed of the new technology diffusion. Section 
3.4 provides a first extension with the analysis of the impact of policy instruments 
implemented by the Southern government. Section 3.5 presents the welfare analysis. 
Section 3.6 introduces a second extension: a licensing contract between the two firms. 
Section 3.7 concludes.  
3.2. The Model 
Let us suppose a dynamic model in which time is continuous and defined over ሾͲǡλሻ. 
Initially, the Northern firm benefits from a new technology denoted by ߤ while the 
Southern firm only uses an old technology denoted by ߤכ. Here, the new technology 
diffusion is defined by the technology transfer from the Northern firm to the Southern 
firm. Such a diffusion occurs at period ܶ over ሾͲǡλሻ. The Southern firm can use the new 
technology ߤכ over ሾܶǡλሻ. The Northern firm benefits from ߤ over ሾͲǡλሻ. Here, we 
consider that the new technology diffusion occurs due to information diffusion via 
telecommunications such as the Internet and due to the existence of a bilateral trade 
between the North and the South. Nevertheless, the level of the bilateral trade between 
the North and the South does not influence the speed of technology diffusion.  
We use the same linear functions for production costs where ܿ (ܿכ) denote the Northern 
(Southern) firm’s marginal cost.  
Assumption 3.1: Each firm’s technological endowment influences its marginal cost: ܿ ൌ ܿሺߤሻ, with ߤ ൌ ߤ, ܿכ ൌ ܿכሺߤכሻ, with ߤכ ൌ ߤכǡ ߤכ. We have: ܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൐ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯. The value of ܿכ changes at time ܶ. 
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Such a structure relates to an empirical example, for instance the agricultural sector. 
The assumption of the existence of two markets works because the level of bilateral 
trade between Northern and Southern countries is high in the agricultural sector. 
Northern and Southern producers also differ in productivity. Developing countries’ 
agricultural productivity is lower than developed countries’ (Fulginiti and Perrin, 
1999). The role of technological endowment is crucial. For example, O’Neill (2000) 
mentions that “the application of ergonomics differs between IDCs [Industrially 
Developing Countries] and IACs [Industrially Advanced Countries] particularly through 
the limited infrastructure in IDCs to support ergonomics activity and interventions [p. 
631].” Another interesting feature of the agricultural sector is that producers from rich 
countries file patents to protect their technologies. For example, developed countries’ 
intellectual property makes it difficult for developing countries to access modern 
agricultural biotechnologies (Adenle et al., 2012). Furthermore, firms files patents on 
both products and processes: nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, plants (Alendete-Saez 
et al., 2014). In this chapter, we consider a process patent on a new technology.  
Assumption 3.2: At each point in time, there is Cournot competition on both markets. 
Each firm sells a homogenous good. 
Consider a two-stage model. At each point in time, both firms select the level of output 
that maximizes their static profit flows. The Northern firm files a patent to increase the 
monopoly period with the new technology. The patent filing cost increases with the 
patent length. Then, the Northern firm selects its patent-related expenditures (i.e. the 
patent length) that maximize its discounted sum of profit flows. 
At each point in time, the static profit flows are: ߨሺݔ௡ǡ ݔ௦ǡ ݕ௡ǡ ݕ௦ሻ ൌ ݔ௡݌௡ሺݔ௡ ൅ ݕ௡ሻ ൅ ݔ௦݌௦ሺݔ௦ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ܿሺߤሻሺݔ௡ ൅ ݔ௦ሻ െ ݃ݔ௦   (3.1) ߨכሺݔ௡ǡ ݔ௦ǡ ݕ௡ǡ ݕ௦ሻ ൌ ݕ௡݌௡ሺݔ௡ ൅ ݕ௡ሻ ൅ ݕ௦݌௦ሺݔ௦ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ܿכሺߤכሻሺݕ௡ ൅ ݕ௦ሻ െ ݃כݕ௡Ǣ ׊ߤכ ൌ ቄߤכǡ ߤכቅ (3.2) 
Consider the same specific linear inverse demand functions: ݌ሺܺ௡ሻ ൌ ܽ௡ െ ܺ௡, ݌ሺܺ௦ሻ ൌܽ௦ െ ܺ௦. Each firm selects the optimal levels of domestic sales and exports that maximize 
their profit. In this model, technology diffusion influences the level of the Southern firm’s 
marginal cost ܿכ. Equilibrium expressions are the same as Equations (1.6), (1.7) and (1.8) 
in Chapter 1. We search the effect of ܿכ on domestic sales, exports, prices and profits to 
determine the effect of the Southern firm’s technological endowment. We can easily 
demonstrate that:  
§ The Southern firm’s marginal cost increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) firm’s 
domestic sales and exports. 
§ Each market price increases with the Southern firm’s marginal cost. 
§ The Northern (Southern) firm’s profit increases (decreases) with the Southern firm’s 
marginal cost. 
The Northern firm enjoys a monopoly with the new technology until ܶ and files a patent 
at time Ͳ in the Northern country’s office in order to increase such a monopoly. It 
involves an industrial protection on the Northern market while the Southern firm is not 
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able to discover the new technology by itself in its domestic country. We omit the 
existence of a patent filed in the South. Firms generally filed patents in developed 
countries’ patent offices like the European Patent Office (EPO). The period ሾͲǡ ܶሻ is called 
the monopoly period.  
The patent filing engenders a filing cost which increases with the said patent length. The 
variable ݇ denotes the Northern firm’s expenditures needed to implement the patent. It 
also denotes the patent length. Consider that such expenditures are realized at each 
point in time over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. They relate to maintenance fees. Such a consideration is 
credible because patentee firms pay maintenance fees on a yearly basis: they choose to 
maintain the patent in force or not. We consider constant expenditures at each point in 
time.  
Nevertheless, a criticism may be raised against the fact that the level of ݇ increases with 
the patent length. Empirically, annual maintenance fees do not depend on the patent 
length. The total cost of the patent depends on it. Such a total cost would equal the total 
discounted sum of fees ݇ paid at each point in time over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The monopoly period with 
the new technology would depend on such a discounted sum. But it looks complex, if not 
impossible, to solve the model in this case. We consider that the level of patent 
expenditures paid at each point in time increase with the patent length in order to 
simplify the demonstration.    
Patent expenditures also involve public revenues for the Northern government because 
they are paid to a public national patent office. An increase in the patent length leads to 
an increase in the Northern government’s public revenues. 
Assumption 3.3: The Northern firm’s monopoly period ܶ with the new technology 
depends on the patent length i.e. the patent expenditures ݇: ܶ ൌ ܶሺ݇ሻ. ܶ increases with ݇: ܶᇱሺ݇ሻ ൌ ܶሺ݇ሻ ݇Τ ൐ Ͳ.  
Without patent, the Northern firm benefits from a positive monopoly with the new 
technology: ܶሺͲሻ ൐ Ͳ. With the patent, such a monopoly is greater: ܶሺ݇ሻ ൐ ܶሺͲሻǢ ׊݇ ൐ Ͳ. 
Assumption 3.4: The Northern firm is encouraged to file the patent: ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ݇ ൐ ߨො൫ߤכ൯.  
Since the Northern firm pays patent fees at each point in time, it has no reason to file 
the patent, otherwise. The Northern firm selects the optimal level of patent expenditures ݇ by choosing the optimal level of patent length (see Figure 3.1). 
-Figure 3.1- 
The Optimal Patent Length 
 
Source: author. 
The Northern Firm 
selects the optimal level 
of the patent length by 
anticipating the patent 
filing cost for the patent 
office. 
Therefore, the Northern 
firm has to spend the 
(optimal) patent 
expenditures ݇ that offer 
the optimal patent 
length. 
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A share of the economic literature has studied the case in which an optimal patent 
length maximizes the domestic country’s social welfare (Futagami and Iwaisako, 
2007). Here, it only maximizes a discounted sum of profit flows, denoted by ȫ, with 
respect to ݇ by anticipating the previous static results: ௞ஹ଴ ʞሺ݇ሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ݇ቃ ்߬ሺ௞ሻ଴ ൅ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨො൫ߤכ൯߬ஶ்ሺ௞ሻ    (3.3) 
where ݅ denotes an exogenous interest rate that discounts flows. Let us consider that 
both the Northern firm and the Northern government cannot influence the level of such 
an interest rate. Time is denoted by ߬. We use exponentials in order to discount profit 
flows when time is continuous. The integral becomes: ௞ஹ଴ ʞሺ݇ሻ ൌ ൣଵି௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻ൧ቂగෝቀఓכቁି௞ቃା௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻగෝ൫ఓכ൯௜    (3.4) 
The first order condition ȫ௞ ൌ Ͳ involves:18 ൣଵି௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻ൧௜்ᇲሺ௞ሻ௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻ ൅ ݇ ൌ ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯   (3.5) 
Since the Northern firm selects the optimal level of patent expenditures, we have to 
consider that the second order condition is verified: ȫ௞௞ ൌ ݁ି௜்ሺ௞ሻ ቄሾܶᇱᇱሺ݇ሻ െ ݅ܶᇱሺ݇ሻଶሿ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯ቃ െ ʹܶᇱሺ݇ሻቅ ൏ Ͳ  
The Northern firm selects a non-optimal level of ݇, otherwise. The sign of ܶᇱᇱሺ݇ሻ is 
unknown. It seems intuitive to consider a linear relationship between the monopoly 
period ܶ and the patent expenditures ݇ i.e. ܶԢԢ ൌ Ͳ. Nevertheless, we may also consider ܶԢԢ ൏ Ͳ because the Southern firm may benefit from the diffusion of an alternative 
modern technology that is not patented over time. On the other hand, it seems complex 
to consider ܶԢԢ ൐ Ͳ. Hence, we have: ܶԢԢ ൑ Ͳ. In the body of the chapter, we use a general 
form for the function ܶ. But we will use a specific linear function for the welfare analysis. 
We denote by ܭሺ݇ሻ the left side of (3.5). We have: ܭሺ݇ሻ ൌ ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯. Since ܶԢԢ ൑ Ͳ, the 
function ܭ increases with ݇: ܭᇱሺ݇ሻ ൌ ൣଵି௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻ൧ൣ௜்ᇲሺ௞ሻమି்ᇲᇲሺ௞ሻ൧௜்ᇲሺ௞ሻమ௘ష೔೅ሺೖሻ ൅ ʹ ൐ Ͳ   (3.6) 
A simple interpretation of (3.6) stems from rewriting as: ݇ ൌ ߰ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯ቃ with ߲߰ ߲ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯ቃൗ ൐ Ͳ. Hence, ݇ increases with the difference in profit ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െߨො൫ߤכ൯ቃ. In this chapter, the Northern firm’s difference in profit is defined as the 
difference between the Northern firm’s static profit when ߤכ ൌ ߤכ and its static profit 
when ߤכ ൌ ߤכ.  
                                                          
18 Subscripts denote partial derivatives for ȫ௞.  
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The difference in profit equals: ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯ ൌ ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂଶ௔೙ାଶ௔ೞି଼௖ሺఓሻାଶ௖כቀఓכቁାଶ௖כ൫ఓכ൯ିସ௚ାଶ௚כቃଽ     (3.7) 
The maximum patent length is determined by patent legislation because it generally 
equals twenty years. Each year, the patentee firm may decide whether or not to 
maintain the patent in force. The firm has to pay further annual maintenance fees if it 
decides to keep the patent in force (Pakes, 1986). The patent is cancelled, otherwise. 
Since the maximum patent length generally equals twenty years, we should set a 
maximum monopoly period with the new technology as ܶ such as ܶሺ݇ሻ ൏ ܶ.  
Empirically, the patent length often ends before twenty years. In 2012, “the available 
data show that more than half of the applications … remained in force for at least eight 
years after the application data. Approximately 18.5 percent of these patents lasted the 
full 20-year patent term [WIPO, 2013, p. 84].” Patentees have to pay annual 
maintenance fees while the industrial protection effect of the patent decreases over time. 
Furthermore, a patented technology is no longer a “new” technology twenty years later. 
Therefore, we consider that there is always an interior solution ෠݇ such as ܶ൫෠݇൯ ൏ ܶ, in 
order to simplify the demonstration. 
3.3. Policy Instruments Implemented by the Northern Government 
Let us study the impact of policy instruments implemented by the Northern government: 
an import tariff, a production subsidy, a patent subsidy and an import quota.  
Assumption 3.5: Policy instruments are implemented over ሾͲǡλሻ, except for the patent 
subsidy implemented over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The Northern government sets the level of the policy 
instrument at period Ͳ. Such a level remains the same over ሾͲǡλሻ. 
The Northern government may be encouraged to implement policy instruments for 
political reasons. The Northern government tries to implement an instrument that 
increases the Northern country’s national welfare as compared to the initial case in 
Section 3.2. An instrument that increases the consumer surplus is politically desirable. 
We make a welfare analysis in Section 3.5 to ascertain whether or not governments are 
encouraged to implement each policy instrument. The structure of the model is the 
following (see Figure 3.2). 
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-Figure 3.2- 
Structure of the Dynamic Model 
 
Source: author. 
First, the government selects the optimal value of the policy instrument by anticipating 
the equilibrium levels of domestic sales, exports, prices and profits flows of each firm and 
the Northern firm’s patent length. Hence, the Northern government maximizes the 
Northern country’s national welfare  which is given by:  ൌ ȫ ൅  ൅ , where  now 
denotes the Northern discounted consumer surplus, and  the Northern discounted 
public revenues. Second, the Northern firm selects the optimal level of patent 
expenditures ෠݇ at period Ͳ by anticipating each static equilibrium level of domestic sales, 
exports and profit flows. Third, each firm selects the optimal level of domestic sales and 
exports at each point in time.  
We solve the model by starting with the third stage for each instrument. Then, we find 
the optimal level of patent expenditures ෠݇. Finally, we find the optimal level of the public 
policy instrument because we need to know the equilibrium expression for each variable. 
3.3.1. An Import Tariff, a Production Subsidy and a Patent Subsidy 
We have already studied the economic impact of an import tariff and a production 
subsidy on domestic sales, exports, prices and static profits in previous chapters. The 
patent subsidy has no direct impact. The effect is only indirect by impacting the patent 
length.  
Proposition 3.1: The Northern firm’s patent length increases with the implementation 
of an import tariff, a production subsidy and a patent subsidy. Consequently, the 
Northern firm has to increase its patent expenditures ݇. The monopoly period ܶ also 
increases. These policy instruments slow down the new technology diffusion from the 
North to the South.  
Proof: □ Let us study the impact of each policy instrument. We are looking for the 
impact on the import tariff and the production subsidy on the difference in profit. Then, 
we study the impact of the patent subsidy.  
§ The economic impact of the implementation of the Northern government’s import 
tariff is the same as that of an increase in the Southern firm’s unit transport cost ݃כ. 
According to Equation (3.3), we have:  
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ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௧ቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௧൯ቃୢ௧ ൌ ଶቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൐ Ͳ  
The tariff increases the difference in profit. The Northern government’s tariff ݐ 
reduces competition from the Southern firm on the Northern market. The Northern 
firm benefits from a higher market share on its domestic market. The positive impact 
of the drop in ݕ௡ on ߨ increases with ݔ௡: ߲ߨ ߲ݕ௡Τ ൌ െݔ௡ ൏ Ͳ. The domestic sales ݔ௡ are 
higher before the new technology diffusion. The Northern firm increases its patent 
expenditures. 
§ The economic impact of the implementation of the Northern government’s production 
subsidy is the same as that of a drop in the Northern firm’s marginal cost ܿሺߤሻ. We 
have: ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௦ቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௦൯ቃୢ௦ ൌ ଼ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൐ Ͳ  
The difference in profit increases with the production subsidy. The Northern 
government’s production subsidy increases ݇ because the positive effect on its profit 
is higher when the Southern firm uses the old technology (its output is greater). The 
production subsidy leads to further revenues for the Northern firm. Such revenues 
increase with the level of output (ݔ௡ ൅ ݔ௦). The Northern firm increases the patent 
length to benefit from higher market shares and revenues. The subsidy ݏ slows down 
the new technology diffusion. 
§ Finally, let us study the impact of the patent subsidy. The said patent is denoted by ߮. The static profit flows expressions do not change. Unlike a production subsidy, it 
does not directly affect outputs, price and profit flows. But it does reduce the patent 
filing cost. The real cost now equals: ሺͳ െ ߮ሻ݇. The Northern firm’s discounted sum of 
profit flows is now: ௞ஹ଴ ʞሺ݇ǡ ߮ሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ሺͳ െ ߮ሻ݇ቃ ்߬ሺ௞ሻ଴ ൅ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨො൫ߤכ൯߬ஶ்ሺ௞ሻ   
The first order condition leads to:  ܭሺ݇ሻ ൌ గෝቀఓכቁିగෝ൫ఓכ൯ଵିఝ  
Therefore, ݇ decreases with ሺͳ െ ߮ሻ i.e. it increases with the patent subsidy ߮. Such a 
subsidy reduces the Northern firm’s total patent filing cost. The firm benefits from 
further revenues that increase with its expenditures. It explains why the firm is 
encouraged to increase ݇. The monopoly period with the new technology increases 
when the total patent filing cost does not vary. In this sense, a patent subsidy is more 
efficient than a production subsidy to encourage a firm to protect its technological 
advantage. 
These policy instruments implemented by the Northern government always slow down 
the new technology diffusion by increasing the patent length. □ 
The sign of the impact of “at-the-border” policy instruments like an import tariff is the 
same as that of the impact of “behind-the-border” policy instruments like a production 
subsidy. But “behind-the-border” policy instruments seem to be more efficient because 
the impact of the production subsidy is greater. 
The form of inverse demand functions may influence the results. We cannot demonstrate 
that the production subsidy and the import tariff increase the difference in profit by 
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using general forms (see Appendix 3.A). Using any other linear form, the impact is 
always positive. But under nonlinear forms, the results may differ owing to second order 
effects. 
3.3.2. The Specific Case of an Import Quota 
Proposition 3.2: The Northern firm decreases the patent length with the 
implementation of both a relatively binding and a strongly binding quota by the 
Northern government. The Northern government’s quota accelerates the new technology 
diffusion.  
Proof: □ Let us study two cases (see Section 1.3.5 in Chapter 1). 
§ First case: ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൑ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡൫ߤכ൯. The quota is relatively binding because it is only 
binding over ሾܶǡλሻ. The effect of the quota is null over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The Northern firm’s 
profit increases as compared to free trade only after the new technology diffusion. 
Therefore, the difference in profit is lower: ߨො ቀߤכǡ ݍቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכǡ ݍ൯ ൏ ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯. 
§ Second case: ݍ ൏ ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ. The quota is strongly binding because it reduces the level of 
the Southern firm’s exports regardless of its technological endowment. The Northern 
firm’s profit increases as compared to free trade over ሾͲǡλሻ. With the quota, the 
difference in profit equals: ߨො ቀߤכǡ ݍቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכǡ ݍ൯ ൌ ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௫ොೞቀఓכቁା௫ොೞ൫ఓכ൯ቃଷ    
According to Equation (3.3), under free trade, the difference in profit equals:  ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯ ൌ ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௫ො೙ቀఓכቁା௫ො೙൫ఓכ൯ା௫ොೞቀఓכቁା௫ොೞ൫ఓכ൯ቃଷ   
The difference in profit decreases with a very restrictive quota as compared to free 
trade since ቂݔො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൅ ݔො௡൫ߤכ൯ቃ ൐ Ͳ. 
The difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade regardless of the level of the 
quota. Therefore, the Northern firm reduces the patent length. The Northern 
government’s quota accelerates the new technology diffusion. □ 
Comparing the impact of an import quota and that of an import tariff is interesting. The 
effect of the first (second) on the patent length is negative (positive) while both 
instruments reduce competition from the Southern country. With the quota, the 
Northern firm’s profit earned on the Northern market no longer depends on the 
Southern firm’s technological endowment. With the tariff, it still depends on such a 
technological endowment. This is the main difference between the two policy 
instruments and the reason why the Northern firm reduces the patent length. Such a 
result means that Voluntary Exports Restraints (VER) implemented by the Southern 
country may be a way to accelerate the new technology diffusion. 
3.4. First Extension: The Southern Government’s Policy Instruments 
In Chapters 1 and 2, the main issue has been to find ways to enhance competitiveness in 
industrialized countries for policy makers when they face growing competition from low 
-CHAPTER 3- 
97 
 
cost countries. We have focused on the Northern government’s policy instruments. Here, 
the main issue is no longer rich countries’ competitiveness but developing countries’ 
economic development through technology diffusion. Nevertheless, we realize that our 
contribution is limited and should be dramatically improved in future research. We only 
extend the general framework. 
The Southern government may implement policy instruments in order to accelerate the 
new technology diffusion. The structure is the same as that in Figure 3.2. We study the 
impact of the implementation of an import tariff, a production subsidy, an import quota 
and a public R&D investment.  
3.4.1. An Import Tariff and a Production Subsidy 
Proposition 3.3: An import tariff and a production subsidy implemented by the 
Southern government accelerate the new technology diffusion by reducing the patent 
length. When each government implements an import tariff (a production subsidy), the 
Northern firm reduces (increases) the patent length. A tariff war (subsidy war) 
accelerates (slows down) the new technology diffusion. 
Proof: □ We denote by ݐכ the import tariff and ݏכ the production subsidy implemented by 
the Southern government. Let us study the impact of these instruments on the Northern 
firm’s difference in profit. 
§ The economic impact of the Southern government’s tariff is the same as that of an 
increase in the Northern firm’s marginal cost ݃. We have: ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௧כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௧כ൯ቃୢ௧כ ൌ െ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  
The difference in profit decreases with the implementation of the Southern 
government’s import tariff. Now, let us study the case in which each government 
implements an import tariff. We have: ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כ൯ቃୢ௧ ൅ ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כ൯ቃୢ௧כ ൌ െ ଶቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  
Such a result means that a tariff war between the two countries accelerates the new 
technology diffusion since the levels of tariff are the same in the two countries. The 
Southern government’s tariff is a further transport cost for the Northern firm and 
involves a direct cost. The Northern government’s tariff only involves an indirect gain 
for the Northern firm via the drop in competition from the Southern firm on the 
Northern market. 
§ The economic impact of the Southern government’s production subsidy is the same as 
that of a drop in the Southern firm’s marginal cost ܿכሺߤכሻ. We have: ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௦כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௦כ൯ቃୢ௦כ ൌ െ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  
The difference in profit decreases with the Southern government’s production 
subsidy. Let us study the case in which each government implements a production 
subsidy. We have: ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כ൯ቃୢ௦ ൅ ୢቂగෝቀఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כቁିగෝ൫ఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כ൯ቃୢ௦כ ൌ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  
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The difference in profit increases. The reason is that the Northern government’s 
production subsidy involves a direct positive gain for the Northern firm while the 
Southern government’s production subsidy only involves an indirect cost via the 
increase in competition from the Southern firm.  
An import tariff and a production subsidy implemented by the Southern government 
slow down the new technology diffusion because the Northern firm reduces the patent 
length. But a tariff war between the two countries accelerates the new technology 
diffusion while a subsidy war slows it down. □ 
Nevertheless, we cannot prove that these results hold with general forms for inverse 
demand functions (see Appendix 3.A). 
3.4.2. An Import Quota 
Now let us study the impact of the implementation of an import quota by the Southern 
government. We denote by ݍכ such a quota, i.e. the maximum level of the Northern firm’s 
exports.  
Proposition 3.4: An import quota implemented by the Southern government 
accelerates the new technology diffusion because the Northern firm reduces the patent 
length as compared to free trade. The result holds with both a relatively binding and a 
strongly binding quota.  
Proof: □ Let us study the two cases: 
§ First case: ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯ ൑ ݍכ ൏ ݔො௦ ቀߤכቁ. The quota is relatively binding because it only 
reduces the Northern firm’s exports over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The Northern firm’s profit only 
decreases when ߤכ ൌ ߤכ. The difference in profit decreases with a relatively binding 
quota: ߨො ቀߤכǡ ݍכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכǡ ݍכ൯ ൏ ߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכ൯. 
§ Second case: ݍכ ൏ ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯. The quota is strongly binding because it reduces the 
Northern firm’s exports regardless of the Southern firm’s technology endowment. The 
Northern firm’s profit decreases over ሾͲǡλሻ. With the Southern government’s quota, 
the difference in profit equals: ߨො ቀߤכǡ ݍכቁ െ ߨො൫ߤכǡ ݍכ൯ ൌ ቂܿכ ቀߤכቁ െ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ቃ ቈ௫ො೙ቀఓכቁା௫ො೙൫ఓכ൯ଷ ൅ ௤כଶ ቉  
The implementation of the quota reduces the difference in profit as compared to free 
trade since ቂݔො௦ ቀߤכቁ ൅ ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯ቃ ൐ ʹݍכ ͵Τ . 
The difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade regardless of the level of the 
quota. Therefore, the Northern firm reduces the patent length and the patent 
expenditures ݇. The Southern government’s quota accelerates the new technology 
diffusion. Such a result means that a quota war between the two governments would 
involve an increase in the speed of the new technology diffusion as compared to free 
trade. □ 
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The Southern government’s quota reduces the Northern firm’s exports but does not 
change the outcome on the Northern market. We have: ߲ߨ ߲ݍכΤ ൌ ݌௦ െ ܿሺߤሻ െ ݃ െ ݍכ. The 
negative effect of a binding quota increases with the Southern market price. Such a 
market price is higher when the Southern firm uses the old technology. Therefore, the 
Northern firm is encouraged to reduce the patent length. 
3.4.3. A Public R&D Investment 
Finally, let us study the impact of a public R&D investment implemented by the 
Southern government. Under the initial case, the Southern firm does not invest in R&D 
because the cost of such an investment is too high. Southern economies’ R&D 
expenditures are lower than Northern economies’ because skilled labor and modern 
telecommunications are scarce and costly. The Southern government can, however, 
encourage innovations in its domestic country.  
Consider a cost-reducing R&D investment denoted by ݎכ and implemented at period Ͳ. 
We denote by ݒכ the unit R&D cost. We consider that the Southern government directly 
invests in R&D by implementing a public R&D program. The Southern firm benefits 
from another technological endowment owing to such public innovations. In this case, 
the Southern government selects the optimal level of public R&D that maximizes the 
Southern country’s national welfare by anticipating the Northern firm’s patent 
expenditures.  
The Southern firm now benefits from an intermediate technology over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. We cannot 
consider that the Southern firm benefits from the new technology at period Ͳ. The 
dynamic structure would be unnecessary, otherwise. Furthermore, it would be less 
credible because the speed of technology diffusion often depends on rich countries’ 
behaviors. Southern countries’ innovations are too low. These countries generally benefit 
from foreign sources of productivity (Keller, 2004).  
Assumption 3.6: The Southern government implements an R&D investment denoted by ݎכ at period Ͳ that reduces the marginal cost ܿכ over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The Southern firm can use an 
intermediate technology over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The returns of the R&D investment are decreasing: ܿכ ݎכΤ ൏ ͲǢ ଶܿכ ݎכଶΤ ൒ Ͳ. The function of marginal cost is convex.  
We denote by ߤ௥ככ  the intermediate technology that depends on the level of R&D 
investments ݎכ such as: ܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൐ ܿכሾߤ௥ככ ሺݎכሻሿ ൐ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯. Therefore, the Southern firm’s 
marginal cost ܿכሾߤ௥ככ ሺݎכሻሿ is endogenous. When the new technology diffusion occurs, the 
R&D investment no longer influences the Southern firm’s marginal cost. The Southern 
firm’s static profit expression is the same as that in Equation (3.2). But we have ߤכ ൌ ߤ௥ככ ሺݎכሻ over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. According to the impact of ܿכ on each variable, we can easily find 
the impact of ݎכ. The R&D investment increases (reduces) the Southern (Northern) 
firm’s domestic sales, exports and profit flows. It also reduces the market prices. The 
effect on the total supply on each market is positive. Therefore, there is a direct positive 
impact on each country’s consumer surplus.  
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The Northern firm’s discounted sum of profit flows is now: ௞ஹ଴ ʞሺ݇ǡ ݎכሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨොሾߤ௥ככ ሺݎכሻሿ்߬ሺ௞ሻ଴ ൅ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨො൫ߤכ൯߬ஶ்ሺ௞ሻ െ ݇   (3.8) 
The Southern firm’s discounted sum of profit flows increases with the public R&D 
investment. But the Southern firm does not maximize such a discounted sum. The 
Southern government selects the optimal level of R&D that maximizes the Southern 
country’s national welfare.  
Proposition 3.5: The Southern government’s public R&D investment accelerates the 
new technology diffusion because the Northern firm reduces the patent length.  
Proof: □ Differentiating the Northern firm’s first order conditionʞ௞ ൌ Ͳ, we have: ୢ௞ୢ௥כ ൌ െ ʞೖೝכʞೖೖ ൏ Ͳ, with ʞ௞௥כ ൌ ܶᇱሺ݇ሻ݁ି௜்ሺ௞ሻ ଶ൛௫ො೙ൣఓೝככ ሺ௥כሻ൧ା௫ොೞൣఓೝככ ሺ௥כሻ൧ൟଷ ୢ௖כൣఓೝככ ሺ௥כሻ൧ୢ௥כ ൏ Ͳ 
The Northern firm’s patent expenditures decrease with the public R&D investment. The 
two variables are strategic substitutes. The Northern firm reduces its patent 
expenditures. The monopoly period involves a lower gain for the Northern firm because 
the Southern firm uses an intermediate technology. □ 
We did not study the case in which the Southern country’s R&D investment influences 
the date of the new technology diffusion. We could have considered a case in which the 
Southern country implements an R&D program at period Ͳ to discover the new 
technology as soon as possible. The monopoly period with the new technology would 
decrease with such an R&D program. But the effect of the patent would be null because 
the Southern country could discover the new technology by itself. The issue of the model 
would no longer make sense in this case.  
3.5. Welfare Analysis 
Previously, we have studied the impact of policy instruments on the speed of the new 
technology diffusion from the Northern firm to the Southern firm. Now, let us analyze 
the economic impact of each instrument via the effect on profits, consumer surplus, 
public revenues and national welfares. 
3.5.1. General Framework under the Initial Case 
We use a linear function for the monopoly period ܶ: ܶሺ݇ሻ ൌ ߠ ൅ ߱݇. The Northern firm 
selects the optimal level of patent expenditures ෠݇. The equilibrium expressions of 
discounted sum of profit flows are: ȫ෡൫෠݇൯ ൌ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃቂగෝቀఓכቁି௞෠ ቃା௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯గෝ൫ఓכ൯௜ Ǣ ȫ෡כ൫ ෠݇൯ ൌ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃగෝכቀఓכቁା௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯గෝכ൫ఓכ൯௜   
The equilibrium expressions of each country’s consumer surplus are: 
෢൫෠݇൯ ൌ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃቂ௑෠೙ቀఓכቁቃమା௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ൣ௑෠೙൫ఓכ൯൧మଶ௜ Ǣ ෢כ൫෠݇൯ ൌ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃቂ௑෠ೞቀఓכቁቃమା௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ൣ௑෠ೞ൫ఓכ൯൧మଶ௜   
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The Northern government benefits from public revenues from the Northern firm’s patent 
expenditures. The Northern government’s equilibrium discounted public revenues are:  ෢൫෠݇൯ ൌ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃ௞෠௜   
Under the initial case, the national welfares are: ෡ ൌ ȫ෡ ൅ ෢ ൅ ෢Ǣ෡ כ ൌ ȫ෡כ ൅ ෢כ. 
3.5.2. Discussion 
Let us study now the impact of each policy instrument on discounted sums of profit 
flows, consumer surplus and public revenues. Policy instruments may influence public 
revenues.19 Table 3.1 illustrates the economic impact of each policy instrument.  
-Table 3.1- 
Economic Impact of Each Policy Instrument 
Instrument ܶ ʞ ʞכ  כ  כ 
Production Subsidy (North) + + – +/– +/– +/– 0 
Patent Subsidy (North) + + – – – +/– 0 
Import Tariff (North) + + – – – + 0 
Import Quota (North) – + +/– +/– + – 0 
Production Subsidy (South) – – + + + – – 
Import Tariff (South) – – + + – – + 
Import Quota (South) – – + + +/– – 0 
Public R&D (South) – – + + + – – 
Source: author. 
The Northern government’s production subsidy increases (reduces) the Northern 
(Southern) firm’s discounted sum of profit flows by providing further revenues and by 
increasing the monopoly period with the new technology. There is a direct positive 
impact on each consumer surplus by increasing total supplies on each market and 
reducing each market price:  ෠ܺ௡ሺߤכǡ ݏሻ ݏΤ ൌ  ෠ܺ௦ሺߤכǡ ݏሻ ݏΤ ൌ ͳ ͵Τ ൐ ͲǢ ݌Ƹ௡ሺߤכǡ ݏሻ ݏΤ ൌ݌Ƹ௦ሺߤכǡ ݏሻ ݏΤ ൌ െͳ ͵Τ ൏ Ͳ. But the total effect on each discounted consumer surplus is 
unknown because the production subsidy slows down the new technology diffusion. 
Finally, the production subsidy involves further public expenditures for the Northern 
government but it also increases patent expenditures. The total effect on the discounted 
public revenues is unknown.  
The Northern government’s patent subsidy increases (reduces) the Northern (Southern) 
firm’s discounted sum of profit flows. The subsidy does not directly impact price and 
                                                          
19 ෢ ൌ ۖەۖ۔
ۓቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃ௞෠ି௦ቄቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃቂ௫ො೙ቀఓכቁା௫ොೞቀఓכቁቃାൣ௫ො೙൫ఓכ൯ା௫ොೞ൫ఓכ൯൧ቅ௜ ǡ ݏቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ି௜ఝቃ௞෠௜ ǡ ߮ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃ௞෠ା௧ቄቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃ௬ො೙ቀఓכቁା௬ො೙൫ఓכ൯ቅ௜ ǡ ݐ
 
෢ כ ൌ ۖەۖ۔
ۓെݏכ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃቂ௬ො೙ቀఓכቁା௬ොೞቀఓכቁቃାൣ௬ො೙൫ఓכ൯ା௬ොೞ൫ఓכ൯൧௜ ǡ ݏכݐכ ቂଵି௘ష೔೅൫ೖ෡൯ቃ௫ොೞቀఓכቁା௫ොೞ൫ఓכ൯௜ ǡ ݐכെݒݎכǡ ݎכ   
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outputs. But the Southern firm uses the old technology for longer i.e. its marginal cost 
remains ܿכ ቀߤכቁ for longer. Therefore, it reduces each country’s consumer surplus. The 
effect on the Northern country’s public revenues is uncertain because there is a negative 
effect via public expenditures and a positive effect via the increase in patent 
expenditures. 
The Northern government’s import tariff reduces (increases) the Southern (Northern) 
firm’s discounted sum of profit flows due to further transport costs. It also reduces the 
Northern country’s consumer surplus by reducing the total supplies and increasing the 
market price:  ෠ܺ௡ሺߤכǡ ݐሻ ݐΤ ൌ െͳ ͵Τ ൏ ͲǢ ݌Ƹ௡ሺߤכǡ ݐሻ ݐΤ ൌ ͳ ͵Τ ൐ Ͳ. The tariff also reduces 
the Southern country’s consumer surplus by increasing the monopoly period with the 
new technology. Finally, the Northern government’s tariff leads to further public 
revenues for the Northern country.  
The Northern government’s import quota accelerates the new technology diffusion by 
reducing the monopoly period with the new technology. The quota increases the 
Northern firm’s discounted sum of profit flows. The effect on the Southern firm’s 
discounted profit is unknown because it reduces its exports and accelerates the new 
technology diffusion. The effect on the Northern country’s discounted consumer surplus 
is unknown for the same reason. The quota increases the Southern country’s discounted 
consumer surplus by reducing the monopoly period with the new technology. Finally, it 
reduces the Northern government’s public revenues by reducing patent expenditures.  
The Southern government’s production subsidy and import tariff reduce (increase) the 
Northern (Southern) firm’s discounted sum of profit flows. The Southern government’s 
production subsidy (tariff) has an unknown effect on (reduces) each (the Southern) 
country’s consumer surplus and involves further public expenditures (revenues) for the 
Southern government. The Southern government’s tariff increases the Northern 
country’s consumer surplus by reducing the monopoly period. But it reduces the 
Northern government’s public revenues by reducing patent expenditures.  
The Southern government’s import quota accelerates the new technology diffusion by 
reducing the monopoly period. It reduces (increases) the Northern (Southern) firm’s 
discounted sum of profit flows. It increases the Northern country’s discounted consumer 
surplus by accelerating the new technology diffusion. But the effect on the Southern 
country’s consumer surplus is uncertain because it also reduces the Northern firm’s 
exports. 
The Southern government’s public R&D investment increases the Southern firm’s 
discounted sum of profit flows by providing an intermediate technology over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The 
Northern firm’s discounted sum of profit flows decreases as compared to the initial case 
without R&D owing to the rise in the Southern firm’s domestic sales and exports. 
Furthermore, the Northern firm reduces its patent expenditures. The effect on each 
country’s consumer surplus is positive. But it involves further public expenditures for 
the Southern government and reduces the Northern government’s public revenues.  
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3.5.3. Optimal Policy Instruments under Numerical Simulations 
According to the economic impact of each policy instrument, we have to verify whether or 
not governments are encouraged to implement it. Let us study the impact on national 
welfares  and כ. We can also compare each instrument.  
Table 3.2 illustrates the optimal level of each instrument and the effect on national 
welfares as compared to the initial case, when the foreign government does not 
implement policy instruments. The results are obtained under numerical simulations 
because analytical demonstrations seem complex. We consider that the Northern firm’s 
marginal cost is lower (higher) than the Southern firm’s marginal cost when it uses the 
old (new) technology. We set: ܿሺߤሻ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ ͻǢ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ ൌ ͵. When each firm uses the 
new technology, the Southern firm’s marginal cost is lower because it benefits from a 
lower labor cost. Since we consider a linear function for the monopoly period, we set: ߠ ൌ ͷǢ߱ ൌ ͳ. Finally, we consider that the nominal interest rate equals one percent 
because such a value relates to the current low level of interest rates: ݅ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ.  
-Table 3.2- 
Optimal Policy Instruments 
Instrument Optimal Value ȟ ȟכ 
Production Subsidy (North) 23.8612717 22151.2878 -1865.90818 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 43.5021429 -243.482143 
Import Tariff (North) 13.3515851 8917.4674 -13534.7484 
Import Quota (North) 0 7743.50649 -14320.069 
Production Subsidy (South) 18.9035745 -7609.00861 13553.846 
Import Tariff (South) 11.1251021 -11781.9601 6148.17801 
Import Quota (South) 0 -13570.938 4135.66017 
Public R&D (South) 52.2290503 -4394.43969 24000.7106 
Source: author. 
Note: ܽ௡ ൌ ͷͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܿሺߤሻ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ ͻǢ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ߠ ൌ ͷǢ߱ ൌ ͳǢ ݅ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ. For the Southern 
government’s public R&D expenditures, we use a linear marginal cost function: ܿכሾߤ௥ככ ሺݎכሻሿ ൌ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ ൅ߣ ሺͳ ൅ ݎכሻΤ , with ߣ ൌ ͸. The unit cost of the public R&D equals: ݒכ ൌ ͳͲ. 
We conclude that: 
§ The Northern government is encouraged to implement a production subsidy and an 
import tariff because their optimal levels are positive. They increase the Northern 
country’s national welfare. The Northern government’s tariff always reduces the 
Southern country’s national welfare. But the Northern government’s production 
subsidy may increase the Southern country’s national welfare. The potential positive 
effect on the consumer surplus may be stronger than the negative effect on the 
discounted sum of profit flows. Nevertheless, the production subsidy ݏ often reduces 
the Southern country’s national welfare.  
§ The Southern government is also encouraged to implement a production subsidy and 
an import tariff for the same reason. They increase (reduce) the Southern (Northern) 
country’s national welfare. We do not find any case in which the Southern 
government’s production subsidy increases the Northern country’s national welfare.  
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§ The Northern government is encouraged to subsidize its domestic firm’s patent 
expenditures because the optimal patent subsidy is positive. The optimal patent 
subsidy tends towards one under each case.  
§ The Southern government is encouraged to implement a public R&D program 
because the optimal level of public R&D is positive. It increases (reduces) the 
Southern (Northern) country’s national welfare.  
§ Each government is encouraged to implement a prohibitive quota such as the foreign 
firm no longer exports to the domestic market. With a relatively binding import 
quota implemented by the Northern government, the Southern country’s discounted 
national welfare may increase as compared to the initial case. Therefore, the 
Southern government may be encouraged to implement a VER.  
§ The Northern country’s favorite policy instrument is the production subsidy. We 
have: ݏ ظ ݐ ظ ݍ ظ ߮, where ظ denotes the Northern government’s preference. The 
reasons are: (i) the production subsidy is the only policy instrument that can increase 
the Northern discounted profit, the Northern discounted consumer surplus and the 
Northern discounted public revenues (if patent expenditures sharply increase 
compared to the initial case); (ii) it directly increases the Northern firm’s profit via 
further revenues compared to a tariff and a quota that only reduce competition from 
the South; (iii) it may increase the domestic discounted consumer surplus unlike the 
patent subsidy. 
§ The Southern country’s favorite policy instrument is the public R&D investment. We 
have: ݎכ ظ ݏכ ظ ݐכ ظ ݍכ. The public R&D increases the Southern firm’s discounted 
profit by providing an intermediate technology over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. The difference with respect 
to the production subsidy is that the Southern government only incurs the R&D cost 
at period Ͳ.  
The results generally hold when the value of parameters varies (see Appendix 3.B). But 
the Southern government’s favorite policy instrument becomes the production subsidy 
under one case: when the value of ܿכ ቀߤכቁ decreases. In this case, the cost of the 
technological gap is lower for the Southern firm. A production subsidy leads to a higher 
increase in its expected profit.  
3.6. Second Extension: A Licensing Contract 
Consider now the case of a licensing contract i.e. a financial transfer (royalty) from the 
Southern firm to the Northern firm in order to buy the intellectual property right. In this 
case, the Southern firm benefits from the new technology ߤכ at the date of the licensing 
contract. Modeling such a contract is realistic since patent licensing “is quite widespread 
and takes place in almost industries [Filippini, 2005, p. 582].”  
3.6.1. General Framework with the License 
Patent licensing contracts are generally royalties per unit of output produced with the 
patented technology. However, we only consider that royalties are paid at the period of 
the licensing contract in order to simplify the demonstration. Since our structure is a 
duopoly, we consider that maintenance fees with the patent for the Northern firm are 
removed after the licensing contract.  
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The licensing contract is implemented at the date ܮ over ሾͲǡ ܶሻ. Of course, we have: ܮ ൏ ܶሺߠሻ. There is no economic impact, otherwise. The Southern firm benefits from the 
new technology ߤכ over ሾܮǡλሻ. The license involves a financial transfer from the Southern 
firm to the Northern firm. This is the price of licensing. As a consequence, there is a 
further cost for the Southern firm denoted by ߣ. Such a cost depends on the date ܮ. The 
license is costlier when ܮ is lower.  
Assumption 3.7: The Southern firm’s cost of licensing ߣ is a decreasing function of ܮ: ߣ ൌ ߣሺܮሻ, with ߣᇱሺܮሻ ൏ Ͳ.  
The discounted sums of profit flows are the following: ȫሺܮሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛ ቂߨො ቀߤכቁ െ ݇ቃ ߬௅଴ ൅ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨො൫ߤכ൯߬ஶ௅ ൅ ݁ି௜௅ߣሺܮሻ    (3.9) ȫכሺܮሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨො כ ቀߤכቁ ߬௅଴ ൅ ׬ ݁ି௜ఛߨොכ൫ߤכ൯߬ஶ௅ െ ݁ି௜௅ߣሺܮሻ     (3.10) 
Integrating these expressions, we have: ȫሺܮሻ ൌ ൫ଵି௘ష೔ಽ൯ቂగෝቀఓכቁି௞ቃା௘ష೔ಽൣగෝ൫ఓכ൯ା௜ఒሺ௅ሻ൧௜ Ǣ ȫכሺܮሻ ൌ ൫ଵି௘ష೔ಽ൯గෝכቀఓכቁା௘ష೔ಽൣగෝכ൫ఓכ൯ି௜ఒሺ௅ሻ൧௜   (3.11) 
The Southern firm selects the optimal date of the license that maximizes its discounted 
sum of profit flows. The first order condition leads to:  ݅ߣሺܮሻ െ ߣᇱሺܮሻ ൌ ߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨො כ ቀߤכቁ        (3.12) 
We set a function for the cost of licensing: ߣሺܮሻ ൌ ߜ െ ܮ. In this case, the first order 
condition gives:  ܮ෠ ൌ ௜ఋାଵିቂగෝכ൫ఓכ൯ିగෝכቀఓכቁቃ௜          (3.13) 
where ܮ෠ denotes the optimal date of the licensing contract for the Southern firm and ݅ߜ ൅ ͳ ൐ ቂߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁቃ. The second order condition is verified because the second 
derivative is given by:  డమஈడ௅మ ൌ ݅ଶ݁ି௜௅ ቂߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁ െ ݅ሺߜ െ ܮሻ െ ʹቃ ൏ Ͳ.  
The condition is that:  ܮ෠ ൏ ቄ௜ఋାଶିቂగෝכ൫ఓכ൯ିగෝכቀఓכቁቃቅ௜   
Equation (3.13) satisfies such a condition.  
An interpretation of (3.13) stems for rewriting as: ܮ ൌ ߰ ቂߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁቃ. The date of 
licensing depends on the Southern firm’s difference in profit ቂߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁቃ and is a 
decreasing function: ߲߰ ߲ ቂߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁቃൗ ൏ Ͳ. We have: 
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ߨොכ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௔೙ା௔ೞାଶ௖ሺఓሻିଶ௖כቀఓכቁିଶ௖כ൫ఓכ൯ା௚ିଶ௚כቃଽ     (3.14) 
The Northern firm sells its property right only if a profit gain appears. The condition is 
that its discounted sum of profit flows is higher with the license compared to that 
without the license. The Northern firm accepts the licensing contract only if: ȫ൫ܮ෠൯ ൐ȫ൫෠݇൯. The date of the license ܮ must be greater than the threshold ܮ such as ȫ൫ܮ൯ ൌ ȫሺ݇ሻ. 
We have: ܮ ൌ ߜ െ ቄଵି௘ష೔ൣ೅ሺೖሻషಽ൧ቅቂగቀఓכቁି௞ିగ൫ఓכ൯ቃ௜         (3.15) 
Since both sides of (3.15) depends on ܮ, it seems complex to find the value of ܮ. The 
Northern firm sells the intellectual property right at the period ܮ෠ if ܮ෠ ൐ ܮ. The patent is 
maintained in force until ܶሺ݇ሻ, otherwise. We make the assumption that ܮ෠ ൐ ܮ. The 
Southern firm cannot select the optimal date of license, otherwise.  
Assumption 3.8: The licensing contract is implemented: ܮ෠ ൐ ܮ.  
3.6.2. The Impact of Import Tariffs and Production Subsidies 
Proposition 3.6: The implementation of an import tariff and a production subsidy by 
the Northern (Southern) government increases (reduces) the level of ܮ෠ and slows down 
(accelerates) the new technology diffusion as compared to free trade. A tariff (subsidy) 
war slows down (accelerates) the new technology diffusion.  
Proof: □ 
§ First, let us study the impact of tariffs. We focus on the Southern firm’s difference in 
profit that depends on each tariff. We have: ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௧൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௧ቁቃୢ௧ ൌ െ ଼ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௧൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௧ቁቃୢ௧כ ൌ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൐ Ͳ  ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כ൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כቁቃୢ௧ ൅ ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כ൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௧ǡ௧כቁቃୢ௧כ ൌ െ ସቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  
The implementation of the Northern (Southern) government’s import tariff reduces 
(increases) the Southern firm’s difference in profit. The level of ܮ෠ is higher (lower) as 
compared to free trade. It slows down (accelerates) the new technology diffusion as 
compared to free trade. Finally, a tariff war slows down the new technology diffusion 
by reducing the difference in profit and increasing ܮ෠.  
§ Now, let us study the impact of production subsidies. We have: ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௦൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௦ቁቃୢ௦ ൌ െ ଼ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൏ Ͳ  ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௦כ൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௦כቁቃୢ௦כ ൌ ଵ଺ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൐ Ͳ  ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כ൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כቁቃୢ௦ ൅ ୢቂగෝכ൫ఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כ൯ିగෝכቀఓכǡ௦ǡ௦כቁቃୢ௦כ ൌ ଼ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃଽ ൐ Ͳ  
An implementation of a production subsidy by the Northern (Southern) government 
reduces (increases) the Southern firm’s difference in profit and slows down 
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(accelerate) the new technology diffusion by increasing (reducing) the level of ܮ. The 
total impact of both subsidies on the difference in profit is positive. A subsidy war 
accelerates the new technology diffusion.  
The results show that the impact of each policy instrument is the same compared to 
previous sections. But now, a tariff war slows down the new technology diffusion while a 
subsidy war accelerates it. The reason is that the speed of the new technology diffusion 
now depends on the Southern firm’s behavior through the licensing contract. □ 
3.6.3. The impact of Import Quotas 
Proposition 3.7: The implementation of an import quota by the Northern firm always 
slows down the new technology diffusion by increasing the level of ܮ෠. A relatively binding 
quota implemented by the Southern government slows down the new technology 
diffusion. With a strongly binding quota, there is a threshold ݍכ such as the date of the 
licensing contract equals the free trade level. The quota accelerates (slows down) the new 
technology diffusion with a more (less) binding quota.  
Proof: □ 
§ Let us study the impact of an import quota ݍ implemented by the Northern 
government. We consider the two previous cases again: a relatively binding quota 
and a strongly binding quota:  
§ First case: ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൑ ݍ ൏ ݕො௡൫ߤכ൯. The quota is relatively binding. The quota is 
binding only after the new technology diffusion. In this case, the Southern firm’s 
difference in profit ቂߨො כ൫ߤכǡ ݍ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכǡ ݍቁቃ decreases as compared to free trade. The 
Southern firm increases the date of the license ܮ෠.  
§ Second case:  ݍ ൏ ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ. The quota is strongly binding. The Southern firm’s 
profit decreases regardless of the Southern firm’s technological endowment. We 
denote by ߨො௡כ  the Southern firm’s profit on the Northern market. The Southern 
firm’s difference in profit on the Northern market now equals:  ቂߨො௡כ൫ߤכǡ ݍ൯ െ ߨො௡כ ቀߤכǡ ݍቁቃ ൌ ݍ ቂܿכ ቀߤכቁ െ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ቃ  
Under free trade, we have:  ቂߨො௡כ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨො௡כ ቀߤכቁቃ ൌ ଶቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௬ො೙ቀఓכቁା௬ො೙൫ఓכ൯ቃଷ   
We have to compare these expressions. Note that we have: ʹ ቂݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൅ ݕො௡൫ߤכ൯ቃ ͵Τ ൌ ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൅ ቂʹݕො௡൫ߤכ൯ െ ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁቃ ͵Τ ൐ ݍ, because ݕො௡ ቀߤכቁ ൐ ݍ. 
The difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade. The Southern firm 
increases ܮ෠.  
§ Now let us study the impact of an import quota ݍכ implemented by the Southern 
government. We consider two cases again:  
§ First case:ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯ ൑ ݍכ ൏ ݔො௦ ቀߤכቁ. The quota is relatively binding. The quota is 
binding only before the new technology diffusion. In this case, the Southern firm’s 
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difference in profit ቂߨො כ൫ߤכǡ ݍכ൯ െ ߨොכ ቀߤכǡ ݍכቁቃ decreases as compared to free trade. 
The Southern firm increases the date of the license ܮ෠.  
§ Second case: ݍכ ൏ ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯. The quota is strongly binding. We denote by ߨො௦כ the 
Southern firm’s profit on the Southern market. We have: ቂߨො௦כ൫ߤכǡ ݍכ൯ െ ߨො௦כ ቀߤכǡ ݍכቁቃ ൌ ቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௬ොೞቀఓכǡ௤כቁା௬ොೞ൫ఓכǡ௤כ൯ቃଶ   
Under free trade, we have: ቂߨො௦כ൫ߤכ൯ െ ߨො௦כ ቀߤכቁቃ ൌ ଶቂ௖כቀఓכቁି௖כ൫ఓכ൯ቃቂ௬ොೞቀఓכቁା௬ොೞ൫ఓכ൯ቃଷ   
We find the condition such as the difference in profit increases with the quota as 
compared to free trade: ݍכ ൏ ݍכ, with:  ݍכ ൌ ଶ௔ೞି଼௖ሺఓሻା଻௖כቀఓכቁା଻௖כ൫ఓכ൯ଵ଼   
where ݍכ denotes the level of quota such as the Southern firm’s difference in profit 
equals the free trade level. We can easily demonstrate that ݍכ is over ቀͲǡ ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯ቁ. 
The difference in profit decreases as compared to free trade when ݍכ אቀݍכǡ ݔො௦൫ߤכ൯ቁ, levels off when ݍכ ൌ ݍכ, and increases when ݍכ א ൣͲǡ ݍכ൯.  
The impact of each quota is reversed compared to the previous results. Now, the 
Northern government’s quota always slows down the new technology diffusion. Both a 
relatively binding and a strongly binding quota slow down the new technology diffusion. 
Such a result means that a VER implemented by the Southern country no longer 
accelerates the new technology diffusion. The Southern government’s quota either slows 
down or accelerates the new technology diffusion. A strongly binding quota accelerates 
the new technology diffusion only if ݍכ א ൣͲǡ ݍכ൯. □ 
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
The objective of this chapter is to study the impact of policy instruments on technology 
diffusion in a dynamic North-South model. Here, we have explored a case in which the 
Northern firm implements a patent in order to increase the monopoly period with the 
new technology. Then, we have demonstrated that developing countries can accelerate 
technology diffusion by implementing policy instruments. However, developed countries 
can slow it down in exactly the same way, except for an import quota. Now, if developed 
countries aim to help developing countries by accelerating technology diffusion, 
liberalization is one way to do it. In this way, the role of the WTO via a TRIPs agreement 
and trade liberalization is crucial to promote access to technological information for 
developing countries.   
It seems complex to find empirical examples to explain why the Southern government’s 
policy instruments generally reduce the Northern firm’s patent length. Empirically, 
there is a positive correlation between the probability that an innovator maintains a 
patent in force and the return to such a patent (Pakes, 1986). The return is the profit 
gain. Furthermore, policy instruments involve profit-shifting among firms. The Southern 
government’s policy instruments increase (reduce) the Southern (Northern) firm’s profit. 
These previous results hold both theoretically and empirically.  
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A possible example is climate-friendly green technologies (Deutsche Bank Research, 
2010). Innovators from developed countries file patents on green technologies that slow 
down the green technologies diffusion to developing countries. “At the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen, a group of 77 developing countries and 
emerging markets … called for an end to patent protection in general or compulsory 
licensing … for climate-friendly and/or energy-efficient technologies in order to speed up 
the growth-enhancing transfer of technology [Deutsche Bank Research, 2010, p. 1].” 
The report introduces the option that funds should be granted to poor countries in order 
to use green technologies at an earlier date. Such an example relates to the profit-
shifting with the implementation of policy instruments like production subsidies for 
Southern firms. In this case, it accelerates the new technology diffusion. 
An important result is the impact of the Northern government’s quota on the speed of 
the new technology diffusion. Both a relatively binding and a strongly binding quota 
accelerate the diffusion as compared to the initial case while other policy instruments 
slow it down. The result relates to the fact that trade restrictions may reduce the 
incentive to innovate (see Chapters 1 and 2). Such a result means that the Southern 
government could be encouraged to implement Voluntary Export Restraints in order to 
accelerate the new technology diffusion. Furthermore, such a VER may increase the 
Southern country’s discounted national welfare. 
Here, we omit externalities of technology diffusion in developing countries in the welfare 
analysis in order to study a simple case. At points, negative externalities appear. For 
example, there is a cost for unskilled labor. Modern technologies require that firms in 
developing countries hire skilled labor. Another example is the environment. Technology 
diffusion may create pollution in developing countries.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A. General Forms for Inverse Demand Functions 
Using general forms, we consider that the static second order conditions are verified: ߨ௫೔௫೔ ൏ ͲǢ ߨ௬೔௬೔כ ൏ Ͳ. Cross effects are also negative: ߨ௫೔௬೔ ൏ ͲǢ ߨ௬೔௫೔כ ൏ Ͳ. Own effects are 
stronger than cross effects: หߨ௫೔௫೔ห ൐ หߨ௫೔௬೔หǢ หߨ௬೔௬೔כ ห ൐ หߨ௬೔௫೔כ ห. Stability conditions are 
verified on each market: ܦ௜ ൌ ߨ௫೔௫೔ߨ௬೔௬೔כ െ ߨ௫೔௬೔ߨ௬೔௫೔כ ൐ Ͳ. We have: ୢగෝୢ௦ ൌ ௫ො೙గೣ೙ೣ೙గ೤೙೤೙כ஽೙ ൅ ௫ොೞగೣೞೣೞగ೤ೞ೤ೞכ஽ೞ ൐ Ͳ  ୢగෝୢ௦כ ൌ െቀ௫ො೙గೣ೙ೣ೙గೣ೙೤೙஽೙ ൅ ௫ොೞగೣೞೣೞగೣೞ೤ೞ஽ೞ ቁ ൏ Ͳ  ୢగෝୢ௧ ൌ ௫ො೙గೣ೙ೣ೙గೣ೙೤೙஽೙ ൐ Ͳ  ୢగෝୢ௧כ ൌ െ ௫ොೞగೣೞೣೞగ೤ೞ೤ೞכ஽ೞ ൏ Ͳ  
Under linear demand function, the only terms that depend on ߤכ are ݔො௡ and ݔො௦. We have 
already proven that the Northern firm’s domestic sales and exports increase with the 
Southern firm’s marginal cost. The positive (negative) effect of ݏ and ݐ (ݏכ and ݐכ) on ߨ is 
stronger when the Southern firm uses the old technology ߤכ ൌ ߤכ. The production subsidy 
and the tariff implemented by the Northern (Southern) government increase (reduce) the 
difference in profit. But under nonlinear demand function, it is complex to find general 
results because each term depends on ߤכ. In this case, each instrument may increase or 
decrease the difference in profit. Nevertheless, we did not find any nonlinear example in 
which the effects of ݏ and ݐ (ݏכ and ݐכ) are negative (positive). Therefore, the tariff and 
the production subsidy implemented by the Northern (Southern) government generally 
slow down (accelerate) the new technology diffusion. 
3.B. Numerical Simulations for the Welfare Analysis 
-Table 3.3- 
Optimal Policy Instruments When Parameters Vary 
 Policy Instrument Optimal Value ȟ ȟכ οܽ௦ ൌ ͳͲ Production Subsidy (North) 25.290453 24884.446 -960.921509 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 49.995 -249.975 
Import Tariff (North) 13.3506118 8915.48189 -13525.7287 
Import Quota (North) 0 7750 -14332.1429 
Production Subsidy (South) 23.2244619 -11646.5167 20483.7046 
Import Tariff (South) 14.462308 -19603.7866 10395.9037 
Import Quota (South) 0 -22453.3333 7204.16667 
Public R&D (South) 55.8629685 -5709.82651 27921.6878 οܽ௦ ൌ ʹͲ Production Subsidy (North) 26.7194045 27775.5342 57.43592 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 55.1491237 -255.129124 
Import Tariff (North) 13.3496751 8913.69435 -13518.1238 
Import Quota (North) 0 7755.15464 -14340.7316 
Production Subsidy (South) 27.5395673 -16569.5534 28838.1571 
Import Tariff (South) 17.7979499 -29401.5686 15752.6067 
Import Quota (South) 0 -33559.2898 11107.3454 
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Public R&D (South) 59.2784275 -7026.78422 31848.3402 οܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ െ͵ Production Subsidy (North) 23.4323182 21361.5118 -7599.31365 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 40.1986824 -270.581047 
Import Tariff (North) 14.3513642 10303.1016 -17744.2922 
Import Quota (North) 0 7990.2027 -19509.1327 
Production Subsidy (South) 21.3387132 -3420.48458 16973.2693 
Import Tariff (South) 11.1498359 -10306.4705 6165.59765 
Import Quota (South) 0 -11335.8509 5011.71948 
Public R&D (South) 52.2290468 -1914.41015 12323.609 οܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ ͵ Production Subsidy (North) 22.9999 22890.4317 3030.72601 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 46.5578438 -218.415656 
Import Tariff (North) 12.3517705 7631.8282 -9771.01994 
Import Quota (North) 0 7196.5625 -9929.63153 
Production Subsidy (South) 16.6085162 -10631.1635 10554.0823 
Import Tariff (South) 11.1046478 -13253.3932 6133.39921 
Import Quota (South) 0 -16005.9465 3035.19153 
Public R&D (South) 52.2290468 -7374.71702 33975.7796 οܿሺߤሻ ൌ െ͵ Production Subsidy (North) 25.9999 26308.7934 3890.04012 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 49.4332584 -198.856517 
Import Tariff (North) 13.350277 8914.88868 -11737.1933 
Import Quota (North) 0 8336.9382 -12038.3501 
Production Subsidy (South) 18.2693175 -12004.0347 12822.7549 
Import Tariff (South) 12.0842229 -15511.1376 7273.78412 
Import Quota (South) 0 -18640.1043 3766.56477 
Public R&D (South) (a) 50.8817373 -5767.14252 22616.2001 οܿሺߤሻ ൌ ͵ Production Subsidy (North) 21.717602 18349.5976 -6668.62659 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 35.3810769 -304.584923 
Import Tariff (North) 13.3529608 8920.46299 -15340.6992 
Import Quota (North) 0 6922.88462 -16789.2308 
Production Subsidy (South) 20.0074228 -2643.29956 14465.1641 
Import Tariff (South) 10.1990618 -8492.75698 5137.33085 
Import Quota (South) 0 -9301.36752 4207.88462 
Public R&D (South) (a) 53.5497695 -3019.515 25392.0572 ο߱ ൌ െͲǤͷ Production Subsidy (North) 23.8653991 22168.45 -2046.69722 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 87.0042857 -486.964286 
Import Tariff (North) 13.369823 8946.07921 -13637.584 
Import Quota (North) 0 7687.01299 -14240.138 
Production Subsidy (South) 19.431957 -7686.79813 13919.0691 
Import Tariff (South) 11.252551 -11829.756 6247.93573 
Import Quota (South) 0 -13530.7648 4333.82035 
Public R&D (South) 44.1092 -4375.88165 24041.2713 ο߱ ൌ ͳ Production Subsidy (North) 23.8592075 22142.7072 -1775.52426 
Patent Subsidy (North) 0.9999 21.7510714 -121.741071 
Import Tariff (North) 13.3424613 8903.17398 -13483.4004 
Import Quota (North) 0 7771.75325 -14360.0345 
Production Subsidy (South) 18.6602839 -7521.45641 13378.3546 
Import Tariff (South) 11.062265 -11757.7479 6098.89427 
Import Quota (South) 0 -13591.0245 4036.58009 
Public R&D (South) 52.2002932 -4397.77749 23973.0386 
Source: author. 
Note: ܽ௡ ൌ ͷͲǢ ܽ௦ ൌ ͶͲǢ ܿሺߤሻ ൌ ͸Ǣ ܿכ ቀߤכቁ ൌ ͻǢ ܿכ൫ߤכ൯ ൌ ͵Ǣ ݃ ൌ ݃כ ൌ ͳǢ ߠ ൌ ͷǢ߱ ൌ ͳǢ ݅ ൌ ͲǤͳǢ ݒכ ൌ ͳͲǢ ߣ ൌ ͸. (a) 
Since the Southern firm’s marginal cost depends on the public R&D investment, we study the case in which 
the parameter ߣ varies. 
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-CHAPTER 4- 
Technology Diffusion via Patent 
Collaborations: the Case of the European 
Union Integration20 
4.1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest for the study of international patent collaborations as a 
potential measure for technology diffusion in the economic literature. They can be 
defined as patents filed by domestic applicants with co-inventors located in foreign 
countries. The total number of patent collaborations dramatically increased from 24,194 
in 1980 to 137,120 in 2012 (source: OECD).  
The economic literature has already studied the impact of potential determinants of 
patent collaborations (see the review of the economic literature on patent collaborations 
in Chapter 0, at the end of subsection 0.4.3). Therefore, it would be interesting to make 
an original contribution for a specific region of the world, for instance the European 
Union.  
This chapter studies the impact of potential determinants of technology diffusion in an 
empirical framework. The explained variable is patent collaborations between developed 
and emerging countries. The applicant is located in the emerging country while the 
foreign co-inventor is located in the developed country. They have to pay a patent filing 
cost that depends on the patent length. In this case, co-inventors benefit from an 
industrial protection on the market of the country where they filed the patent.  
Several variables may be significant determinants of both the probability and the 
intensity of patent collaborations. First, we run Logit estimations by studying their 
impact on the probability of collaborations. Then, we run both conditional and total 
estimations by studying their impact on the intensity. With conditional estimations, we 
only integrate the cases in which the number of collaborations at least equals one and we 
run both OLS/GLS and Poisson estimations. With total estimations, we integrate all the 
cases and we only run Poisson estimations.  
The example of the European Union (EU) is illustrated here. We use data for Eastern 
and Western European countries over the period 2000-2011. In this chapter, we denote 
countries of the former “Eastern Bloc” as European emerging countries and Western 
European countries as European developed countries. We consider patent collaborations 
between these two groups of countries i.e. the number of patents filed at the European 
Patent Office (EPO) by an inventor located in a European emerging country with a 
foreign co-inventor located in a European developed country. Inventors from non EU 
                                                          
20 This chapter has been published in a LAREFI Working Paper (Berthoumieu, 2015).  
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countries can file patents at the EPO.21 Then, inventors benefit from an industrial 
protection on the European market.  
There is a growing interest in patent collaborations in the European Union (see Figure 
4.1). Technological collaborations represent a way to benefit from foreign sources of 
productivity in Europe, especially for Eastern transition economies.  
-Figure 4.1- 
Evolution of the Number of Patent Collaborations (Priority Date) Filed at the 
European Patent Office by an Inventor from the European Union (with a Co-
Inventor from a Foreign European Country) over 1980-201122 
 
Source: OECD. 
The main issue of this chapter is to study the impact of the European Union integration 
of Eastern European countries on their patent collaborations with Western European 
countries. The European integration is measured by a dummy equal to one when the 
emerging country is a European Union member and zero, otherwise. Here, the European 
integration relates to: (i) a customs union in which trade barriers are removed and 
countries set common external import tariffs; (ii) an internal market with the free 
movements of goods, capital, services and people.  
Picci (2010)  studies the impact of a dummy variable for EU members on the number of 
internationalized patents and generally finds a positive impact, except for one case in 
which the coefficient is significantly negative. Cappelli and Montobbio (2016) also 
find a positive impact of the European Union integration on patent collaborations over 
1981-2000. Nevertheless, the author uses a general structure for 56 countries. He does 
not focus on technological relationships between developed and emerging countries.  
                                                          
21 For example, Russian inventors file patents at the EPO while Russia is not an EU member, 
neither an EPO member.  
22 The priority date is the filing date of the very first application for a specific invention (source: 
EPO, WIPO).  
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In this chapter, we focus on collaborations between European developed and emerging 
countries. Furthermore, we aim to study the impact of transition economies’ European 
integration on both the probability and the intensity of patent collaborations with 
developed countries while the economic literature has essentially focused on the 
intensity. These two points are the main contributions of our chapter.  
Previous studies have analyzed trade agreements as an endogenous variable. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) show that the probability of a free trade agreement between two 
countries is higher: (i) the closer in economic and geographic distance are these 
countries; (ii) the more remote they are from the rest of the world; (iii) when each 
national income increases; (iv) when the difference in terms of labor-capital endowments 
between the two countries is high; (v) when such a difference is low with respect to the 
rest of the world. Here, we focus on the impact of the European Union integration as an 
exogenous variable. We implement tests in order to verify that there is no endogeneity 
problem. 
We also study the impact of gravity equation variables like common borders, geographic 
distance, populations and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Then, we analyze the impact 
of each country’s R&D expenditures and of public expenditures on education. These two 
variables are potential measures of investments in human capital. We also analyze the 
impact of the technological gap and of the technological distance between Eastern and 
Western European countries. We define technological gap as a difference in the level of 
innovations while technological distance is a difference in the structure of innovations. 
Finally, we study the impact of imports, exports and FDI.  
The results illustrate a positive and significant impact of the European integration on 
the intensity of patent collaborations under both conditional and total estimations while 
the impact on the probability of patent collaborations under Logit regressions is not 
significant. The most significant determinant (of both the number and the probability of 
patent collaborations) is emerging countries’ exports to developed countries. However, 
the impact of imports and FDI is not significant.  
Several variables are also positive determinants of the probability and/or the intensity of 
patent collaborations: populations, common borders, emerging countries’ GDP, emerging 
countries’ R&D and emerging countries’ public expenditures in education. Other 
variables may have a negative impact: geographic distance, income inequalities, 
technological gap and technological distance. 
Section 4.2 introduces the general framework of the chapter. Section 4.3 presents the 
database. Section 4.4 presents the results of Logit estimations with the probability of 
patent collaborations as the explained variable. Section 4.5 presents the results of both 
conditional and total estimations with the number of patent collaborations. Section 4.6 
summarizes and discusses the results. Section 4.7 assesses the robustness of the results 
by using the number of years from the European integration to the last year of the 
database instead of a dummy variable. Section 4.8 concludes.  
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4.2. General Framework 
Patent collaborations measure technology diffusion. They are defined as the number of 
patents filed at the EPO by an inventor located in a European emerging country with a 
co-inventor from a European developed country. Using the example of Russia, it is 
possible that the patent applicant does not come from an EU member country. The 
variable ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ denotes the number of patents filed by an inventor from the emerging 
country ݅ with a co-inventor from the developed country ݆ at time ݐ i.e. the number of 
patent collaborations. The main problem is that statistics may integrate simple inventor 
movements.  
Let us study a significant example of patent collaboration. We focus on the European 
Union. Figure 4.2 illustrates the evolution of Polish patent collaborations with three 
European developed countries over 1980-2011. 
-Figure 4.2- 
Poland’s Patent Collaborations (Priority Date) over 1980-2011: Evolution of the 
Number of Patents Filed with German, French and British Co-Inventors 
 
Source: OECD. 
We analyze the evolution of the number of patents filed by Polish inventors with 
German, French and British co-inventors. Poland joined the European Union in 2004. 
The number of patent collaborations with German co-inventors sharply increased from 
2005. Such an example proves that the European integration may have a significant 
impact on patent collaborations. Nevertheless, we cannot draw the same conclusion for 
collaborations with French and British co-inventors. Other variables may impact patent 
collaborations. For example, geographic distance seems to be a significant source because 
Poland and Germany share a common border. 
We attempt to identify potential determinants of international technology diffusion. 
According to previous studies and economic intuitions, the following variables are 
potential determinants. 
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§ The effect of the European integration is the main issue. We aim to determine 
whether or not technology diffusion to Eastern European countries is higher after 
integrating the European Union (EU). The European integration means that 
members have to remove all trade barriers on imports from other members. In this 
way, this is an (imperfect) measure of free trade. We denote by ܧ ௜ܷ௧ a dummy 
variable equal to one if the emerging country ݅ is an EU member and zero, otherwise. 
The economic literature has illustrated a positive impact of such a dummy variable 
(Picci, 2010; Cappelli and Montobbio, 2016). In Chapter 3, we found a positive 
impact of policy instruments implemented by the South on technology diffusion. But 
the structure was completely different. Now, we focus on patent collaborations. 
Therefore, we expect a positive impact of the European integration. 
§ Technology collaborations may be greater when countries share a common border. 
We denote by ܥܤ௜௝ a dummy variable equal to one when countries ݅ and ݆ share a 
common border and to zero, otherwise. According to the economic literature, the 
expected impact is positive (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 
2001).  
§ Geographic distance may also influence technology diffusion via patent collaborations 
for the same reason. We denote by ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝ the geographic distance between countries ݅ 
and ݆. The economic literature illustrates such negative impacts (Maggioni et al., 
2007; Montobbio and Sterzi, 2013). The expected impact is negative.  
§ Patent collaborations may depend on each country’s market size. We can use two 
indicators: population and GDP. We denote by ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ (ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧) country ݅ (݆)’s population 
and ௜ܻ௧ ( ௝ܻ௧) country ݅ (݆)’s GDP. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) study the impact of 
labor force and show that the effect can be either positive or negative. Even if our 
variables are different, their expected impact is also ambiguous. For example, 
innovations may increase with GDP and population. Inventors from developed 
countries may be encouraged to collaborate with foreign inventors. But they may also 
be encouraged to file patents in their own country rather than the emerging country 
owing to a stronger market size. 
§ Income inequalities between the two countries may reduce collaborations. We aim to 
verify whether or not the economic proximity is a significant determinant of 
technology diffusion by using the ratio of GDP per capita ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ  between emerging 
and developed countries, where ݕ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܻ௧ ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧Τ  and ݕ௝௧ ൌ ௝ܻ௧ ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧Τ . We expect an 
increase in collaborations when income inequalities decrease (i.e. when the ratio 
increases).  
§ R&D expenditures may significantly impact technology diffusion because they 
measure innovations. Furthermore, the role of human capital may be prominent 
since R&D expenditures are knowledge investments. We denote by ܴ௜௧ ( ௝ܴ௧) emerging 
(developed) country ݅ (݆)’s R&D expenditures at time ݐ. According to the economic 
literature, R&D investment is a channel for technology diffusion (Eaton and 
Kortum, 1996; Xu, 2000; Griffith, Redding and Van Reneen, 2004; Keller, 
2004). The expected impact is therefore positive. 
§ The effect of technological gap may be a significant determinant. It relates to the 
difference in the level of innovations between the two countries. We analyze the 
impact of the ratio of R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP denoted by ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ , 
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where ݎ௜௧ ൌ ܴ௜௧ ௜ܻ௧Τ  and ݎ௝௧ ൌ ௝ܴ௧ ௝ܻ௧Τ . The technological gap decreases when the ratio 
increases. The reason is that emerging countries’ R&D expenditures are lower than 
developed countries’.23  
§ We analyze the impact of technological distance defined as the difference in the 
structure of innovations. It relates to technological proximity mentioned in the 
economic literature. We denote by ܶܦ௜௝௧ the technological distance between the 
country ݅ and the country ݆ at time ݐ. We use a method close to Jaffe (1988). We use 
the number of patents filed by domestic inventors for the 36 technologies of the 
WIPO database. We calculate the share of the number of patents over the total 
number of patents for each technology. Then, we calculate the sum of the difference 
in shares between the two countries in absolute terms for the 36 technologies at each 
period. Denoting ݇ the index for technologies and ݌ܽݐ the share of patents, we have: ܶܦ௜௝௧ ൌ σ ห݌ܽݐ௜௧௞ െ ݌ܽݐ௝௧௞ห௞ୀଷ଺௞ୀଵ . An increase in such a variable leads to an increase in 
technological distance i.e. a drop in technological proximity. Montobbio and Sterzi 
(2013) prove that technological proximity is positive. Therefore, the expected sign of 
the impact of technological distance is negative. 
§ We also study the impact of public expenditures on education. It represents another 
way to measure investments in human capital with respect to R&D investments.   
§ Finally, technology diffusion may depend on bilateral trade and FDI (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Keller, 
2004). Trade and FDI foster business relationships. Therefore, the effect on 
technological collaborations may be positive. We denote by ௜ܺ௝௧ emerging country ݅’s 
exports to developed country ݆, ܯ௜௝௧ emerging country ݅’s imports from developed 
country ݆, and ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ emerging country ݅’s FDI from developed country ݆. The 
expected impacts of these variables are positive. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the expected impact of each explanatory variable on technology 
diffusion via patent collaborations. 
-Table 4.1- 
Expected Impact of Each Explanatory Variable ܧ ௜ܷ௧ ܥܤ௜௝ ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝ ௜ܻ௧ ௝ܻ௧ ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧ ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧ ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ  ܴ௜௧ 
+ + – +/– +/– +/– +/– + + ௝ܴ௧ ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ  ܶܦ௜௝௧ ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧ ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧ ௜ܺ௝௧ ܯ௜௝௧ ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ 
+ + – + + + + + 
Source: author.   
4.3. Data 
We use panel data with:  
§ 13 emerging countries (index ݅): 
§ 8 EU members since 2004: Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
§ 2 EU members since 2007: Romania, Bulgaria 
                                                          
23 The ratio ݎ݅ݐ ݎ݆ݐΤ  is lower than one for 1042 cases over 1092 in our database.  
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§ 3 non EU members: Russia, Ukraine, Croatia24 
§ 7 European developed countries (index ݆): France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy 
§ Over the period 2000-2011 (index ݐ) 
Table 4.2 illustrates the definition and the source of data. Data are collected from several 
sources: OECD, CEPII, World Bank WDI, WIPO and COMTRADE. Descriptive statistics 
are in Appendix 4A. ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ denotes the number of patent collaborations between ݅ and ݆. Data are collected 
from the OECD database as the number of patent applications at the priority date filed 
by an inventor located in the country ݅ with a foreign co-inventor located in the country ݆. 
The priority date is the filing date of the very first application for a specific invention. 
Therefore, it is interesting to collect the number of applications at this date since there is 
a lag between the real beginning of collaborations and the filing date. From ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧, we 
can define a dummy variable equal to one if ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ and zero, otherwise. ܲ൫ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ൯ 
denotes the probability of patent collaborations. 
-Table 4.2- 
Definition and Source for Each Variable 
Variable Definition Source ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧  Number of patent applications (at the priority date) filed at the EPO by an 
inventor from the emerging country ݅ with a co-inventor from the developed 
country ݆ at time ݐ.  OECD ܧ ௜ܷ௧  Dummy variable equal to one if the emerging country ݅ is a European 
Union member at time ݐ and zero, otherwise. - ܥܤ௜௝  Dummy variable equal to one if the emerging country ݅ shares a common 
border with the developed country ݆ and to zero, otherwise. - ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  Geographic distance between the emerging country ݅’s biggest city and the 
developed country ݆’s, in kilometers. CEPII ௜ܻ௧  Gross Domestic Product of the emerging country ݅ at time ݐ, in USD. World Bank WDI ௝ܻ௧  Gross Domestic Product of the developed country ݆ at time ݐ, in USD. World Bank WDI ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧  Population in the emerging country ݅ at time ݐ, number of residents. World Bank WDI ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧  Population in the developed country ݆ at time ݐ, number of residents. World Bank WDI ܴ௜௧  R&D expenditures of the emerging country ݅ at time ݐ, in USD. World Bank WDI ௝ܴ௧  R&D expenditures of the developed country ݆ at time ݐ, in USD. World Bank WDI ܲܣ ௜ܶ௧௞25 Number of patents filed by an inventor located in the country ݅ at time ݐ for 
the technology ݇.  WIPO ܲܣ ௝ܶ௧௞  Number of patents filed by an inventor located in the country ݆ at time ݐ for 
the technology ݇. WIPO ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧  Public expenditures on education of the emerging country ݅ at time ݐ, in 
USD. 
World Bank WDI ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧  Public expenditures on education of the developed country ݆ at time ݐ, in 
USD. 
World Bank WDI 
௜ܺ௝௧  Exports of goods from the emerging country ݅ to the developed country ݆ at 
time ݐ, in USD. COMTRADE ܯ௜௝௧  Imports of goods of the emerging country ݅ from the developed country ݆ at 
time ݐ, in USD. COMTRADE ܨܦܫ௜௝௧  Foreign Direct Investments stock from the developed country ݆ to the 
emerging country ݅ at time ݐ, in USD. OECD 
Source: author. 
                                                          
24 Croatia is an EU member since 2013. 
25 The share of patents for the technology ݇ is given by: ݌ܽݐ௜௧௞ ൌ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௧௞ ൫σ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௧௞௞ୀଷ଺௞ୀଵ ൯Τ .  
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Table 4.3 illustrates the number of cases in which the emerging country is an EU 
member and those in which patent collaboration occurs, over 1,092 cases. Emerging 
countries are EU members in about 53 percent of the 1,092 cases. Too high a share 
would lead to biased results. Furthermore, patent collaboration occurs in 23 percent of 
the cases when emerging countries are EU members. It only occurs in 20 percent of the 
cases when they are not. Nevertheless, when emerging countries are EU members, 
patent collaboration does not occur in 29 percent of the cases. 
-Table 4.3- 
Data Description for the European Union Integration and the Probability of 
Patent Collaborations 
 Number of Country Pairs Frequency ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ ܧ ௜ܷ௧ ൌ ͳ Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Yes 252 322 574 0.2308 0.2949 0.5256 
No 220 298 518 0.2014 0.2729 0.4744 
Total 472 620 1,092 0.4322 0.5678 1 
Source: author.   
4.4. Probability of Patent Collaborations under Logit Estimations 
We run Logit estimations in which the explained variable is the probability of patent 
collaborations ܲ൫ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ൯. In the regression (A), we estimate the direct impact of 
emerging countries’ European integration. We integrate gravity equations variables in 
the regression (B) by using GDP as the measure of market sizes. We use populations 
instead of GDP in the regression (C). We also estimate the impact of income inequalities 
in the regression (D) by using the ratio of GDP per capita. We study the impact of R&D 
expenditures in the regression (E), the ratio of the share of R&D expenditures in GDP 
and the technological distance in the regression (F), and public expenditures on 
education in the regression (G). Finally, we study the impact of exports, imports and FDI 
in the regression (H). Table 4.4 illustrates the marginal effects for each regression. 
We run Hausman tests for each regression to choose between country fixed effects 
(dummy for each country ݅ and each country ݆) and country pair random effects. We also 
run Fischer tests to estimate whether or not time fixed effects are significant. Finally, we 
test for multi-collinearity by using the method of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) (see 
Appendix 4.B). The correlation matrix confirms the results, at the end of Appendix 4.A.  
Populations and GDP must be integrated separately. The VIF test indicates a multi-
collinearity problem. Correlation coefficients equal 0.8190 for Western European 
countries and 0.9571 for Eastern European countries. GDP is also highly correlated with 
R&D expenditures, public expenditures on education, bilateral trade and FDI. Finally, 
we cannot integrate populations under the regression (G) owing to collinearity with 
public expenditures on education. According to the correlation matrix, correlation 
coefficients are high between R&D and population, and between exports and imports. 
Nevertheless, the results of the VIF tests allow us to study the impact of these variables 
in the same regression.  
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Furthermore, the value of marginal effects may change with the value of explanatory 
variables. We calculate marginal effects for ܧ ௜ܷ௧ ൌ ͳ and for ܧ ௜ܷ௧ ൌ Ͳ. We find that the 
value of marginal effects is the same under both cases compared to “at-means” marginal 
effects.  
-Table 4.4- 
Marginal Effects under Logit Estimations ܲ൫ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ൯  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧   0.3058* 
(0.1695) 
0.0352 
(0.0773) 
0.0371 
(0.0596) 
0.0061 
(0.0590) 
0.0067 
(0.0780) 
0.0401 
(0.0637) 
0.0473 
(0.0792) 
-0.0025 
(0.0795) ܥܤ௜௝   0.1194 
(0.1305) 
0.1198 
(0.1305) 
0.1181 
(0.1292) 
0.1235 
(0.1323) 
0.1169 
(0.1288) 
0.1202 
(0.1301) 
0.1424 
(0.1380)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.4499*** 
(0.1198) 
-0.4405*** 
(0.1190) 
-0.4422*** 
(0.1187) 
-0.4487*** 
(0.1197) 
-0.4336*** 
(0.1164) 
-0.4485*** 
(0.1201) 
-0.1784* 
(0.0995)  ௜ܻ௧   0.3323* 
(0.1830) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.2477 
(0.5021) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.4789 
(0.9877) 
 0.8401 
(1.0900) 
0.4345 
(0.9909) 
 0.9363 
(1.1101)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    2.5116* 
(1.4574) 
 3.2268 
(2.4537) 
2.4665* 
(1.4601) 
 2.9352 
(2.4825) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.2114** 
(0.0879) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.1431 
(0.1113) 
  0.1403 
(0.1185)  ௝ܴ௧      0.1758 
(0.3354) 
  0.0614 
(0.3248) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       -0.0675 
(0.1309) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.1421 
(0.1268) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        0.2095* 
(0.1240) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        -0.1393 
(0.3791) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.1031** 
(0.0440) ܯ௜௝௧         0.0379 
(0.0737)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0348 
(0.0252) 
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0002 0.3888 0.3770 0.3786 0.3888 0.3781 0.3886 0.3976 
Panel Effects (a) Country ݅ RE 
 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test (b) 
Fischer Test (c) 
0.5367 
0.2790 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0374 
0.2754 
0.0000 
0.1280 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0814 
0.2724 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. (a) FE (RE) denotes 
fixed (random) effects. (b) The choice between fixed and random effects depends on the Hausman test. 
Probabilities of random effects are given. (c) Time fixed effects depend on the Fischer test. Probabilities of 
non-significant time fixed effects are given.  
According to the regression (A), the European integration significantly increases the 
probability of patent collaborations between emerging and developed countries without 
taking into account any other explanatory variable. Nevertheless, the results do not hold 
under other regressions. The marginal effects of the EU integration on the probability 
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are no longer significant. The probability of patent collaborations depends on other 
variables.   
There is a significant and negative impact of geographic distance. In spite of modern 
telecommunications, it seems complex to collaborate when co-inventors are 
geographically distant. Nevertheless, the existence of a common border does not 
significantly influence the probability of patent collaboration.  
The levels of GDP and population measure the market size. According to the regression 
(B), the probability of patent collaborations significantly increases with emerging 
countries’ GDP. The effect of developed countries’ GDP is not significant. Developed 
countries’ population significantly increases the probability under two cases while 
emerging countries’ population has no significant impact. According to the regression 
(D), income inequalities significantly reduce the probability of patent collaborations 
because the effect of the ratio of GDP per capita is significant and positive.  
R&D investments do not significantly increase the probability of patent collaborations. 
Technological gap is not a significant determinant because the effect of the ratio ݎ௜ ݎ௝Τ  is 
not significant. The impact of technological distance is not significant either. But the 
impact of emerging countries’ public expenditures on education is positive and 
significant. The role of human capital is significant through education.   
Emerging countries’ exports to developed countries significantly increase the probability 
of patent collaborations while the effects of imports and FDI are not significant. Trade 
flows from emerging to developed countries significantly impact on technology diffusion.  
4.5. Intensity of Patent Collaborations 
We now study the impact of each explanatory variable on the intensity/number of patent 
collaborations. First, we run conditional estimations by considering the number of 
collaborations only when ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ. Then, we run total estimations.  
4.5.1. Conditional Estimations 
Here, the explained variable is the number of patent collaborations in the cases in which 
they occur. As a consequence, the number of observations now equals 620. Table 4.5 
illustrates the results.  
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-Table 4.5- 
Results of Poisson Conditional Estimations  ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳΤ   (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  0.2006** 
(0.0950) 
0.1907 
(0.1217) 
0.2889*** 
(0.0935) 
0.2357*** 
(0.0686) 
0.2024** 
(0.0993) 
0.2881*** 
(0.0939) 
0.1781 
(0.1157) 
0.2037** 
(0.1017) ܥܤ௜௝   0.1083 
(0.0930) 
0.5088** 
(0.2596) 
0.1074 
(0.0928) 
0.1064 
(0.0932) 
0.5412** 
(0.2604) 
0.1089 
(0.0929) 
0.0179 
(0.1026)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.3638*** 
(0.1342) 
-0.2917* 
(0.1767) 
-0.3543*** 
(0.1328) 
-0.3690*** 
(0.1349) 
-0.2917 
(-0.1785) 
-0.3613*** 
(0.1345) 
-0.2068 
(0.1584)  ௜ܻ௧   0.0181 
(0.2015) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.8625 
(0.6719) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.3396*** 
(0.0604) 
 1.8603 
(1.9608) 
0.3431*** 
(0.0628) 
 1.7347 
(1.8851)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    0.5220*** 
(0.0906) 
 0.5873 
(1.8884) 
0.5293*** 
(0.0920) 
 -0.4990 
(1.8423) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.0713 
(0.0749) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.2319 
(0.1653) 
  0.2272 
(0.1778)  ௝ܴ௧      0.7622 
(0.5201) 
  0.7358 
(0.5098) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.0873 
(0.1281) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.0912 
(0.2442) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        -0.0184 
(0.1305) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        0.0451 
(0.4897) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.2195*** 
(0.0553) ܯ௜௝௧         -0.0546 
(0.1257)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0457 
(0.0449) 
Constant -0.1152 
(0.1309) 
-21.2493 
(18.3818) 
-12.912*** 
(1.7130) 
1.6262 
(0.7749) 
-59.4399 
(46.8354) 
-12.989*** 
(1.7337) 
0.8901 
(14.4675) 
-44.7150 
(45.5816) 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0015 0.1780 0.1093 0.1748 0.1788 0.1108 0.1776 0.1826 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE 
 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.6622 
0.8417 
0.0001 
0.0005 
0.2618 
0.9319 
0.0000 
0.9092 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1555 
0.8992 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.0010 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
The number of patent collaborations generally significantly increases with the EU 
integration. Now, integrating other explanatory variables, the impact remains 
significantly positive except for the regression (B).  
The impact of common border is now significantly positive under two cases while its 
impact on the probability is not significant. The impact of geographic distance is 
significantly negative under five cases. But it is no longer significant in regressions (F) 
and (H). Distance is no longer a significant determinant of the intensity of patent 
collaborations with bilateral trade and FDI.  
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The impact of each GDP is not significant. But the effect of each country’s population is 
significantly positive in regressions (B) and (F). The market size is a significant 
determinant of patent collaborations through populations.  
The human capital does not seem to be a significant determinant because the impacts of 
R&D expenditures, technological gap and public expenditures on education are not 
significant. The effect of technological distance is not significant either.  
Finally, there is again a significant and positive impact of emerging countries’ exports 
while the impacts of imports and FDI are not significant. 
We also run conditional OLS/GLS estimations (see Appendix 4.C). The main changes are 
the following. First, with OLS/GLS estimations, the impact of common borders is always 
significantly positive while the effect is only significant under two cases with Poisson 
estimations. Second, we find one case in which developed countries’ population 
significantly reduces the intensity of collaborations. Third, emerging countries’ R&D 
expenditures significantly increase collaborations under one case while the effect is 
never significant under Poisson estimations. The results generally hold, otherwise.  
4.5.2. Total Estimations 
We run Poisson total estimations by using the entire database. We integrate the cases in 
which the number of patent collaborations equals zero. The explained variable is ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧. 
Table 4.6 illustrates the results.  
The number of patent collaborations always increases with the European integration for 
each regression. There is a strong and positive impact of exports as in previous tables. 
Geographic distance still significantly reduces collaborations. The levels of population 
are also significant and positive determinants. We do not find any case in which 
developed countries’ population significantly reduces the number of patent 
collaborations. The impacts of GDP and income inequalities are still not significant. 
Technological gap and technological distance are now negative and significant 
determinants. The impact of the ratio ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ  is positive and significant. Another 
difference with respect to conditional estimations is that common border is no longer a 
significant determinant of the number of patent collaborations. 
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-Table 4.6- 
Results under Poisson Total Estimations ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  0.3099*** 
(0.0791) 
0.2384* 
(0.1256) 
0.3329*** 
(0.0780) 
0.2202* 
(0.1225) 
0.3162*** 
(0.1086) 
0.2887*** 
(0.0804) 
0.2098* 
(0.1204) 
0.3220*** 
(0.1138) ܥܤ௜௝   0.0024 
(0.1093) 
0.4826 
(0.4344) 
0.0018 
(0.1090) 
0.0001 
(0.1093) 
0.5011 
(0.4365) 
0.0016 
(0.1085) 
-0.1648 
(0.1139)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.7765*** 
(0.1204) 
-1.1360*** 
(0.2687) 
-0.7770*** 
(0.1203) 
-0.7768*** 
(0.1204) 
-1.0490*** 
(0.2680) 
-0.7775*** 
(0.1200) 
-0.4597*** 
(0.1489)  ௜ܻ௧   -0.2416 
(0.2385) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.5221 
(0.7763) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.7107*** 
(0.0774) 
 3.2370 
(2.0912) 
0.6843*** 
(0.0796) 
 3.0309 
(1.9616)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    1.0563*** 
(0.1152) 
 -0.8068 
(2.3455) 
1.0496*** 
(0.1158) 
 -2.6456 
(2.2423) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     -0.2940 
(0.2137) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.1922 
(0.1874) 
  0.1376 
(0.1885)  ௝ܴ௧      0.3894 
(0.5692) 
  0.3669 
(0.5522) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.3182** 
(0.1356) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       -0.3046* 
(0.1570) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        -0.2316 
(0.1586) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        0.0320 
(0.5705) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.4005*** 
(0.0657) ܯ௜௝௧         -0.0059 
(0.1276)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0550 
(0.0476) 
Constant 0.7673*** 
(0.2643) 
-2.7972 
(21.7444) 
-21.5217 
(2.3872) 
4.3796*** 
(0.7779) 
-47.2896 
(55.0151) 
-21.3344*** 
(2.4040) 
9.9823 
(16.8031) 
-24.1735 
(51.8154) 
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0158 0.5996 0.4392 0.5997 0.6001 0.4414 0.5997 0.6094 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.5113 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.7452 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.7807 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Source: author.   
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
4.6. Summary and Discussion 
Let us summarize and discuss the results.  
§ The European integration is a significant determinant of technology diffusion via 
patent collaborations. It especially increases the number of patent collaborations. 
The effect on the probability of patent collaborations is not significant by considering 
other explanatory variables. The European integration increases technological 
collaborations as compared to the case in which emerging countries are not European 
members. Such a result means that the technology diffusion (via patent 
collaborations) is greater under free trade and free human movements. Picci (2010) 
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generally finds a positive impact of the European integration on internationalized 
patents. But he also finds a negative and significant impact under one case. Cappelli 
and Montobbio (2016) also find a positive impact of the European integration. The 
results in the empirical economic literature concerning the impact of policy 
instruments on technology diffusion are ambiguous. Some papers show a positive 
impact of free trade. For example, Bustos (2011) explains that the MERCOSUR 
integration has involved technology upgrading in Argentina because firms have been 
encouraged to use new technologies. But other studies mention a positive impact of 
policy instruments (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995; Van Dijk and Szirmai, 2006).  
§ Geographic distance is also a significant determinant by significantly reducing both 
the number and the probability of patent collaborations. In spite of modern 
telecommunications, it seems complex to collaborate when co-inventors are 
geographically distant. Nevertheless, the impact of exports is more significant than 
that of geographic distance. The economic literature also finds a significant negative 
impact. Using an OLS estimation, Maggioni and al. (2007) also study the European 
case and find an elasticity of -1 while our significant elasticities vary over [0.25,0.3] 
(see Appendix 4.C).  
§ Sharing a common border significantly increases the number of patent collaborations 
under conditional estimations even if we integrate the levels of trade and FDI. 
Potential co-inventors can work together more easily when countries share common 
borders. The impact is greater than that of distance in this case. But the effect on the 
probability of patent collaborations is not significant. A common border involves a 
large number of collaborations in Europe but does not influence the probability of 
collaborations. However, the results do not hold under Poisson total estimations. 
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) always find a positive and 
significant effect of the common border under TOBIT estimations. In our study, the 
positive effect is not systematically significant.  
§ Emerging countries’ exports to developed countries are a strong determinant of both 
the number and the probability of patent collaborations while the effects of imports 
and FDI are not significant. These results relate to “learning-by-exporting” because 
exporters need to use modern technologies to be competitive. “A domestic firm might 
through its exporting activity come into contact with foreign technology [Keller, 2010, 
p. 817].” Previous studies demonstrate the existence of a “learning-by-exporting” 
effect (Rhee, Ross-Larson and Pursell, 1984; Bernard and Jensen, 1999). But 
other studies show that the effect is not significant (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 
1998).  
§ Our results illustrate that the role of imports and FDI is not significant while the 
economic literature shows that they are important channels for technology diffusion 
(Coe and Helpman, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Keller, 2004; Keller, 2010). 
Nevertheless, Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) also find a non-significant impact of 
FDI on patent collaborations under Poisson estimations while the effect of trade is 
only significant for two cases over eight.  
§ Emerging countries’ economic growth encourages inventors from developed countries 
to innovate with domestic partners but does not influence the number of 
collaborations. The impact of developed countries’ GDP is never significant.  
-CHAPTER 4- 
127 
 
§ The impact of the level of each population on the probability and the number of 
collaborations is positive. Nevertheless, we find one case in which developed 
countries’ population significantly reduces the number of collaborations under 
OLS/GLS estimations. Inventors from developed countries may be encouraged to file 
patents in their domestic countries instead of emerging countries due to higher 
market sizes. Market sizes are significant determinants of technological 
collaborations, otherwise.   
§ Income inequalities significantly reduce the probability of patent collaborations 
because the impact of the ratio of GDP per capita is significantly positive under the 
Logit estimation. European Union has to reduce income inequalities between 
members to increase technology diffusion. But it does not significantly influence the 
number of collaborations.  
§ Emerging countries’ R&D expenditures only significantly influence the number of 
patent collaborations under OLS/GLS conditional estimations. The impact of 
developed countries’ R&D is not significant. There is a negative and significant 
impact of technological gap on the intensity of collaborations under Poisson total 
estimations. The European Union should promote Eastern European countries’ R&D 
expenditures in order to reduce technological inequalities. Finally, emerging 
countries’ public expenditures on education significantly increase the probability of 
patent collaborations. Therefore, human capital is a significant determinant. But the 
effect on the intensity is not significant. The economic literature also illustrates a 
positive impact of the human capital (Eaton and Korturm, 1996; Xu, 2000). 
§ The impact of technological distance is only significant under the Poisson total 
estimation. It significantly reduces the intensity of the patent collaborations. The 
impact is not significant under other estimations. Montobbio and Sterzi (2013) 
also find cases in which the impact of the technological proximity is not significant.  
In this chapter, emerging countries’ exports to developed countries is the most 
significant determinant of patent collaborations. Therefore, the most significant channel 
for technology diffusion seems to be the level of trade from emerging countries to rich 
countries.  
4.7. Robustness Test: the European Union Integration Length 
Previously, we have studied the impact of the Eastern countries’ European integration 
on the probability and the intensity of patent collaborations with Western European 
countries. The results show that the European integration has a significant and positive 
impact on the intensity of patent collaborations while the impact on the probability is 
not significant.  
Let us study now the impact of the number of years from the EU integration to 2011. We 
call such a number of years as “the European Union integration length.” We denote by ܧܷܮ௜௧ the country ݅’s European integration length. Since the first instance of Eastern 
countries’ European integration was in 2004, we have: ܧܷܮ௜௧ א ሾͲǡͺሿ. We aim to verify 
whether or not the results hold by using such a quantitative variable instead of a 
dummy variable.  
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Appendix 4.D illustrates the results of Logit, OLS/GLS and Poisson estimations. The 
results generally hold with the European integration length. The effect on the 
probability is not significant but the impact on the intensity is still positive and 
significant. Nevertheless, coefficients are lower than those in previous sections. They are 
between 0.03 and 0.12 while they were always greater than 0.2 in previous sections. The 
signs of the impact of the European integration length and the impact of the dummy 
variable are the same. But the impact of the dummy variable is stronger.  
As regard the impact of other explanatory variables, the common border significantly 
reduces the number of patent collaborations under the regression (H) with Poisson total 
estimations. Emerging countries’ public expenditures on education significantly 
increases the intensity of collaborations by using OLS/GLS estimations. The ratio of 
R&D no longer significantly influences the intensity with Poisson total estimations. 
Technological distance significantly increases the intensity of patent collaborations 
under OLS/GLD estimations. The results generally hold, otherwise. 
4.8. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we study the impact of potential determinants of technology diffusion via 
patent collaborations by running econometric estimations with panel data for Eastern 
and Western European countries (91 country pairs, over 2000-2011). First, we study the 
impact on the probability of patent collaborations under Logit estimations. Then, we 
study the impact on the intensity of collaborations under OLS/GLS and Poisson 
conditional estimations, and Poisson total estimations. We analyze the impact of the 
European integration on collaborations. We also integrate other explanatory variables 
like geographic distance, common borders, GDP, populations, income inequalities, 
exports, imports, FDI, R&D expenditures, technological gap, technological distance and 
public expenditures on education.  
The results show that the European integration is not a significant determinant of the 
probability of patent collaborations for emerging countries. But it significantly increases 
the intensity of patent collaborations. Therefore, there is an interest in joining the 
European Union in order to benefit from stronger technology diffusion from other 
European countries. Such an example means that both emerging and rich countries 
should liberalize their economies to enhance technology diffusion. Using the number of 
years from the European integration to 2011 instead of the dummy variable, the results 
generally hold. 
There is also a crucial effect of exports from emerging to developed countries that relates 
to “learning-by-exporting” because exports lead to business relationships. Exporters may 
innovate and collaborate with foreign inventors owing to such relationships. Geographic 
distance and populations are other significant determinants.  
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.A. Descriptive Statistics 
-Table 4.7- 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧  1,092 2.9798 5.8670 0 48 ܧ ௜ܷ௧   1,092 0.4743 0.4996 0 1 ܥܤ௜௝  1,092 0.0879 0.2833 0 1 ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  1,092 1313.118 536.8261 59.6172 2510.88 ௜ܻ௧  1,092 1.53e+10 2.90e+11 5.69e+09 1.90e+12 ௝ܻ௧  1,092 1.51e+12 1.04e+12 1.96e+11 3.75e+12 ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧  1,092 2.28e+07 3.76e+07 1.33e+06 1.47e+08 ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧  1,092 4.28e+07 2.80e+07 8.01e+06 8.25e+07 ܴ௜௧  1,092 1.49e+09 3.20e+09 3.37e+07 2.08e+10 ௝ܴ௧  1,092 3.06e+10 2.57e+10 3.80e+09 1.09e+11 ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ   1,092 0.0869 0.2125 0.0007 1.7827 ܶܦ௜௝௧  1,092 0.7281 0.1804 0.2872 1.4915 ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧  1,092 6.83e+09 1.26e+10 3.04e+08 8.85e+10 ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧  1,092 7.48e+10 5.07e+10 1.10e+10 1.81e+11 ௜ܺ௝௧  1,092 3.26e+09 6.85e+09 1.14e+07 6.12e+10 ܯ௜௝௧  1,092 2.76e+09 5.22e+09 1.88e+07 4.85e+10 ܨܦܫ௜௝௧  1,092 3.10e+09 5.68e+09 618,947.1 3.91e+10 
Source: author. 
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4.B. Multi-Collinearity Tests: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) and Partial 
Correlation Matrix 
-Table 4.8- 
VIF with ࡼ൫ࡼ࡭ࢀ࢏࢐࢚ ൒ ૚൯ 
 (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  1.09 1.13 1.41 1.65 1.14 1.12 1.93 ܥܤ௜௝  1.81 1.85 1.73 1.86 1.85 1.80 1.95  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  2.07 2.19 1.96 2.33 2.44 2.10 3.37  ௜ܻ௧  1.03        ௝ܻ௧  1.25        ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧   1.21  3.54 1.52  4.57  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧   1.19  6.50 1.26  8.06 ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯    1.65      ܴ௜௧     3.16   4.18  ௝ܴ௧     6.89   7.67 ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯      1.05    ܶܦ௜௝௧      1.45    ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧       1.04   ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧       1.30   ௜ܺ௝௧        8.44 ܯ௜௝௧        9.26  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧        3.39 
Source: author.  
Note: We consider that there is a multi-collinearity problem when at least one VIF is greater than ten. These 
tests are implemented after OLS estimations.  
-Table 4.9- 
VIF with ܔܗ܏ࡼ࡭ࢀ࢏࢐࢚ ൫ࡼ࡭ࢀ࢏࢐࢚ ൒ ૚൯Τ  
 (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  1.19 1.14 1.39 1.55 1.15 1.24 1.76 ܥܤ௜௝  1.97 2.03 1.86 2.08 2.08 1.95 2.27  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  2.74 3.16 2.17 3.29 3.37 2.77 4.20  ௜ܻ௧  1.13        ௝ܻ௧  1.40        ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧   1.54  4.01 1.79  4.58  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧   1.45  6.63 1.55  8.51 ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯    1.65      ܴ௜௧     3.03   4.22  ௝ܴ௧     6.55   7.66 ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯      1.05    ܶܦ௜௝௧      1.32    ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧       1.12   ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧       1.46   ௜ܺ௝௧        6.21 ܯ௜௝௧        7.70  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧        3.75 
Source: author.  
Note: We consider that there is a multi-collinearity problem when at least one VIF is greater than ten. These 
tests are implemented after OLS estimations.  
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-Table 4.10- 
VIF with ࡼ࡭ࢀ࢏࢐࢚ 
 (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  1.09 1.13 1.41 1.65 1.13 1.12 1.93 ܥܤ௜௝  1.81 1.85 1.73 1.86 1.85 1.80 1.95  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  2.07 2.19 1.96 2.33 2.44 2.10 3.37  ௜ܻ௧  1.03        ௝ܻ௧  1.25        ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧   1.21  3.54 1.49  4.57  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧   1.19  6.50 1.26  8.06 ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯    1.65      ܴ௜௧     3.16   4.18  ௝ܴ௧     6.89   7.67 ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯      1.07    ܶܦ௜௝௧      1.45    ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧       1.04   ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧       1.30   ௜ܺ௝௧        8.44 ܯ௜௝௧        9.26  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧        3.39 
Source: author.  
Note: We consider that there is a multi-collinearity problem when at least one VIF is greater than ten. These 
tests are implemented after OLS estimations. 
-Table 4.11- 
Partial Correlation Matrix 
 ܧ ௜ܷ௧ ܥܤ௜௝ ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  ௜ܻ௧  ௝ܻ௧  ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧ ܧ ௜ܷ௧  1       ܥܤ௜௝  0.1196 1       ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝  -0.1460 -0.6484 1      ௜ܻ௧  0.0653 0.0664 0.0433 1     ௝ܻ௧  0.1889 -0.0739 0.3259 0.1154 1    ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧  -0.3198 -0.0606 0.2442 0.8190 -0.0031 1   ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧  0.0106 -0.0731 0.3312 0.0066 0.9571 -0.0002 1  ܴ௜௧  0.0911 0.1026 -0.0046 0.9515 0.1162 0.7201 0.0069  ௝ܴ௧  0.2065 -0.0204 0.2775 0.1275 0.9592 -0.0035 0.8957  ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧  0.0882 0.0687 0.0503 0.9869 0.1227 0.7925 0.0071  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧  0.2232 -0.0979 0.3460 0.1372 0.9909 -0.0037 0.9313  ௜ܺ௝௧  0.1846 0.3202 -0.1785 0.7562 0.4007 0.5444 0.3366 ܯ௜௝௧  0.2109 0.3388 -0.2115 0.7301 0.4524 0.4900 0.3749  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧  0.1148 0.2807 -0.3118 0.7080 0.0801 0.4877 -0.0024 
  ܴ௜௧  ௝ܴ௧  ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧  ௜ܺ௝௧ ܯ௜௝௧  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧  ܴ௜௧  1        ௝ܴ௧  0.1295 1       ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧  0.9548 0.1361 1      ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧  0.1390 0.9590 0.1466 1     ௜ܺ௝௧  0.7302 0.4068 0.7350 0.3871 1   ܯ௜௝௧  0.7037 0.4755 0.7187 0.4327 0.9203 1   ܨܦܫ௜௝௧  0.6933 0.1389 0.6773 0.0805 0.7467 0.7442 1 
Source: author.  
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4.C. OLS/GLS Conditional Estimations 
-Table 4.12- 
Results of OLS/GLS Conditional Estimations  ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳΤ   (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧ ௜ܷ௧  0.2141*** 
(0.0746) 
0.2130** 
(0.1077) 
0.2907*** 
(0.0766) 
0.2546*** 
(0.0776) 
0.2168** 
(0.1004) 
0.2892*** 
(0.0771) 
0.2022* 
(0.1050) 
0.2048** 
(0.1022) ܥܤ௜௝   0.4347*** 
(0.1157) 
0.8316*** 
(0.2926) 
0.4327*** 
(0.1140) 
0.4338*** 
(0.1137) 
0.8352*** 
(0.2977) 
0.4347*** 
(0.1149) 
0.3158*** 
(0.1178)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.2723** 
(0.1131) 
-0.1354 
(0.1514) 
-0.2584** 
(0.1093) 
-0.2749** 
(0.1139) 
-0.1397 
(0.1608) 
-0.2705** 
(0.1130) 
-0.0827 
(0.1307)  ௜ܻ௧   0.0319 
(0.2299) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.6042 
(0.6526) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.3193*** 
(0.0555) 
 3.2267* 
(1.7952) 
0.3218*** 
(0.0588) 
 2.8255* 
(1.7174)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    0.4557*** 
(0.0853) 
 -3.8484 
(2.6232) 
0.4570*** 
(0.0900) 
 -4.3647* 
(2.5327) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.0599 
(0.1027) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.3092* 
(0.1678) 
  0.2794 
(0.1797)  ௝ܴ௧      0.4079 
(0.4412) 
  0.4132 
(0.4322) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.0124 
(0.0932) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.0343 
(0.1689) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        -0.0150 
(0.1466) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        0.3604 
(0.5334) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.2252*** 
(0.0493) ܯ௜௝௧         0.0305 
(0.1106)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0032 
(0.0357) 
Constant 0.8728*** 
(0.1199) 
-14.3821 
(18.1564) 
-
11.4498*** 
(1.6147) 
2.0675*** 
(0.6732) 
-4.2005 
(53.4929) 
-11.4599 
(1.6665) 
-7.4255 
(15.3694) 
4.5526 
(51.3941) 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
R-Squared 0.0048 0.5977 0.3499 0.5891 0.6142 0.3505 0.6324 0.6163 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE 
 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.6884 
0.7547 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2618 
0.5949 
0.0000 
0.6462 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1555 
0.5359 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
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4.D. European Integration Length 
-Table 4.13- 
Results of Logit Estimations with the European Integration Length ܲ൫ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳ൯  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧܷܮ௜௧   0.0344 
(0.0315) 
0.0071 
(0.0162) 
-0.0129 
(0.0124) 
-0.0091 
(0.0107) 
-0.0124 
(0.0168) 
-0.0115 
(0.0200) 
0.0130 
(0.0177) 
-0.0165 
(0.0177) ܥܤ௜௝   0.1307 
(0.5679) 
0.1180 
(0.1302) 
0.1183 
(0.1289) 
0.1224 
(0.1321) 
0.1185 
(0.1311) 
0.1198 
(0.1303) 
0.1441 
(0.1380)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.4500*** 
(0.1196) 
-0.4411*** 
(0.1198) 
-0.4420*** 
(0.1189) 
-0.4488*** 
(0.1201) 
-0.4400*** 
(0.1179) 
-0.4487*** 
(0.1198) 
-0.1770* 
(0.0990)  ௜ܻ௧   0.3531* 
(0.1923) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.2516 
(0.5005) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.2986 
(0.9685) 
 1.0858 
(1.1340) 
0.6074 
(1.0773) 
 1.2508 
(1.1575)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    4.0545 
(1.6493) 
 3.1048 
(2.4547) 
2.6651 
(2.4068) 
 2.7717 
(2.4896) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.3039*** 
(0.0977) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.1738 
(0.1166) 
  0.1826 
(0.1261)  ௝ܴ௧      0.1535 
(0.3375) 
  0.0398 
(0.3261) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.0495 
(0.1583) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.1310 
(0.1333) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        0.2451* 
(0.1392) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        -0.1402 
(0.3791) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.1114** 
(0.0450) ܯ௜௝௧         0.0275 
(0.0743)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0332 
(0.0250) 
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0001 0.3888 0.3774 0.3796 0.3892 0.3883 0.3886 0.3981 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.6983 
0.2661 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0037 
0.1088 
0.0000 
0.4965 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0050 
0.0900 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0003 
0.0002 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
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-Table 4.14- 
Results of OLS/GLS Conditional Estimations with the European Union 
Integration Length  ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳΤ   (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧܷܮ௜௧  0.0437*** 
(0.8859) 
0.0878*** 
(0.0253) 
0.0618*** 
(0.0148) 
0.0467*** 
(0.0134) 
0.0557*** 
(0.0199) 
0.0623*** 
(0.0161) 
0.0953*** 
(0.0277) 
0.0544*** 
(0.0208) ܥܤ௜௝   0.4312*** 
(0.1143) 
0.4363*** 
(0.1123) 
0.4357*** 
(0.1129) 
0.4317*** 
(0.1132) 
0.4510*** 
(0.1118) 
0.4305*** 
(0.1139) 
0.3042*** 
(0.1174)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.2678** 
(0.1134) 
-0.2552** 
(0.1106) 
-0.2580** 
(0.1105) 
-0.2692** 
(0.1143) 
-0.2351** 
(0.1105) 
-0.2673** 
(0.1135) 
-0.0725 
(0.1317)  ௜ܻ௧   0.4563 
(0.2865) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.5783 
(0.6473) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    -0.1104 
(1.7038) 
 1.7259 
(1.8985) 
0.0308 
(1.7062) 
 1.4248 
(1.7939)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    -2.1462 
(1.9915) 
 -3.6668 
(2.5959) 
-2.2204 
(2.0188) 
 -4.1429* 
(2.5091) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.0758 
(0.1073) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.2948* 
(0.1688) 
  0.2435 
(0.1805)  ௝ܴ௧      0.4382 
(0.4403) 
  0.4346 
(0.4317) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       -0.0295 
(0.2156) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.2574* 
(0.1558) 
  
          ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        0.3437* 
(0.2035) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        0.3299 
(0.5294) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.2130*** 
(0.0509) ܯ௜௝௧         0.0644 
(0.1135)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0045 
(0.0359) 
Constant 0.8859*** 
(0.1333) 
-24.3033 
(18.3652) 
37.928 
(48.6419) 
2.0938*** 
(0.6696) 
16.7570 
(53.7223) 
36.8692 
(48.7420) 
-16.0277 
(15.5777) 
23.3863 
(51.1759) 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
R-Squared 0.0105 0.6287 0.5905 0.6317 0.6283 0.6314 0.6288 0.6191 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.8376 
0.8455 
0.0041 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.1661 
0.0000 
0.5469 
0.0185 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.1513 
0.0006 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
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-Table 4.15- 
Results of Poisson Conditional Estimations with the European Union 
Integration Length  ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൒ ͳΤ   (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧܷܮ௜௧  0.0373** 
(0.0159) 
0.0774*** 
(0.0280) 
0.0503*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0398*** 
(0.0102) 
0.0511*** 
(0.0181) 
0.0506*** 
(0.0159) 
0.0833*** 
(0.0299) 
0.0526*** 
(0.0193) ܥܤ௜௝   0.1085 
(0.0926) 
0.5167** 
(0.2567) 
0.1134 
(0.0924) 
0.1071 
(0.0929) 
0.5459** 
(0.2572) 
0.1086 
(0.0928) 
0.0082 
(0.1019)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.3584*** 
(0.1348) 
-0.2882* 
(0.1751) 
-0.3531*** 
(0.1339) 
-0.3628*** 
(0.1356) 
-0.3003* 
(0.1771) 
-0.3577*** 
(0.1354) 
-0.1925 
(0.1612)  ௜ܻ௧   0.4072 
(0.2784) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.8209 
(0.6659) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.3305*** 
(0.0594) 
 0.4380 
(2.1080) 
0.3394*** 
(0.0621) 
 0.3557 
(1.9898)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    0.5193*** 
(0.0900) 
 0.7071 
(1.8750) 
0.5305*** 
(0.0914) 
 -2.2710 
(1.8467) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.0675 
(0.0747) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.2479 
(0.1674) 
  0.2139 
(0.1778)  ௝ܴ௧      0.7610 
(0.5178) 
  0.7320 
(0.5063) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.0435 
(0.1275) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       0.1469 
(0.2428) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        0.3051 
(0.2028) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        0.0072 
(0.4871) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.2076*** 
(0.0568) ܯ௜௝௧         -0.0112 
(0.1302)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0464 
(0.0445) 
Constant -0.0965 
(0.1256) 
-29.8856 
(18.6060) 
-
12.7050*** 
(1.6898) 
1.6515** 
(0.7773) 
-38.6948 
(47.1551) 
-12.9350 
(1.8088) 
-6.5609 
(14.8502) 
-26.4481 
(45.3152) 
Observations 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0105 0.1791 0.1104 0.1748 0.1793 0.1118 0.1787 0.1830 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE Country ݅ FE Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.8654 
0.9021 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.8459 
0.7614 
0.0000 
0.7757 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.9131 
0.7421 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0006 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
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-Table 4.16- 
Results of Poisson Total Estimations with the European Union Integration 
Length ܲܣ ௜ܶ௝௧  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) ܧܷܮ௜௧  0.0875*** 
(0.0143) 
0.1176*** 
(0.0293) 
0.0897*** 
(0.0142) 
0.1077*** 
(0.0279) 
0.0924*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0835*** 
(0.0235) 
0.1195*** 
(0.0314) 
0.0990*** 
(0.0215) ܥܤ௜௝   0.0020 
(0.1063) 
0.4942 
(0.4314) 
0.0014 
(0.1061) 
-0.0011 
(0.1063) 
0.4835 
(0.4344) 
0.0018 
(0.1063) 
-0.1827* 
(0.1102)  ܦܫܵ ௜ܶ௝   -0.7761*** 
(0.1213) 
-1.1012*** 
(0.2654) 
-0.7782*** 
(0.1209) 
-0.7765*** 
(0.1207) 
-1.0593*** 
(0.2657) 
-0.7775*** 
(0.1214) 
-0.4325*** 
(0.1525)  ௜ܻ௧   0.3899 
(0.3090) 
       ௝ܻ௧   0.4816 
(0.7645) 
       ܱܲ ௜ܲ௧    0.7110*** 
(0.0768) 
 0.8571 
(2.2309) 
0.6905*** 
(0.0781) 
 0.7361 
(2.0691)  ܱܲ ௝ܲ௧    1.0514*** 
(0.1141) 
 -0.7727 
(2.2420) 
1.0425*** 
(0.1146) 
 -2.1656 
(2.1629) ൫ݕ௜௧ ݕ௝௧Τ ൯     0.2535 
(0.2762) 
     ܴ௜௧      0.2575 
(0.1880) 
  0.1421 
(0.1880)  ௝ܴ௧      0.3561 
(0.5666) 
  0.3322 
(0.5460) ൫ݎ௜௧ ݎ௝௧Τ ൯       0.1318 
(0.1424) 
   ܶܦ௜௝௧       -0.2512** 
(0.1568) 
   ܧܦ ௜ܷ௧        0.2639 
(0.2299) 
  ܧܦ ௝ܷ௧        -0.0261 
(0.5544) 
  ௜ܺ௝௧         0.3670*** 
(0.0679) ܯ௜௝௧         0.0983 
(0.1336)  ܨܦܫ௜௝௧         0.0612 
(0.0470) 
Constant 0.7673*** 
(0.2638) 
-17.4938 
(21.8895) 
-21.6894*** 
(2.3587) 
5.0752*** 
(0.7789) 
-9.9857 
(55.8570) 
-21.4841*** 
(2.3708) 
-1.4240 
(16.9357) 
4.1869 
(51.6949) 
Observations 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0082 0.6022 0.4456 0.6019 0.6023 0.4488 0.6020 0.6115 
Panel Effects Country ݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Pair ݆݅ RE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Country ݅ FE 
Country ݆ FE 
Time FE 
Hausman Test 
Fischer Test 
0.6578 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.7282 
0.0000 
0.0074 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.2197 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
Source: author.  
Note: Robust standard-errors are between parentheses. *݌ ൏ ͲǤͳ, **݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͷ, ***݌ ൏ ͲǤͲͳ. 
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General Conclusion 
In those chapters, we have tried to answer the questions raised at the end of the general 
introduction (Chapter 0). This study does not aim to prove that free trade is better than 
protectionism in terms of innovations and technology diffusion. We cannot provide a 
general conclusion: (i) several forms of protectionist barriers exist and involve different 
economic impacts; (ii) such impacts may depend on parameters and functional forms. 
Nevertheless, our results prove that the implementation of several policy instruments 
(for example, production subsidies) has a positive economic impact. Therefore, 
governments may “play a major role in certain international industries [Spencer and 
Brander, 1983, p. 717].” 
Chapter 1 and 2 illustrate that industrialized countries that face growing competition 
from emerging countries should implement policy instruments in order to increase their 
competitiveness. Innovations measured by R&D expenditures may increase with these 
policy instruments. The implementation of import tariffs, production subsidies, R&D 
subsidies and minimum prices by Northern governments may increase domestic firms’ 
R&D investments. These instruments involve a profit-shifting from Southern firms to 
Northern firms due to governmental supports. Northern firms increase their R&D 
investments in order to increase profit gains. The results hold with both process and 
product R&D.  
The results show the special features of quantitative restrictions. The implementation of 
import quotas has an ambiguous impact on R&D investments. We have defined two 
types of quota: a relatively binding quota and a strongly binding quota. The 
implementation of the former reduces domestic R&D investments. With a strongly 
binding quota, we have determined a threshold such as R&D investments equal free 
trade levels. Therefore, R&D investments increase with a more binding quota as 
compared to free trade, and vice versa with a less binding quota. Such a policy 
instrument may reduce R&D investments. We can explain this result by the nature of 
the quota. Quotas change strategic relationships between competitors (Bhagwati, 1968; 
Krishna, 1989). Southern countries may implement VER in order to reduce Northern 
countries’ R&D expenditures. 
Chapter 3 studies the issue of technology diffusion. Southern countries may benefit from 
competitive advantages owing to lower production costs. But they may face competitive 
disadvantages in terms of technological endowments. Technology diffusion allows 
Southern firms to use modern technologies previously discovered in Northern countries. 
First, we have designed a theoretical model in which a new technology is patented in 
order to slow down technology diffusion. We have analyzed the impact of the 
implementation of policy instruments on the patent length that measures the speed of 
the new technology diffusion. Northern countries’ policy instruments slow down the new 
technology diffusion by increasing the patent length except for an import quota. 
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Finally, Chapter 4 makes an empirical analysis on technology diffusion via an 
econometric estimation. Patent collaborations measure technology diffusion. We have 
focused on collaborations between Eastern Europe and Western European countries over 
2000-2011. We have studied the impact of the European Union integration of Eastern 
countries. The European integration is not a significant determinant of the probability of 
patent collaborations. However, the impact is significant and positive for the intensity 
(number) of patent collaborations. We have also analyzed the impact of other potential 
determinants of patent collaborations like bilateral trade, FDI, geographical and 
technological distances, human capital, market sizes and common borders.  
Last, let us mention a few directions in which we might possibly extend the previous 
studies. All these extensions are interesting and could be studied in future research. 
§ First, it would be interesting to study retaliations since the implementation of a tariff 
in the Northern country may imply retaliatory tariff in the Southern country with 
the potential WTO permission, and the implementation of a production subsidy may 
lead to countervailing duty in the foreign country. We have studied the impact of 
Southern countries’ policy instruments at the end of Chapter 3 as a first extension. 
Nevertheless, it can be dramatically improved. It would be interesting to make a 
welfare analysis by considering that each government implements policy instruments 
at the same time.  
§ We could also design a different theoretical framework. We have focused on a North-
South duopoly. We could model an oligopoly with ܰ firms, design North-North and 
South-South frameworks, or add a third country. Furthermore, we could design 
endogenous growth models.  
§ A third possible extension may consist in the introduction of asymmetrical 
information in Chapters 1 and 2. The Northern government may not know the 
probability of R&D success or the level of marginal cost if the R&D succeeds. Another 
option is that the R&D is similar to an effort undertaken by the firm and the 
government may not be in a position to control this level of effort.  
§ About Chapter 3, the main extension would be the introduction of a licensing 
contract between the North and the South (see the second possible extension). In this 
case, the speed of the new technology diffusion would depend on the date of the 
licensing contract. This section could be improved. Another possible extension would 
be the introduction of trade secrets rather than patents. 
§ About the econometric estimation in Chapter 4, another explained variable could 
measure technology diffusion. For example, FDI in R&D from the North to the South 
are a potential measure. We might also study the impact of policy instruments like 
taxes and subsidies.  
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Policy Instruments, Research and Development, Innovations and Technology Diffusion in a 
North-South Structure 
Abstract: We study the relationship between policy instruments, innovations through Research and 
Development (R&D) and technology diffusion in a North-South structure. First, we analyze the impact 
of the implementation of policy instruments by a Northern country on domestic (process and product) 
R&D expenditures in a theoretical framework. The North faces competition from a low-cost Southern 
country. The results show that policy instruments increase R&D expenditures except for an import 
quota. Then, we focus on the issue of technology diffusion from the North to the South. We design a 
dynamic theoretical model in which the North files a patent to increase the monopoly period with a 
new technology. Previous policy instruments slow down technology diffusion except for an import 
quota again. Nevertheless, retaliations implemented by the South may accelerate it. Finally, we make 
an empirical study through econometric estimations of potential determinants of the technology 
diffusion from the North to the South measured by patent collaborations. We show that the European 
Union integration of Eastern European countries significantly increases the intensity of patent 
collaborations with Western European countries while the effect on the probability of collaboration is 
not significant. 
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Instruments Politiques, Recherche et Développement, Innovations et Diffusion de la Technologie 
dans une Structure Nord-Sud 
Résumé : Nous étudions la relation entre la mise en place d’instruments politiques, des innovations 
via la Recherche et Développement (R&D) et la diffusion de la technologie dans une structure Nord-
Sud. Nous analysons d’abord l’impact de la mise en place d’instruments politiques d’un pays du Nord 
sur l’investissement en R&D domestique (de procédé puis de produit) dans un cadre théorique. Le 
Nord fait face à la concurrence venant d’un pays du sud à faibles coûts de production. Les résultats 
montrent que ces instruments stimulent les dépenses en R&D mis à part avec un quota sur 
importations. Nous nous concentrons ensuite sur la question de la diffusion de la technologie du Nord 
vers le Sud. Nous utilisons un modèle dynamique théorique dans lequel le Nord publie un brevet pour 
augmenter la durée de monopole concernant l’utilisation d’une nouvelle technologie. Les instruments 
politiques précédents ralentissent la diffusion technologique mis à part le quota, une nouvelle fois. 
Néanmoins, des représailles mises en place par le Sud peuvent l’accélérer. Enfin, nous réalisons une 
étude empirique à l’aide d’estimations économétriques au niveau des déterminants potentiels de la 
diffusion de la technologie entre le Nord et le Sud, mesurée par les collaborations de brevet. Nous 
montrons que l’intégration à l’Union Européenne des pays d’Europe de l’Est augmente 
significativement l’intensité des collaborations avec les pays d’Europe de l’Ouest alors que l’effet sur 
la probabilité de collaboration n’est pas significatif.  
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Collaborations de Brevet 
